Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
Last updated
Last updated
As mentioned above, productivity, indebtedness and luck (e.g., whether one has wars or natural resources) explain differences in countries’ relative performance. This part looks at how different countries’ shares of the world economy have changed and why the drivers discussed above caused these changes to occur, with a particular emphasis on the period since 1820. As I explain below, the rises and declines in countries’ shares of the world economy occur as a result of very long-term cycles that are not apparent to observers who look at economic conditions from a close-up perspective.
如上所述，生产力，负债和运气（例如，是否有战争或自然资源）解释了国家相对绩效的差异。这部分考察了不同国家在世界经济中的份额如何变化，为什么上述讨论的驱动因素引起了这些变化的发生，特别强调了自1820年以来的这个时期。正如我在下面解释的那样，国家份额的上涨和下降世界经济的发展是由于长期的周期，对于从特写角度看待经济条件的观察者来说，这并不明显。
To begin, let’s look at how the world economic pie has been divided up over time and why it has changed. The table below shows the shares of world GDP by major countries and/or regions at various points in time going back to 1500. Scan that table to see how these shares have evolved over time. Note how China and India were the largest economies from 1500 through 1820, how the United States was nothing and how what people now call the emerging world was much bigger than what they now call the developed world.
首先，让我们来看看世界经济派如何随着时间的流逝而分裂，为什么会发生变化。下表显示了主要国家和/或地区在不同时间点回到1500年的世界GDP份额。扫描该表以了解这些股票随时间发展。请注意中国和印度是1500年至1820年间最大的经济体，美国如何，没有什么，现在人们称之为新兴世界，远比现在所说的发达世界大得多。
Though the table goes back to 1500—i.e., to eight years after Columbus “discovered America”—we won’t track the changes since then, but we will track them back to 1820. As shown:
虽然表可以追溯到1500年 - 即哥伦布“发现美国”八年后，我们将不会跟踪自那以后的变化，但我们将追溯到1820年。如图所示：
In 1820 China and India were the biggest economic powers. Their shares declined as they became decadent387 and overly indebted. As a result they were overtaken, both economically and militarily, by the emerging British Empire in the late 19th and early 20th century. 1820年中国和印度是最大的经济大国。他们的股票下跌，因为他们变得颓废387和过度负债。因此，他们是在19 世纪末和20 世纪初超越，在经济上和军事上，通过新兴的大英帝国。
From the second half of the 19th century until the early 20th century, England and other Western European countries emerged to become the world’s dominant powers and the United States moved from being an undeveloped country to an emerging country. The emergence of the British Empire and other European powers to dominance was fueled by two big waves of productivity growth called the Industrial Revolution. 从19 世纪下半叶，直到20 世纪初，英国和其他西欧国家出现，成为世界上占主导地位的大国和美国从作为一个不发达的国家，以新兴国家转移。英国的出现帝国和其他欧洲的统治力量被称为工业革命的两大生产率增长带动。
During the years from 1914-45 the British Empire gained relative to other Western European countries and lost relative to the emerging American Empire. This was largely the result of 1) European countries’ rivalries leading them to two costly wars that left them indebted and crippled, and 2) the increasing “decadence” of the wealthy European powers. Because the British won these wars they benefited in relation to their European rivals (especially Germany); however, they became overly indebted and suffered economically relative to the United States because of them. At the same time the United States was an emerging power largely as the result of its great productivity gains. 在1914 - 45年间，大英帝国相对于其他西欧国家而言，相对于新兴的美国帝国而言，已经有所减损 。这主要是因为1）欧洲国家的竞争导致他们进行两次昂贵的战争，使他们感到沮丧和瘫痪，以及2）富裕的欧洲大国越来越“颓废”。因为英国人赢得了这些战争，他们受益于他们的欧洲对手（特别是德国）;然而，由于这些原因，他们相对于美国而言过度负债并遭受经济损失。与此同时，美国是一个新兴大国，主要是由于其生产力的巨大增长。
In the mid-20th century the United States emerged to become the world’s dominant economic power and the British Empire crumbled. That was primarily the result of World War II because the economic and other setbacks of the war were greatest in England, Western Europe, Japan, China, India, and other emerging countries. 中期，20 世纪美国的出现，成为世界主导经济力量和崩溃的大英帝国 。这主要是第二次世界大战的结果，因为在英国，西欧，日本，中国，印度等新兴国家战争的经济和其他挫折是最大的。
From the mid-20th century (i.e., the immediate post-World War II period of 1945-55) until the beginning of the new millennium (2000-2010) the United States remained the dominant power, though its share declined steadily as other countries reemerged. From 1950 to 1970 the reemergence of Japan and Germany occurred as they recovered from the war setbacks. In the 1970-80 period, relative growth became strongest in what then became known as “emerging countries”— Latin America (due to the 1970s commodity boom) and the “Asian 4 Tigers” (as they entered the world markets as competitive producers and exporters). Then in the 1980-present period, great productivity gains in China (as a result of its “open-door” and “market-oriented” policies) and India (as a result of reductions in its bureaucracy and its opening up) allowed them to reemerge. At the same time the United States became overly indebted as a result of its “decadence” and its declining competitiveness. 从中期的20 世纪 （即，1945年至1955年的后立即第二次世界大战期间），直到新千年的开始（2000- 2010年），美国仍然是主导力量，但其份额稳步下降为其他国家重新出现 。从1950年到1970年，日本和德国的复兴发生在战争挫折中恢复过来。在1970 - 1980年间，相对增长在被称为“新兴国家” - 拉丁美洲（由于1970年代商品繁荣）和“亚洲虎”（相当于竞争对手的生产者进入世界市场）出口）。那么在1980年至今，中国的生产率大幅提升（由于其“开门”和“市场化”政策）和印度（由于官僚作风和开放程度的下降）使得他们重新出现与此同时，由于“颓废”及其竞争力下降，美国过度负债沉重。
Now about half of world GDP is produced in what people now call the “developed world” (US, Europe, Japan, UK, Canada and Australia) with about equal amounts being produced in the US and Europe, and about half of world GDP is produced in what people now call “emerging countries” with about half of that being produced in China and India. 现在世界GDP的大约一半产生于人们所谓的“发达世界”（美国，欧洲，日本，英国，加拿大和澳大利亚），在美国和欧洲生产的产量大约相当于世界GDP的一半是在人们所谓的“新兴国家”中产生的，其中约一半在中国和印度生产 。
For reasons explained previously, I believe that in another 15-20 years emerging countries will produce about 70% of global GDP, China will produce about 25%, and India will produce about 12%, as they did in the mid-19th century. 对于原因如前所述，我认为，在15-20年新兴国家将产生全球GDP的70％左右，中国将产生约25％，而印度将产生约12％，因为他们在次月中旬，19做世纪
While in the past civilizations rose and declined over several hundred years, more recently (over the last couple of hundred years), these cycles have taken 100-150 years. That means to observe a few cycles you’d have to go back a few hundred years. However, that’s beyond the scope of this exercise, so I will start in 1900. The chart below shows the US share of world GDP going back to 1900. It shows how World War II catapulted the US relative share to an abnormally high level as the result of a number of the other major countries (e.g., Europe, Japan, China and Russia) being set back by the war and the gradual adjustment back to more normal levels. In addition to the war effects benefiting the relative position of the US, inefficient economic systems and/or political bureaucracies in some countries (China, Russia and India) caused these countries’ recoveries to be slower than normal until recent years.
而过去几百年来，文明上升和下降，最近（过去几百年），这些周期已经花了100-150年。这意味着要观察几个周期，你必须回到几百年。然而，这超出了这个练习的范围，所以我将从1900年开始。下面的图表显示了美国在世界GDP中的份额可以追溯到1900年。它显示了第二次世界大战如何将美国的相对份额提升到异常高的水平，其他一些主要国家（如欧洲，日本，中国和俄罗斯）在战争中被淘汰，逐步调整回到正常水平的结果。除了有利于美国的相对立场，一些国家（中国，俄罗斯和印度）的经济体系和/或政治官僚主义的战争影响之外，这些国家的复苏速度比近年来还要慢。
The next chart shows the “emerging countries” share of world GDP going back to 1900 along with China’s piece of it. As shown below, while emerging countries as a whole increased their share of the world economy starting in 1950, it was not until 1980 that China’s share started to increase.
下图显示了“新兴国家”占世界GDP的比例可追溯到1900年以及中国的一半。如下图所示，从1950年开始，新兴国家整体增加了世界经济份额，直到1980年，中国的份额才开始增加。
As mentioned, over the last couple of hundred years these changes have been due to a) productivity growth, b) debt cycles, and c) other shocks and distortions (e.g., wars, the good or bad luck of having natural resources, political shifts, etc.). 如上所述，在过去的几百年中，这些变化是由于a）生产率增长，b）债务周期，c）其他冲击和扭曲（例如战争，自然资源的好运或坏运，政治转移等）。
Over the very long run one gets to spend what one earns, which is a function of one’s productivity. For a country as a whole, the earnings will equal a) the number of workers, times b) the number of hours worked, times c) the output per hour worked. In order to be more productive, you have to work either harder or smarter. Over the shorter run, one can spend an amount that is different than the amount one earns because of borrowing and lending. Human nature (i.e., culture) plays a big role determining people’s productivity and indebtedness. Over long time frames the drive for higher living standards motivates people to implement changes to get around their impediments, which goes on until people’s earnings gravitate toward their potential/equilibrium levels and levels of productivity and indebtedness change in ways that shift income growth. I examined the cause-effect linkages f productivity and indebtedness previously, but here I will lay out the concepts and walk you through the logic of how shifts in productivity and indebtedness lead to big cycles in which countries prosper and which ones don’t.
从长远来看，人们可以花费一笔挣的钱，这是一个人的生产力的功能。对于整个国家而言，收入将等于a）工人数，次数b）工作时数，次数c）每小时工作产量。为了提高工作效率，您必须更加努力或更智能地工作。在较短的时间内，可以花费与借款和贷款所赚取的金额不同的金额。人性（即文化）在决定人们生产力和负债方面起着重要的作用。长期以来，提高生活水平的驱动力促使人们实施变革，摆脱困境，直到人们的收入向他们的潜力/均衡水平和生产力水平和负债水平转变为转移收入增长的方式发生变化。我研究了因果关系以前的生产力和负债，但在这里，我将阐述这些概念，并引导你们了解生产力和债务转变如何导致国家繁荣的大循环，哪些国家不会。
All else being equal, per capita incomes of countries will tend to converge because, in a competitive world, buyers of goods, services and labor shift their demands away from those who are expensive to those who offer better value, which creates a labor rate arbitrage. But all things are not equal. Differences and barriers often exist that justify income differences. Based on our research, the most important of these differences that account for most income gaps are in culture, education, economic and political systems, savings and investment rates, indebtedness, and remoteness of location.388 Also, trade and capital control barriers can stand in the way of economic competition that brings about income conversion. If these economic barriers are temporary in nature (e.g., war damage) the forces behind this labor rate arbitrage will get rid of them (e.g., there will be rebuilding). If the impediments are more permanent in nature (e.g., culture, remoteness of location, etc.), the forces behind the arbitrage won’t be able to overcome them, even over very long periods. Additionally, long-term debt cycles play a big role in driving these cycles. When debt levels are low relative to income levels and are rising, the upward cycle is self-reinforcing until debt levels become too high for this to continue, when the reverse occurs.
一切平等，国家的人均收入将趋于趋同，因为在竞争激烈的世界中，商品，服务和劳动者的买主将他们的需求从那些价格更高的人那里转移出来，从而创造出劳动力套利。但一切都不平等 。通常存在差异和障碍，证明收入差异是正当的。根据我们的研究，最重要的这些差异占到大多数收入差距的是文化，教育，经济和政治制度，储蓄和投资率，负债和位置偏远另外，贸易和资本管制的障碍也可能阻碍带来收入转换的经济竞争。如果这些经济壁垒本质上是暂时性的（例如战争破坏），这种劳动力套利背后的力量就会摆脱（例如重建）。如果这些障碍在本质上更具永久性（如文化，地点偏远等），套利背后的力量即使在很长一段时间内也无法克服。此外，长期债务周期在推动这些周期方面发挥重要作用。当债务水平相对于收入水平较低并且正在上升时，上升周期是自强的，直到债务水平过高才能继续下去。
For these reasons, when I see big differences in income and indebtedness, I ask myself whether the impediments are temporary or more permanent in nature—e.g., are there good reasons that an average Chinese earns 1/10th as much as an average American?—and I imagine the changes that will have to occur to bring this labor rate convergence about (e.g., building infrastructure, changing laws, bringing in capital, etc.), and I try to visualize the ripple effects of these changes (e.g., buying more commodities, creating more pollution) and the likelihood of these things happening. I believe that’s where the big investment opportunities of the century lie.
由于这些原因，当我看到在收入和债务很大的差异，我问自己是否障碍是临时或更持久的性质，例如，是否有充分的理由，一个普通的中国人一样多的收入1/10作为一个普通的美国人？ - 我想象，要实现这一劳动价格趋同的变化（例如，建设基础设施，法律不断变化，引入资本等），我试图想象这些变化的波动效应（例如，购买更多的商品，造成更多的污染）和这些事情发生的可能性。我相信这是世纪的巨大投资机会所在。
Not all important changes are due to economic influences because not all competition is economic. For example, throughout history war has frequently been an important means of competing and, when wars happen, they typically impede the labor rate arbitrage.
并不是所有重要的变化都是由于经济影响而不是所有的竞争都是经济的。例如，在整个历史上，战争经常是一个重要的竞争手段，当战争发生时，通常会阻碍劳动力套利。
Since the previously shown table and charts are based on both the number of people in the country and their average incomes, and average incomes are more relevant in seeing how countries compete, let’s look at their relative incomes. The chart below shows per capita GDPs as a percent of the highest per capita GDP since 1900. As shown:
由于以前显示的表格和图表都是以全国人口和平均收入为基础的，平均收入在看待国家竞争方面更为重要，我们来看看他们的相对收入。下图显示了自1900年以来，人均国内生产总值占人均国内生产总值的百分比。如图所示：
Until the end of World War II, the UK had the highest per capita income. It was then replaced by the US. This shift represented the end of the British Empire and the emergence of the American Empire. I will examine this later. 直到二战结束，英国 人均收入最高。然后被美国所取代。这种转变代表了大英帝国的结束和美帝国的出现。稍后我会再考察一下。
Prior to World War II, developed countries other than Japan typically had incomes that were about 70% of the top income country. For reasons explained later, the country with the greatest total income has also typically been the reserve currency country and has derived income benefit from being in this position; this accounts for a significant part of the gap between the top income earning country (the UK prior to the mid-20th century and the US after then) and the other developed countries. Note how the shock of World War II sent other developed countries’ incomes down to only 40% of the top earner (the US) and how, in the 25 years that followed World War II, average incomes in these countries normalized to 70%- 80% of the top earning country. 二战前，除日本以外的发达国家 通常收入约占最高收入国家的70％。由于后来解释的原因，总收入最高的国家通常也是储备货币国家，并从收入中获利;这占的顶部创收国家之间的差距显著部分（英国前中期，20 世纪再经过美国）和其他发达国家。请注意，第二次世界大战的震惊使其他发达国家的收入下降到最高收入国家（美国）的40％，而在二战以来的25年中，这些国家的平均收入达到70％ 80％的高收入国家。
Prior to World War II, the average income in Japan ranged around 25%-35% of the top earner. Then the shock of World War II brought it down to around 15%. After the war it recovered to about 90% of the top (US) in 1990 (at its bubble’s peak). Since then, it has slipped back to about 75% of the top, which is also where the UK and other European countries’ average incomes are. The long-term shift from an average income of 25%-35% of the top earner to about 75% now has largely been due to Japan opening up to the world economy so that it could compete in it. 二战之前 ，日本的平均收入 约占25％-35％。那么第二次世界大战的震惊把它降到了15％左右。战后，它在1990年（泡沫高峰期）恢复到了顶级（美国）的90％左右。从那时起，它已经回落到顶部的75％左右，这也是英国和其他欧洲国家平均收入的地方。从目前的平均收入的25％-35％到现在的大约75％的长期转变，主要是由于日本向世界经济开放，以便能够竞争。
Other emerging countries have had their average incomes vary between about 25% and 35% of the top since 1900. I believe that this is because of some fairly long-lasting structural impediments that vary by country and that would require too great of a digression to explain here. 其他新兴国家 自1900年以来，他们的平均收入差距在25％至35％之间。我认为这是因为一些相当长期的结构性障碍因国家而异，并且需要大量的解释来解释这一点。
Per capita incomes in China have ranged from 2% to 18% of the top earner over the last 110 years and are now growing at a pace that is comparable with Japan’s pace in 1950-70 for essentially the same reasons. Because of the remoteness of a large segment of the population, I don’t expect per capita incomes in China to reach developed country levels for the foreseeable future; however, I expect income growth rates to remain strong and reach developed country levels for hundreds of millions of Chinese in another 25 years. Per capita incomes in Russia have ranged from 16% to 42% of the top earner over the last 110 years and have increased from 17% to 30% over the last 10 years. 中国人均收入 在过去的110年中，这一比例已经达到了顶级收入的2％至18％，并且基本相同的原因现在正在以与日本在1950 - 1970年的速度相当的速度增长。由于大部分人口偏远，我预计中国的人均收入在可预见的将来将达到发达国家水平;然而，我预计收入增长率将保持强劲，并在另外25年内达到数亿中国人的发达国家水平。人均收入在俄罗斯 在过去十多年中，这一比例已经达到顶级收入的16％至42％，并在过去10年中从17％上升到30％。
While productivity and indebtedness can be said to be the drivers, it is primarily people’s choices that determine their levels of productivity and indebtedness, so psychology is of prominent importance. It is psychology that drives people’s desires to work, borrow, consume, and go to war. Since different experiences lead to different psychological biases that lead to different experiences, etc., certain common cause-effect linkages drive the typical cycle. While I will describe what I believe is the typical cycle, of course no cycle is exactly typical.
虽然生产力和负债可以说是驱动因素，但主要是人们选择决定生产率和负债水平，所以心理学是非常重要的。心理学驱使人们的欲望上班，借钱，消费，去战争。由于不同的经历导致不同的心理偏见导致不同的经历等，某些常见的因果关系驱动了典型的循环。虽然我会描述我认为是典型的循环，当然没有周期是典型的。
As explained, economic conditions affect human nature and human nature affects economic conditions. This typically happens dynamically in a sequence that leads countries to rise and fall for largely the same reasons that families rise and fall over 3 to 5 generations. I believe that countries typically evolve through five stages of the cycle:
如上所述，经济条件影响人的本性，人的本性会影响经济状况。这通常以导致国家上升和下降的顺序动态发生，这与家庭上升和下降3至5代的原因基本相同。我相信国家通常会在这个周期的五个阶段发展：
In this stage they have very low incomes and most people have subsistence lifestyles, they don’t waste money because they value it a lot, and they don’t have any debt to speak of because savings are short and nobody wants to lend to them. They are undeveloped.
在这个阶段，他们的收入很低，大多数人都有生活习惯，他们不会浪费钱，因为他们很重视它们，他们没有任何债务可以说是因为储蓄很短，没有人愿意借给他们。他们不发达。
Some emerge from this stage and others don’t, with culture and location being the biggest determinants of which emerge and which don’t, as these influence people’s desires and abilities to compete. For example, in China large percentages of the population are too removed to compete and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, so while it is reasonable to expect Chinese incomes in the major cities to approach those in other major cities elsewhere in the world, it is unreasonable to expect the average income of a Chinese person to equal that of an American, or for that matter someone in Beijing, in the foreseeable future.
有些从这个阶段出现，其他的则不是，文化和位置是最大的决定因素出现，哪些不会影响人们的欲望和能力。例如，在中国，在可预见的将来，中国大部分人口都被淘汰，可能会继续存在，所以在大城市的中国收入预期接近世界其他主要城市是合理的在可预见的将来，预计中国人的平均收入与美国人平均收入相当，或者在北京有人认为是人均收入是不合理的。
Those that transition from this stage to the next stage typically gradually accumulate more money than they need to survive, and they save it because they are worried about not having enough in the future. Because they have very low incomes, their labor costs are typically low, so when they begin to emerge, their economic growth is led by them producing low-value-added goods cheaply and selling to rich countries. Because they are low-cost producers, they also typically attract foreign direct investment from companies that want to manufacture in low-cost countries to export to the rich countries (if they are politically stable). These low-cost countries have to provide high returns to attract these investors because of the perceived risks, but they are capable of providing these high returns because they are very cost-effective producers.
从这个阶段转变到下一阶段的人通常会逐渐积累更多的钱，而不是生存下来，因为他们担心在未来不够充足。由于收入非常低，劳动力成本通常较低，所以当他们开始出现时，他们的经济增长是由廉价生产低附加值商品和卖给富国的。因为他们是低成本的生产者，他们也通常吸引来自想在低成本国家制造的公司的外国直接投资出口到富国（如果它们在政治上是稳定的）。这些低成本国家必须提供高回报来吸引这些投资者，因为感觉到风险，但是由于它们是非常具有成本效益的生产者，因此能够提供这些高回报。
At this stage in their development, their currencies and capital markets are undeveloped. As a result, their governments peg their exchange rates to gold or whatever the obvious relevant reserve currency is (typically of the currency bloc that they want to sell their goods to), and their citizens, who gradually accumulate income in excess of spending, typically save/invest in their businesses and by buying hard assets like apartments as savings. Those in these countries who have more money and a more global perspective typically want to invest some money outside the country just to be safe, so they invest in whatever they perceive to be the world’s safest investments, most typically government debt in the world’s reserve currencies. Because people in this stage value earning money and building savings more than spending money, their governments generally prefer their currencies to be undervalued rather than to be overvalued, and they like to build up their savings/reserves. How fast countries evolve through this stage primarily depends on their cultures and their abilities. I call these countries early-stage emerging countries.
在发展的这个阶段，货币和资本市场不发达。因此，他们的政府将汇率固定在黄金上，或者明显的相关储备货币（通常是要出售货物的货币组合）以及其逐渐积累超过支出的收入的公民储蓄/投资企业，购买像公寓这样的硬资产作为储蓄。那些拥有更多资金和更全球化视野的国家通常希望在国外投资一些资金来安全，所以他们投资于任何他们认为是世界上最安全的投资，最常见的是世界储备货币政府债务。因为这个阶段的人们有价值赚钱和建立储蓄超过花钱，所以他们的政府普遍喜欢货币被低估而不是被高估，他们喜欢建立储蓄/储备。这个国家在这个阶段进展如何快速地主要取决于他们的文化和能力。我称这些国家是耳熟能详的新兴国家 。
At this stage they behave pretty much the same as they did when they were in the prior stage but, because they have more money and still want to save, the amount of this saving and investment rises rapidly. Because they are typically the same people who experienced the more deprived conditions in the first stage, and because people who grew up with financial insecurity typically don’t lose their financial cautiousness, they still a) work hard, b) have export-led economies, c) have pegged exchange rates, d) save a lot, and e) invest efficiently in their means of production, in real assets like gold and apartments, and in bonds of the reserve countries.
在这个阶段，他们的表现与前一阶段的表现大致相同，但是由于他们有更多的钱，而且还要保存，所以这种储蓄和投资的数量迅速上升。因为他们通常是在第一阶段经历了更为匮乏的条件的人，而且因为经济不安全而长大的人通常不会失去财务谨慎性，所以他们仍然努力工作，b）有出口导向的经济体c）与汇率挂钩，d）节省大量资金，e）有效投资于生产资料，黄金和公寓等实物资产以及储备国债券。
Because their exchange rates remain undervalued, their labor rates and their domestic costs are cheap so they remain competitive. Their competitiveness is reflected in their strong balance of payments, and incomes and net worths rising as fast as or faster than their debts.
由于他们的汇率仍然低估，他们的劳动收入和国内成本便宜，因此它们仍然具有竞争力。他们的竞争力反映在他们强劲的国际收支中，收入和净值上涨速度快于或高于其债务。
Countries in this stage experience rapidly rising income growth and rapidly rising productivity growth at the same time. In the early stages rapid income growth is matched by rapid productivity growth so inflation is not a problem despite the fast increases in incomes and money in the economy. Because of rapidly rising productivity, these countries can also become more competitive in relation to others.
这个阶段的国家同时经历快速增长的收入增长和生产率的快速增长。在早期阶段，快速的收入增长与生产率快速增长相匹配，尽管经济中收入和金钱的快速增长，通货膨胀并不是问题。由于生产率迅速上升，这些国家也可能相对于其他国家更具竞争力。
During this stage, these countries’ debts typically do not rise significantly relative to their incomes and sometimes they decline. It is a very healthy period.
在这个阶段，这些国家的债务通常不会相对于收入而大幅上涨，有时候它们会下降。这是一个非常健康的时期。
However, they eventually transition to a stage in which debts rise faster than incomes and incomes rise faster than productivity. Inflation rates rise because rapidly rising income growth leads to rapidly increasing spending on many items that cannot be correspondingly increased in supply via productivity gains. Additionally, by having their currencies linked to reserve currencies, they also link their interest rates to those of the reserve currency countries, who have slower income growth and lower inflation rates. While these interest rates are appropriate for the sluggish growth, low inflation countries, they are too low for the faster growth, higher inflation countries. As a result, these emerging countries have interest rates that are low in relation to their inflation and nominal growth rates. This fuels money and credit growth and inflation. Typically countries in this stage maintain their pegged exchange rates and linked monetary policies via changes in reserves until the upward inflationary/bubble pressures and trade protectionist pressures become too great.
然而，他们最终过渡到债务上涨速度高于收入和收入增长速度快于生产力的阶段。通货膨胀率上升，因为快速增长的收入增长导致许多物品的支出迅速增加，而生产力增长则不能相应地增加供应。此外，通过将其货币与储备货币挂钩，它们也将其利率与储备货币国家的利率挂钩，这些国家的收入增长较慢，通货膨胀率较低。虽然这些利率适合经济低迷的低通胀国家，但由于通货膨胀率较高国家的增长速度较快，因此这些利率太低。因此，这些新兴国家的利率与通货膨胀率和名义增长率相比是低的。这会促成货币和信贷增长和通货膨胀。通常情况下，这个阶段的国家通过储备的变化来维持汇率和汇率联动的货币政策，直到上涨的通胀/泡沫压力和贸易保护主义的压力变得太大。
The transition from this stage to the next stage is typically signaled by a) debt growth significantly outpacing income growth, b) accelerating inflation arising from productivity growth not increasing fast enough to offset the increased spending and income growth, c) overinvestment, and d) balance of payments surpluses. This mix of conditions eventually leads to movement to independent currency/monetary policies.389 This transition to an independent currency policy typically occurs as both a practical necessity and an earned right. As previously mentioned, countries in this second stage run basic balance of payments surpluses that either drive up their exchange rates and/or lead their central banks to lower their real interest rates (which fuels bubbles and inflations) and/or drive up their foreign savings/reserves. So, practical necessity motivates these governments to abandon their pegs and appreciate when they want to curtail inflation and/or bubbles; at the same time, international tensions arising from trade imbalances leading to the loss of jobs in the developed country and capital outflows from that country (e.g., as existed in the US in 1970) also motivate the move. Having an independent currency/monetary policy is an earned right because their performance in the previous stages that led up to this point gave them the credibility to be able to float the currency and have it appreciate. Every country wants to have an independent monetary policy because that is the most powerful tool available for managing the economy; it gives governments the freedom to decide how they will balance inflation and growth in light of their own conditions.390 For these good reasons no major developed economy has an exchange rate that is pegged to another country’s exchange rate. Only relatively small and/or emerging economies forgo their independence because of the practical necessities of being unable to engender enough confidence that their currencies will maintain their value or being unable to manage monetary policy in a viable way.
从这个阶段到下一阶段的过渡通常表现为：a）债务增长明显高于收入增长，b）加速生产率增长所产生的通货膨胀，而不是快速增长以抵消增加的支出和收入增长，c）过度投资，d）国际收支盈余。这种情况的混合最终导致了独立货币/货币政策的转变。2 这种向独立货币政策的过渡通常发生在实际的必要性和获得的权利之上。如前所述，第二阶段的国家运行基本的国际收支盈余，以提高其汇率和/或领导其央行降低其实际利率（促成泡沫和膨胀）和/或提高其外国储蓄/储量。那么实际上的必要性就是促使这些政府放弃他们的兴趣，并希望减少通货膨胀和/或泡沫;与此同时，导致发达国家失业和资本外流的贸易失衡引起的国际紧张局势（例如，1970年美国存在）也激励了这一举动。拥有独立的货币/货币政策是获得的权利，因为他们在以前的阶段的表现导致了这一点，使他们有能力浮动货币的信誉，并感谢。每个国家都想要有一个独立的货币政策，因为这是最有力的管理经济的工具;它使政府有自由决定如何根据自己的条件平衡通货膨胀和增长。3 由于这些好的原因，没有一个主要发达经济体的汇率与另一个国家的汇率挂钩。只有相对较小和/或新兴经济体放弃独立，因为实际上不可能产生足够的信心，使其货币能维持价值或不能以可行的方式管理货币政策。
In the transition to the next stage, their domestic capital markets begin to become more widely accepted, private sector lending begins, and capital formation occurs with both foreign and domestic investors participating in this investment boom.
在向下一阶段转型的过程中，国内资本市场开始受到越来越广泛的接受，私营部门贷款开始，外资和国内投资者纷纷参与投资热潮。
You can tell countries in this stage from those in the first stage because they are the ones with gleaming new cities and infrastructures next to old ones, they have high savings rates, they enjoy rapidly rising incomes, and they typically have rising foreign exchange reserves. While countries of all sizes can go through this stage, when big countries go through it they are typically emerging into great world powers.
在这个阶段，你可以告诉那些在第一阶段的国家，因为它们是与旧的城市和基础设施相邻的新兴城市和基础设施，他们拥有高储蓄率，享受快速增长的收入，而且外汇储备通常也在上升。虽然各国都可以经历这个阶段，但是当大国经历时，它们通常会成为伟大的世界大国。
I call these countries late-stage emerging countries.
我称这些国家为后期新兴国家 。
At this stage, their per capita incomes approach the highest in the world as their prior investments in infrastructure, capital goods and R&D are paying off by producing productivity gains. At the same time, the prevailing psychology changes from a) putting emphasis on working and saving to protect oneself from the bad times to b) easing up in order to savor the fruits of life. This change in the prevailing psychology occurs primarily because a new generation of people who did not experience the bad times replaces those who lived through them. Signs of this change in mindset are reflected in statistics that show reduced work hours (e.g., typically there is a reduction in the average work week from six days to five) and big increases in expenditures on leisure and luxury goods relative to necessities.
在现阶段，由于其在基础设施，资本货物和研发方面的先前投资，通过提高生产力提升，其人均收入达到世界前所未有的水平。同时，现行心理学从a）重点放在工作和储蓄上，以保护自己免受恶劣时代的影响，b）放松身心，以品尝生活中的果实。现行心理学的这种变化主要是因为没有经历坏时代的新一代人代替了那些通过他们生活的人。统计数字反映在统计数字上，显示工作时间缩短（例如，平均工作周通常从六天减少到五个），休闲和奢侈品相对于必需品的支出大幅增加。
Countries at this stage and in transition to the next typically become the great importers391 and have symbiotic relationships with the emerging countries that are the great exporters, especially of low-value- added goods. At the same time, the businesses and investors of countries in this stage increasingly look for higher returns by investing in emerging countries where labor costs are cheaper, which further supports the symbiotic relationship, and their capital markets and currencies develop blue-chip status and are actively invested in by both domestic and foreign investors. They also attract the money of investors who seek safety rather than high returns because they are perceived as safe, blue-chip countries. In this stage, capital raising and financial market speculation picks up, largely motivated by both the development of these markets and the good returns that they have provided up to this point. With this development of their capital markets, increasingly spending and investing are financed by borrowing as the prior prosperity and investment gains are extrapolated.
在这个阶段和向下转型的国家通常会成为伟大的进口商4，并与出口国，特别是低附加值商品的新兴国家有共生关系。同时，这个阶段国家的企业和投资者越来越多地通过投资于劳动力成本较低的新兴国家寻求更高的回报，进一步支持共生关系，资本市场和货币发展蓝筹，积极投资国内外投资者。他们也吸引那些寻求安全而不是高回报的投资者的钱，因为他们被认为是安全的蓝筹国家。在这个阶段，资金筹集和金融市场的投机回升，主要是由于这些市场的发展和他们提供的良好回报。随着资本市场的这种发展，越来越多的支出和投资都是通过借款资助的，因为先前的繁荣和投资收益被推断。
Countries that are large and in this stage almost always become world economic and military powers.392 They typically develop their militaries in order to project and protect their global interests. Prior to the mid-20th century, large countries at this stage literally controlled foreign governments and created empires of them to provide the cheap labor and cheap natural resources to remain competitive. Since the mid-20th century, when the American Empire ruled by “speaking softly and carrying a big stick,” American “influence” and international agreements provided access for developed countries to the emerging countries’ cheap labor and investment opportunities without requiring direct control of their governments.
在这个阶段的国家几乎总是成为世界经济和军事大国。五 他们通常发展他们的军队，以规划和保护他们的全球利益。此前的中期，20 世纪 ，大国在这一阶段字面上受控外国政府和他们的创造帝国提供廉价劳动力和自然资源，以保持竞争力。自从上世纪20 世纪 ，当美国帝国的“说话轻声和手持大棒‘’美国的‘影响力’和国际协定对发达国家向新兴国家提供接入廉价劳动力和投资机会，而无需直接统治控制其政府。
In this stage they are on top of the world and they are enjoying it. I call these countries early stage developed countries.
在这个阶段他们在世界之上，他们正在享受它。我把这些国家称为早期发达国家 。
This is the leveraging up phase—i.e., debts rise relative to incomes until they can’t any more. The psychological shift behind this leveraging up occurs because the people who lived through the first two stages have died off or become irrelevant and those whose behavior matters most are used to living well and not worrying about the pain of not having enough money. Because the people in these countries earn and spend a lot, they become expensive, and because they are expensive they experience slower real income growth rates. Since they are reluctant to constrain their spending in line with their reduced income growth rates, they lower their savings rates, increase their debts and cut corners. Because their spending continues to be strong, they continue to appear rich, even though their balance sheets deteriorate. The reduced level of efficient investments in infrastructure, capital goods and R&D slow their productivity gains. Their cities and infrastructures become older and less efficient than those in the two earlier stages. Their balance of payments positions deteriorate, reflecting their reduced competitiveness. They increasingly rely on their reputations rather than on their competitiveness to fund their deficits. They typically spend a lot of money on the military at this stage, sometimes very large amounts because of wars, in order to protect their global interests. Often, though not always, at the advanced stages of this phase, countries run “twin deficits”—i.e., both balance of payments and government deficits.
这是杠杆化阶段 - 即债务相对于收入的上涨，直到不能再有。发生这种杠杆作用的心理转移是因为，通过前两个阶段的人们已经死亡或变得无关紧要，而那些行为最重要的人习惯于生活得好，而不用担心没有足够的钱的痛苦。因为这些国家的人们赚钱而且花费很多，所以他们变得昂贵，而且因为昂贵，他们的实际收入增长速度会变慢。由于他们不愿意按照收入增长率下降限制支出，所以他们降低了储蓄率，增加了债务和削减成本。由于他们的支出继续保持强势，即使资产负债表恶化，他们继续出现富裕。基础设施，资本品和研发方面的有效投资水平下降，降低了生产率的提高。他们的城市和基础设施比两个早期阶段的城市和基础设施变得老化，效率较低。国际收支状况恶化，反映出竞争力下降。他们越来越依靠他们的声誉，而不是依靠他们的竞争力来资助他们的赤字。在这个阶段，他们通常在军队上花费大量资金，有时因为战争而非常大量，以保护他们的全球利益。通常，尽管并不总是在这一阶段的高级阶段，各国执行“双赤字” - 国际收支和政府赤字。
In the last few years of this stage, bubbles frequently occur. By bubbles I mean rapidly increasing debt- financed purchases of goods, services and investment assets. These bubbles emerge because investors, businessmen, financial intermediaries, individuals and policy makers tend to assume that the future will be like the past so they bet heavily on the trends continuing. They mistakenly believe that investments that have gone up a lot are good rather than expensive so they borrow money to buy them, which drives up their prices more and reinforces this bubble process. As their assets go up in value their net worths and spending/income levels rise, which increases their borrowing capacities, which supports the leveraging-up process, and so the spiral goes until the bubbles burst.393 Bubbles burst when the income growth and investment returns inevitably fall short of the levels required to service these debts. More often than not they are triggered by central bankers who were previously too easy (i.e., that allowed the bubble to develop by allowing debt growth to increase much faster than income growth) tightening monetary policies in an attempt to rein them in. The financial losses that result from the bubble bursting contribute to the country’s economic decline.
在这个阶段的最后几年，泡沫经常发生。泡沫是指货物，服务和投资资产的债务融资迅速增加。这些泡沫出现，因为投资者，商人，金融中介机构，个人和决策者都倾向于假设未来会像过去一样，所以他们大力投入持续的趋势。他们错误地认为，投资增长很多，而不是昂贵的，所以他们借钱买它们，从而提高价格，加强了这个泡沫过程。随着资产价值上涨，其净值和支出/收入水平上升，从而增加了其借款能力，从而支撑了杠杆化进程，因此螺旋直到泡沫破灭。6 当收入增长和投资回报不可避免地低于服务这些债务所需的水平时，泡沫爆发。通常情况下，他们是由以前太容易的中央银行家（即允许通过允许债务增长增长快于收入增长来发展泡沫）引发的，紧缩货币政策以试图控制它们。财务损失泡沫破灭的结果对国家的经济衰退有促进作用。
Whether due to wars or bubbles or both, what typifies this stage is an accumulation of debt that can’t be paid back in non-depreciated money, which leads to the next stage.
无论是由于战争还是泡沫，还是两者兼而有之，这个阶段的代表是债务的积累，无法以非贬值的钱偿还，导致下一阶段。
I call these countries late stage developed countries. While countries of all sizes can go through this stage, when big countries go through it they are typically approaching their decline as great empires.
我称这些国家为后期发达国家 。虽然各国人口都可以经历这个阶段，但大国经历时，通常会以大帝帝国的身份下降。
After bubbles burst and when deleveragings occur, private debt growth, private sector spending, asset values and net worths decline in a self-reinforcing negative cycle. To compensate, government debt growth, government deficits and central bank “printing” of money typically increase. In this way, their central banks and central governments cut real interest rates and increase nominal GDP growth so that it is comfortably above nominal interest rates in order to ease debt burdens. As a result of these low real interest rates, weak currencies and poor economic conditions, their debt and equity assets are poor performing and increasingly these countries have to compete with less expensive countries that are in the earlier stages of development. Their currencies depreciate and they like it. As an extension of these economic and financial trends, countries in this stage see their power in the world decline.
泡沫破裂之后，当出现脱扣现象时，私人债务增长，私人部门支出，资产价值和净值都将在自我增强的负面循环中下降。为了补偿政府债务增长，政府赤字和央行“印刷”货币通常会增加。这样，他们的中央银行和中央政府就实际利率降低，名义上的国内生产总值的增长，这样就可以轻松地超过名义利率，以缓解债务负担。由于实际利率低，货币疲弱和经济条件差，其债务和股权资产表现不佳，这些国家越来越多与要处于早期发展阶段的较便宜国家进行竞争。他们的货币贬值，他们喜欢。作为这些经济和金融趋势的延伸，这个阶段的国家看到了他们在世界衰落的力量。
These cycles have occurred for as long as history has been written. While no two cycles are identical—they vary according to the countries’ sizes, cultures and a whole host of other influences—the fundamentals of the long- term economic cycle have remained essentially the same over the ages for essentially the same reasons that the fundamentals of life cycles have remained the same over the ages—i.e., because of how man was built. While no two life cycles are the same, and today’s typical life cycle is in some ways different from that of thousands of years ago, the fundamentals remain the same. For example, while families lived in houses that were different ages ago, the cycle of children being raised by parents until they are independent, at which point they work and have their own children which they do until they get old, stop working and die, was essentially the same thousands of years ago. Similarly, while monetary systems were different ages ago (e.g., gold coins were once money), the cycle of building up too much debt until it can’t be serviced with hard money prompting those who manufacture money to make more of it (e.g., reducing the gold content in the coins) is fundamentally the same.
这些周期已经发生，只要历史写了。虽然没有两个周期是相同的 - 它们根据国家的规模，文化和其他一切影响而有所不同 - 长期经济周期的基本原理基本上与原来基本相同的原因基本相同周期在各个年龄段都保持不变 - 即是因为人的建造。虽然没有两个生命周期是相同的，而今天的典型生命周期在几千年前在某种程度上不同，但基本面保持不变。例如，虽然家庭生活在前几年不同的房屋中，但是由父母养育的孩子的周期是独立的，在这一点上他们工作并拥有自己的孩子，直到他们变老，停止工作和死亡，几千年前基本相同。同样的，虽然货币体系在不同年龄之前（例如，金币曾经是金钱），但是建立太多债务的循环，直到不能用硬钱提供服务，促使那些制造钱的人更多地付出代价（例如，减少硬币中的黄金含量）基本相同。
Because these cycles evolve slowly over long time frames—over at least 100+ years—they are imperceptible to most people. They are also essentially irrelevant to rulers who typically have time horizons of a couple of years. As a result, they are not controlled, which is the main reason that they are destined to occur. If human nature were different so that debt growth didn’t outpace income growth and income growth didn’t outpace productivity growth, these cycles would be pretty much eliminated.
由于这些周期在长时间的框架内缓慢发展，至少超过了100多年 - 它们对大多数人来说是无法察觉的。他们也与通常有几年的时间视野的统治者基本上无关。因此，它们不受控制，这是其注定发生的主要原因。如果人的本性是不同的，所以债务增长并没有超过收入增长，收入增长并没有超过生产率增长，所以这些周期将被大大消除。
I will explain my view of the ascent and decline of the British Empire both because it is a good example of the previously described process and because it sets the stage for the rise and early decline of the US Empire and what I believe will be the rise and decline of the Chinese Empire.
我将会解释我对大帝帝国上升与衰落的看法，因为它是以前描述的过程的一个很好的例子，因为它为美帝国的崛起和早期衰落奠定了基础，我相信会是上升和中国帝国的衰落。
As with all history, different people will attribute the ascent and decline of the British Empire to different causes, so keep this in mind when reading my theory.
与所有的历史一样，不同的人会将大英帝国的上升和下降归因于不同的原因，所以在阅读我的理论时要牢记这一点。
It is pretty well agreed that the ascent of the British Empire began in the late 18th century when the Industrial Revolution began and the decline occurred in the middle of the 20th century when World War II ended, so its cycle took place over 150 years. It is also agreed that the British Empire's decline in the mid-20th century was accompanied by the emergence of the American Empire which has been dominant for the last 60 years. But there are disagreements about why these things occurred.
这是很好一致认为，大英帝国的崛起开始于18 世纪后期，当工业革命开始和下降发生在20 世纪中叶，当第二次世界大战结束，所以它的周期就发生了150多年。它也认为，大英帝国的中期，20 世纪衰落伴随着美国帝国这一直占主导地位在过去60年中出现。但是，为什么发生这些事情有不同意见。
While I won't take you back to when the first wave of the Industrial Revolution began in the late 18th century, I will take you back to around 1850. In my opinion, from before then until 1914 Great Britain was in stage 3 of the previously described cycle, from 1914 to 1950 it was in stage 4, and from 1950 until around 1980 it was in stage 5 of the cycle. I will show why I believe this in the charts that follow.
虽然我不会带你回当工业革命的第一次浪潮始于18 世纪后期，我会带你回到1850年左右，在我看来，从之前然后直到1914年英国在阶段3之前描述的周期，从1914年到1950年，它是在第4阶段，从1950年到1980年左右，它是在周期的第5阶段。我会显示为什么我相信这在以后的图表。
To begin, the chart below shows the geographic size of the British Empire going back to 1860. Note how it rose from 1860 until 1920, flatted out until 1950 and then collapsed. By comparing this chart with the one that follows showing relative incomes, you will note that the size of the British Empire correlated with the level of its relative income. In the charts that follow, you will also see that it correlates with sterling's stature as a reserve currency and that this changed due to the reasons explained in my description of the long-term economic cycle.
首先，下图显示了大英帝国的地理大小，可以追溯到1860年。注意从1860年到1920年，它是如何上升，直到1950年才崩溃，然后崩溃了。通过将该图与显示相对收入的图表进行比较，您将注意到，大英帝国的规模与其相对收入水平相关。在下面的图表中，您还将看到它与英镑作为储备货币的地位相关联，并且由于我对长期经济周期的描述中解释的原因而改变。
下图显示了英镑在1900年以后的世界货币储备份额（当时的份额超过60％）。请注意，英国在世界储备中的份额在1950年前占50％以上，在未来五十年内下降到5％左右。395如前所述，当帝国处于高峰时，他们的货币达到储备货币状态，允许他们过度借款，导致其下降。
As previously explained, in the third stage of the cycle, when growth and competitiveness are strong and indebtedness is low, the currency is strong and the country’s reserve currency status is enhanced; however, in the fourth stage the reverse is true. In other words, in the fourth stage the currency suffers due to over-indebtedness, increased money creation and uncompetitiveness, and this leads to the reduced desire to hold the currency. The next charts show the value of sterling both against the US dollar and against gold. Note that sterling was rock- solid until World War I and then it was devalued quickly against both the dollar and against gold.
如前所述，在循环的第三阶段，当增长和竞争力强，债务低，货币强劲，国家储备货币状况得到加强时，然而，在第四阶段，情况恰恰相反。换句话说，在第四阶段货币遭受过度负债，增加货币创造和竞争力，这导致持有货币的欲望减少。下图显示了英镑兑美元和黄金的价值。请注意，在第一次世界大战之前，英镑是坚定的，然后迅速贬值对美元和黄金。
The decline of the British Empire can be seen via the worsening of its twin deficits.
大英帝国的衰落可以通过其双重赤字的恶化来看待。
The next chart shows the UK current account and trade balance going back to 1850. Note that:
下图显示了英国经常账户和贸易平衡可追溯到1850年。请注意：
The UK ran a strong current account surplus of about 8% of GDP until 1913, which was just prior to World War I, and then suffered steady declines worsened by both wars that led it to run large deficits (hitting 10% of GDP) at the end of World War II. 英国在1913年刚刚在第一次世界大战之前，经历了大约8％的国内生产总值的经常账户盈余，然后由于两场战争的稳步下滑，导致它出现巨额赤字（占GDP的10％），在第二次世界大战结束时。
Through most of this time (which starts in 1850, which was well into its ascent), it ran trade deficits while running current account surpluses because of the significant income earned from global asset holdings (both from colonies, and increasingly in the late 19th century from assets in the US) and the profits made from global shipping and financial businesses.大部分时间（从1850年开始，这是上升趋势），由于全球资产持有量（来自殖民地）和19年代末期的收入都显着增加，经营账户盈余出现逆差世纪从美国资产），并从全球航运和金融业务的利润。
After the First and Second World Wars, it was left with large debts owed to foreigners and without its colonies, which weakened the current account surplus significantly.第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战后，留下了对外国人和没有殖民地的大额债务，大大削弱了经常账户盈余。
The next chart shows total debt as a percentage of GDP. Notice that it rose in two big waves, starting in 1914 and peaking in 1947—which marked the period of the decline of the British Empire. As an aside, note how it is now similar.
下图显示总债务占国内生产总值的百分比。请注意，从1914年开始，在1947年达到高峰，这是两大潮，这标志着大英帝国衰落的时期。另外，请注意它现在是如何相似的。
The chart below shows private and public debt burdens separately. As shown, both rose from the First World War through 1947. The increase in government debt was much more substantial and necessary to fund the two world wars.
下图显示了私人和公共债务负担。如图所示，二战从二战开始至二十一世纪。政府债务的增加，对于两次世界大战的资金来说，要大得多。
The next chart shows the government’s budget deficits as a percent of GDP since 1850. Government budget deficits typically shoot up for two reasons: 1) in deleveragings, when increased government spending needs to make up for decreased private sector spending, and 2) in wars. Note the effects of the two wars. Also note that the budget deficit as a percent of GDP is now the highest since World War II (because of the deleveraging).
下一个图表显示了自1850年以来，政府的预算赤字占国内生产总值的百分比。政府预算赤字通常有两个原因：1）去杠杆化时，增加政府支出需要弥补私营部门支出的下降，2）在战争中。注意两场战争的影响。还要指出，预算赤字占国内生产总值的百分比现在是第二次世界大战以来最高的（因为去杠杆化）。
In the charts below you will note the printing of money to help monetize these deficits and debts. Note how it recently has been similar.
In a nutshell, at the end of World War II Great Britain was bankrupt and the US was in a strong financial condition. As a result, the US provided the Marshall Plan, the British Empire collapsed and the UK began a long deleveraging.
As shown in a previous chart, the debt to GDP ratio fell from about 400% of GDP in 1947 to about 150% of GDP in 1970. How did that occur? As mentioned, in deleveragings, nominal interest rates must be kept below nominal GDP growth rates (otherwise debt to income ratios would rise even without debt growth financing increased spending) and real interest rates must be kept low, so that the rates of money growth and currency depreciation that are required to bring that about will occur. The table below shows how the most important part of this deleveraging occurred. I broke it up into two parts – from 1947 to 1959 and from 1960 to 1969 because they were a bit different.
如上图所示，债务与国内生产总值的比率从1947年的国内生产总值的约400％下降到1970年的大约150％，这是如何发生的？如上所述，在去杠杆化中，名义利率必须保持在名义GDP增长率以下（否则债务与收入比率将上升，即使没有债务增长融资增加支出），实际利率必须保持在较低水平，以便货币增长率和需要提供的货币贬值将会发生。下表显示了这种去杠杆化的最重要的部分是如何发生的。我分为两部分 - 从1947年到1959年，从1960年到1969年，因为它们有所不同。
As a result of these policies, the decline in total debt in the post-war period occurred via a rise in nominal GDP which outpaced more modest increases in the amount of new borrowing. Inflation of around 4% from 1947-1970 drove nearly 2/3 of the decline in debt to GDP that is attributable to GDP growth. This is shown in the chart below.
由于这些政策，战后债务总额的下降是通过名义GDP上升发生的，而新借款金额的上升幅度则略有上升。1947 - 1970年间通货膨胀率约为4％，导致国内生产总值增长的债务下降近三分之二。如下图所示。
The same is true for both the government and the private sector. The new borrowing by the government was relatively small through the period, particularly from 1947-1960. The charts below show the attributions of the changes in the debt ratios.
政府和私营部门也是如此。这个时期，特别是1947 - 1960年间，政府的新借款相对较小。以下图表显示了负债比率变动的归属。