2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle

As previously mentioned, when debts and spending rise faster than money and income, the process is self- reinforcing on the upside because rising spending generates rising incomes and rising net worths, which raise borrowers’ capacity to borrow, which allows more buying and spending, etc. However, since debts can’t rise faster than money and income forever there are limits to debt growth. Think of debt growth that is faster than income growth as being like air in a scuba bottle – there is a limited amount of it that you can use to get an extra boost, but you can’t live on it forever. In the case of debt, you can take it out before you put it in (i.e., if you don’t have any debt, you can take it out), but you are expected to return what you took out. When you are taking it out, you can spend more than is sustainable, which will give you the appearance of being prosperous. At such times, you and those who are lending to you might mistake you as being creditworthy and not pay enough attention to what your paying back will look like. When debts can no longer be raised relative to incomes and the time of paying back comes, the process works in reverse. It is that dynamic that creates long-term debt cycles. These long-term debt cycles have existed for as long as there has been credit. Even the Old Testament described the need to wipe out debt once every 50 years, which was called the year of Jubilee.

如前所述，当债务和支出增长速度超过货币和收入时，这一过程自上而下地增加，因为支出增加导致收入上升和净值上升，从而提高借款人的借款能力，从而允许更多的购买和支出，然而，由于债务不能比金钱和收入永远上涨，债务增长有限制。认为债务增长速度比收入增长速度快，像水肺潜水瓶一样 - 您可以使用的数量有限，可以增加额外的收益，但是您永远不会生活在其上。在债务的情况下，你可以把它拿出来（即如果你没有任何债务，你可以把它拿出来），但是你会收回你所取出的东西。当你把它拿出来的时候，你可以花费更多的可持续性，这样会让你变得繁荣昌盛。在这样的时候，你和那些借给你的人可能会误认你是值得信赖的，而不是很重视你的回报。当相对于收入和偿还时间不再提高债务时，流程相反。造成长期债务循环的动力就是这样。这些长期债务周期已经存在，只要有信贷。即使是旧约也描述了每五十年需要消灭一次债务，这被称为禧年。

The next chart shows U.S. debt/GDP going back to 1916 and conveys the long-term debt cycle.

下图显示美国债务/国内生产总值可追溯到1916年，并传达长期债务周期。

Upswings in the cycle occur, and are self-reinforcing, in a process by which money growth creates greater debt growth, which finances spending growth and asset purchases. Spending growth and higher asset prices allow even more debt growth. This is because lenders determine how much they can lend on the basis of the borrowers’ 1) income/cash flows to service the debt and 2) net worth/collateral, as well as their own capacities to lend, and these rise in a self-reinforcing manner.

在循环中的上升发生，并且是自我强化的，在这个过程中，货币增长造成更大的债务增长，从而为支出增长和资产购买提供资金。支出增长和较高的资产价格使得债务增长更为可观。这是因为贷款人决定借款人的1）收入/现金流量来偿还债务，以及2）净值/抵押品以及自身贷款能力，以及这些上升强化方式

Suppose you earn $100,000, have a net worth of $100,000 and have no debt. You have the capacity to borrow $10,000/year, so you could spend $110,000 per year for a number of years, even though you only earn $100,000. For an economy as a whole, this increased spending leads to higher earnings, which supports stock valuations and other asset values, giving people higher incomes and more collateral to borrow more against, and so on. In the up-wave part of the cycle, promises to deliver money (i.e., debt burdens) rise relative to both a) the supply of money and b) the amount of money and credit debtors have coming in (via incomes, borrowings and sales of assets). This up-wave in the cycle typically goes on for decades, with variations in it primarily due to central banks tightening and easing credit (which makes short-term debt cycles). But it can’t go on forever.

假设你赚了10万美元，净值为10万美元，没有债务。您有能力每年借款10,000美元，所以您可以花费11万美元，每年多少年，尽管您只赚了10万美元。对于整体经济来说，这种增加的支出导致更高的收益，这支持了股票估值和其他资产价值，给予更高的收入和更多的抵押品以更多的借款等等。在周期的最后一部分，承诺交付（即债务负担）相对于a）货币供应和b）货币和信用债务人的进入（通过收入，借款和销售）的资产）。这个循环的上涨通常会持续数十年，其变化主要是由于央行紧缩和放松信贷（造成短期债务周期）。但它永远不能继续。

Eventually the debt service payments become equal to or larger than the amount we can borrow and the spending must decline. When promises to deliver money (debt) can’t rise any more relative to the money and credit coming in, the process works in reverse and we have deleveragings. Since borrowing is simply a way of pulling spending forward, the person spending $110,000 per year and earning $100,000 per year has to cut his spending to $90,000 for as many years as he spent $110,000, all else being equal.

最终偿还债务金额等于或大于我们借款的金额，支出必须下降。当承诺交付金钱（债务）不能相对于货币和信贷进入更多时，这个过程是相反的，我们有去杠杆化。由于借款只是推动支出前进的一种方式，每年花费11万美元，每年赚取10万美元的人必须将他的支出减少到9万美元，因为他花费了11万美元，其余都是平等的。

While the last chart showed the amount of debt relative to GDP, the debt ratio, it is more precise to say that high debt service payments (i.e., principal and interest combined), rather than high debt levels, cause debt squeezes because cash flows rather than levels of debt create the squeezes that slow the economy. For example, if interest rates fall enough, debts can increase without debt service payments rising enough to cause a squeeze. This dynamic is best conveyed in the chart below. It shows interest payments, principal payments and total debt service payments of American households as a percentage of their disposable incomes going back to 1920. I am showing this debt service burden for the household sector because the household sector is the most important part of the economy; however, the concept applies equally well to all sectors and all individuals. As shown, the debt service burden of households has increased to the highest level since the Great Depression. What triggers reversals?

虽然最后一张图表显示了债务相对于国内生产总值的负债比例，但更确切地说，高额偿债（即本金和利息合并）而不是高债务水平造成债务挤压，因为现金流量相当比债务水平创造了减缓经济的挤压。例如，如果利率下降，债务可能会增加，而债务偿还金不足以造成挤压。这个动态最好在下面的图表中传达。它显示了美国家庭的利息支付，本金和偿付总额等于可回收到1920年的可支配收入的百分比。由于家庭部门是经济中最重要的部分，我显示出家庭部门的这个债务负担;然而，这一概念同样适用于所有部门和所有个人。如图所示，家庭的偿债负担已经上升到大萧条以来的最高水平。什么触发逆转？

The long-term debt cycle top occurs when 1) debt burdens are high and/or 2) monetary policy doesn’t produce credit growth. From that point on, debt can’t rise relative to incomes, net worth and money supply. That is when deleveraging – i.e., bringing down these debt ratios – begins. All deleveragings start because there is a shortage of money relative to debtors’ needs for it. This leads to large numbers of businesses, households and financial institutions defaulting on their debts and cutting costs, which leads to higher unemployment and other problems. While these debt problems can occur for many reasons, most classically they occur because investment assets are bought at high prices and with leverage6 – i.e., because debt levels are set on the basis of overly optimistic assumptions about future cash flows. As a result of this, actual cash flows fall short of what’s required for debtors to service their debts. Ironically, quite often in the early stages the cash flows fall short because of tight monetary policies that are overdue attempts to curtail these bubble activities (buying overpriced assets with excessive leverage), so that the tight money triggers them (e.g., in 1928/29 in much of the world, in 1989/91 in Japan and in 2006/07 in much of the world). Also, ironically, inflation in financial assets is more dangerous than inflation in goods and services because this financial asset inflation appears like a good thing and isn’t prevented even though it is as dangerous as any other form of over-indebtedness. In fact, while debt- financed financial booms that are accompanied by low inflation are typically precursors of busts, at the time they typically appear to be investment-generated productivity booms (e.g., much of the world in the late 1920s, Japan in the late 1980s and much of the world in the mid 2000s).

当债务负担较高和/或2）货币政策不产生信贷增长时，债务周期长期发生。从那时起，债务不能相对于收入，净值和货币供应而上涨。那就是开始去杠杆化 - 即降低这些负债比率。所有的杠杆化开始是因为相对于债务人的需求而言，资金短缺。这导致大量企业，家庭和金融机构违约债务和削减成本，导致失业率上升等问题。虽然这些债务问题可能由于许多原因而发生，但在大多数情况下，这些债务水平是以对过去乐观的未来现金流量假设为基础的。因此，实际现金流量低于债务人偿还债务所需的现金流量。具有讽刺意味的是，在早期阶段，由于紧缩的货币政策是过度的尝试来限制这些泡沫活动（以过高的杠杆作用购买高估的资产），所以现金流量往往很短，所以紧缩的货币触发了他们（例如1928/29年在世界大部分地区，1989/91年度在日本，2006/07年度在世界大部分地区）。另外，讽刺的是，金融资产的通货膨胀比商品和服务的通货膨胀更危险，因为这种金融资产通胀似乎是一件好事，即使它与其他形式的过度负债一样危险也不会被阻止。事实上，尽管伴随着低通货膨胀的债务融资的金融热潮通常是破产的前身，但在当时它们通常似乎是投资产生的生产力增长（例如，20世纪20年代后期的世界大部分时间，日本在晚期20世纪80年代，大部分世界在二十世纪中期）。

Typically, though not always, interest rates decline in reaction to the economic and market declines and central banks easing, but they can’t decline enough because they hit 0%. As a result, the ability of central banks to alleviate these debt burdens, to stimulate private credit growth and to cause asset prices to rise via lower interest rates is lost. These conditions cause buyers of financial assets to doubt that the value of the money they will get from owning this asset will be more than the value of the money they pay for it. Then monetary policy is ineffective in rectifying the imbalance.

通常情况下，尽管并不总是利率下降，但经济和市场下滑以及中央银行的放缓反而下降，但由于达到0％，所以不能够下降。因此，中央银行减轻这些债务负担，刺激私人信贷增长，并通过降低利率上调资产价格的能力丧失。这些情况导致金融资产的买方怀疑拥有该资产所获得的资金的价值将超过其为此支付的资金的价值。那么货币政策在整顿失衡方面是无效的。

In deleveragings, rather than indebtedness increasing (i.e., debt and debt service rising relative to income and money), it decreases. This can happen in one of four ways: 1) debt reduction, 2) austerity, 3) transferring wealth from the haves to the have-nots and 4) debt monetization. Each one of these four paths reduces debt/income ratios, but they have different effects on inflation and growth. Debt reduction (i.e., defaults and restructurings) and austerity are both deflationary and depressing while debt monetization is inflationary and stimulative.

在去杠杆化过程中，债务和债务的增加（即债务和债务偿还相对于收入和金钱上升）而不是减少。这可以通过以下四种方式之一发生：1）减债，2）紧缩，3）将财富从有钱人转移到有钱人，4）债务货币化。这四条路径中的每一条都可以减少债务/收入比，但对通货膨胀和增长有不同的影响。债务减免（即违约和重组）和紧缩都是通货紧缩和沮丧，而债务货币化则是通货膨胀和刺激性的。

Transfers of wealth typically occur in many forms, but rarely in amounts that contribute meaningfully to the deleveraging. The differences between how deleveragings play out depends on the amounts and paces of these four measures.

财富的转移通常以许多形式出现，但很少有助于去杠杆化。去杠杆化发生之间的差异取决于这四项措施的数量和步伐。

Depressions are the contraction phase of the deleveraging process. Typically the “depression” phase of the deleveraging process comes at the first part of the deleveraging process, when defaults and austerity (i.e., the forces of deflation and depression) dominate. Initially, in the depression phase of the deleveraging process, the money coming in to debtors via incomes and borrowings is not enough to meet debtors’ obligations; assets need to be sold and spending needs to be cut in order to raise cash. This leads asset values to fall, which reduces the value of collateral, and in turn reduces incomes. Because of both lower collateral values and lower incomes, borrowers’ creditworthiness is reduced, so they justifiably get less credit, and so it continues in a self-reinforcing manner. Since the creditworthiness of borrowers is judged by both a) the values of their assets/collaterals (i.e., their net worths) in relation to their debts and b) the sizes of their incomes relative to the size of their debt service payments, and since both net worths and incomes fall faster than debts, borrowers become less creditworthy and lenders become more reluctant to lend. In this phase of the cycle the contraction is self- reinforcing at the same time as debt/income and debt/net-worth ratios rise. That occurs for two reasons. First, when debts cannot be serviced both debtors and creditors are hurt; since one man’s debts are another man’s assets, debt problems reduce net worths and borrowing abilities, thus causing a self-reinforcing contraction cycle. Second, when spending is curtailed incomes are also reduced, thus reducing the ability to spend, also causing a self-reinforcing contraction.

萧条是去杠杆化过程的收缩阶段。通常，去杠杆化过程的“萧条”阶段在去杠杆化过程的第一部分处于默认状态和紧缩状态（即，通货膨胀和萧条背后的动力）占主导地位。最初，在去杠杆化进程的抑郁阶段，通过收入和借款进入债务人的资金不足以满足债务人的义务;资产需要出售，需要削减支出以筹集现金。这导致资产价值下降，这降低了抵押品的价值，从而降低了收入。由于较低的抵押品价值和较低的收入，借款人的信用度下降，所以有理由地获得较少的信贷，所以继续以自我强化的方式。由于借款人的信誉由a）资产/抵押品的价值（即其净值）与债务的相关性进行判断，以及b）相对于偿债额度的收入规模，净值和收入都比债务下降得更快，借款人的信用度降低，放贷人越来越不愿放贷。在这个周期的这个阶段，收缩是自强的，同时债务/收入和债务/净值比率上升。这是由于两个原因。首先，当债务不能得到偿还时，债务人和债权人都受到伤害;由于一个人的债务是另一个人的财产，债务问题减少了净值和借款能力，从而导致了自强的收缩周期。第二，减少收入的收入也会减少，从而降低了消费的能力，也造成了自强的收缩。

You can see debt burdens rise at the same time as the economy is in a deflationary depression in both chart 2 and chart 3. The vertical line on these charts is at 1929. As you can see in chart 2, the debt/GDP ratio shot up from about 160% to about 250% from 1929 to 1933. The vertical line in chart 3 shows the same picture – i.e., debt service levels rose relative to income levels because income levels fell. In the economic and credit downturn, debt burdens increase at the same time as debts are being written down, so the debt liquidation process is reinforced. Chart 4 shows the household sector’s debt relative to its net worth. As shown, this leverage ratio shot up from already high levels, as it did during the Great Depression, due to declines in net worths arising from falling housing and stock prices.

在图表2和图表3中，经济处于通货紧缩状态，您可以看到债务负担同时上升。这些图表的垂直线是在1929年。从图2可以看出，债务/国内生产总值的比率从1929年到1933年，从160％增加到约250％。图3中的垂直线显示了相同的图片 - 即债务服务水平相对于收入水平上升，因为收入水平下降。在经济和信贷衰退期间，债务负担同时增加，同时债务被记录下来，债权清算程序得到加强。图4显示了家庭部门相对于其净值的债务。如图所示，由于住房和股票价格下跌导致的净值下降，这一杠杆比率与大萧条时期的高位相比已经达到高位。

As mentioned earlier, in a credit-based economy, the ability to spend is an extension of the ability to borrow. For lending/borrowing to occur, lenders have to believe that a) they will get paid back an amount of money that is greater than inflation and b) they will be able to convert their debt into money. In deleveragings, lenders justifiably worry that these things will not happen.

如前所述，在信用经济中，消费能力是借款能力的延伸。对于贷款/借款发生，贷款人必须相信a）他们将获得比通货膨胀更大的资金，b）他们将能够将其债务转换为资金。在去杠杆化中，贷方有理由担心这些事情不会发生。

Unlike in recessions, when cutting interest rates and creating more money can rectify this imbalance, in deleveragings monetary policy is ineffective in creating credit. In other words, in recessions (when monetary policy is effective) the imbalance between the amount of money and the need for it to service debt can be rectified by cutting interest rates enough to 1) ease debt service burdens, 2) stimulate economic activity because monthly debt service payments are high relative to incomes and 3) produce a positive wealth effect. However, in deleveragings, this can’t happen. In deflationary depressions/deleveragings, monetary policy is typically ineffective in creating credit because interest rates hit 0% and can’t be lowered further, so other, less effective ways of increasing money are followed. Credit growth is difficult to stimulate because borrowers remain over- indebted, making sensible lending impossible. In inflationary deleveragings, monetary policy is ineffective in creating credit because increased money growth goes into other currencies and inflation-hedge assets because investors fear that their lending will be paid back with money of depreciated value.

与经济衰退不同，当降息和创造更多的资金时，可以纠正这种不平衡现象，在杠杆化过程中，货币政策在创造信贷方面是无效的。换句话说，在经济衰退（货币政策有效的情况下），货币金额与需要偿还债务之间的不平衡可以通过减少利率来加以纠正1）缓解债务负担，2）刺激经济活动，因为每月偿债金额相对于收入高，3）产生积极的财富效应。然而，在去杠杆化中，这不可能发生。在通货紧缩的压低/去杠杆化中，由于利率达到0％而不能进一步降低货币政策，所以货币政策通常是无效的，因此遵循其他不太有效的增加货币的方式。信贷增长难以刺激，因为借款人仍然过度负债，使得明智的借贷不可能。在通货膨胀的杠杆化过程中，货币政策在创造信贷方面是无效的，因为货币增长会增加到其他货币和通货膨胀对冲资产，因为投资者担心贷款将以贬值的货币偿还。

In order to try to alleviate this fundamental imbalance, governments inevitably a) create initiatives to encourage credit creation, b) ease the rules that require debtors to come up with money to service their debts (i.e., create forbearance) and, most importantly, c) print and spend money to buy goods, services and financial assets. The printing of and buying financial assets by central banks shows up in central banks’ balance sheets expanding and the increased spending by central governments shows up in budget deficits exploding. This is shown in the following three charts.

为了减轻这种根本的不平衡，政府不可避免地会制定鼓励信贷创造的举措，b）放宽要求债务人提供资金来偿还债务（即创造宽容）的规则，最重要的是，c ）打印和花钱购买商品，服务和金融资产。中央银行印发和购买金融资产出现在中央银行的资产负债表上，中央财政支出增加显示出预算赤字突破。这在以下三个图表中显示。

As shown below, in 1930/32 and in 2007/08 short-term government interest rates hit 0%...

如下图所示，在1930/32和2007/08年度，短期政府利率达到0％...

...the Fed’s production and spending of money grew...

...美联储的生产和支出增长...

...and budget deficits exploded... ...和预算赤字爆炸...

You can tell deleveragings by these three things occurring together, which does not happen at other times.

你可以通过一起发生的这三件事情来解释去杠杆化，这在其他时候不会发生。

Typically, though not necessarily, these moves come in progressively larger dosages as initial dosages of these sorts fail to rectify the imbalance and reverse the deleveraging process. However, these dosages do typically cause temporary periods of relief that are manifest in bear market rallies in financial assets and increased economic activity. For example, in the Great Depression there were six big rallies in the stock market (of between 21% and 48%) in a bear market that totaled 89%, with all of these rallies triggered by these sorts of increasingly strong dosages of government actions that were intended to reduce the fundamental imbalance.

通常，虽然并不一定，但是由于这些类型的初始剂量不能纠正不平衡并扭转去杠杆化过程，所以这些动作逐渐增加。然而，这些剂量通常会导致临时的缓解期，这些缓解在金融资产的熊市集会和经济活动的增加中显现出来。例如，在大萧条时期，在熊市中，股票市场上有六次大涨（占21％至48％），总共达到89％，所有这些集会都是由这些日益强大的政府行动剂量引发的旨在减少根本的不平衡。

That is because a return to an environment of normal capital formation and normal economic activity can occur only by eliminating this fundamental imbalance so that capable providers of capital (i.e., investors/lenders) willingly choose to give money to capable recipients of capital (borrowers and sellers of equity) in exchange for believable claims that they will get back an amount of money that is worth more than they gave. Eventually there is enough “printing of money” or debt monetization to negate the deflationary forces of both debt reduction and austerity. When a good balance of debt reduction, austerity, and “printing/monetizing” occurs, debt burdens can fall relative to incomes with positive economic growth. In the U.S. deleveraging of the 1930s, this occurred from 1933 to 1937.

那就是因为恢复正常资本形成和正常经济活动的环境只能通过消除这种基本的不平衡，使得有能力的资本提供者（即投资者/放款人）愿意选择向有资格的获得者提供资金（借款人和卖家的股权），以换取可信的索赔，他们将获得一笔比他们所付出的更多的钱。最终有足够的“印刷货币”或债务货币化来抵消债务减免和紧缩的通货紧缩的力量。债务减免，紧缩和“打印/货币化”发生良好平衡后，债务负担相对于经济增长良好的收入而下降。在20世纪30年代的美国去杠杆化中，这发生在1933年至1937年

Some people mistakenly think that the depression problem is just psychological: that scared investors move their money from riskier investments to safer ones (e.g., from stocks and high-yield lending to government cash), and that problems can be rectified by coaxing them to move their money back into riskier investments. This is wrong for two reasons. First, contrary to popular thinking, the deleveraging dynamic is not primarily psychologically driven. It is primarily driven by the supply and demand of and relationships between credit, money and goods and services. If everyone went to sleep and woke up with no memories of what had happened, we would all soon find ourselves in the same position. That is, because debtors still couldn’t service their debts, because their obligations to deliver money would still be too large relative to the money they are taking in, the government would still be faced with the same choices that would still have the same consequences, etc. Related to this, if the central bank produces more money to alleviate the shortage, it will cheapen the value of money, thus not rectifying creditors’ worries about being paid back an amount of money that is worth more than they gave. Second, it is not correct that the amount of money in existence remains the same and has simply moved from riskier assets to less risky ones. Most of what people think is money is really credit, and it does disappear. For example, when you buy something in a store on a credit card, you essentially do so by saying, “I promise to pay.”

有些人误认为忧郁症只是心理上的：害怕投资者将资金从风险较高的投资转移到更安全的投资（例如股票和高收益贷款到政府现金），这些问题可以通过哄骗他们来纠正他们的钱回到了风险较高的投资。这是错误的两个原因。首先，与流行思维相反，去杠杆化的动态并不主要是心理上的驱动。这主要是由于信贷，货币和货物与服务之间的供求关系。如果每个人都睡觉，醒来，没有发生什么事情的回忆，我们很快就会发现自己在同一个位置。也就是说，因为债务人仍然不能偿还债务，因为他们的交付义务相对于他们所接受的资金来说仍然会太大，政府仍然会面临同样的后果。等等。与此相关的是，如果中央银行产生更多的钱来减轻短缺，就会降低货币的价值，从而不能纠正债权人担心偿还一笔比他们多的钱。第二，存在的资金量是相同的，从风险较高的资产转为风险较小的资金是不正确的。大多数人认为钱是真正的信誉，它确实消失了。例如，当您在信用卡上的商店买东西时，您基本上这样做：“我保证支付”。

Together you created a credit asset and a credit liability. So where did you take the money from? Nowhere. You created credit. It goes away in the same way. Suppose the store owner justifiably believes that you and others might not pay the credit card company and that the credit card company might not pay him if that happens. Then he correctly believes that the “asset” he has isn’t really there. It didn’t go somewhere else.

您一起创建了信贷资产和信用责任。那你从哪里拿钱呢？无处。你创造了信用它以相同的方式消失。假设店主有理由相信你和他人可能不会支付信用卡公司，信用卡公司可能不会支付他，如果发生这种情况。那么他正确地认为他所拥有的“资产”不是真的在那里。它没有去别的地方

As implied by this, a big part of the deleveraging process is people discovering that much of what they thought was their wealth isn’t really there. When investors try to convert their investments into money in order to raise needed cash, the liquidity of their investments is tested and, in cases in which the investments prove illiquid, panic-induced “runs” and sell-offs of their securities occur. Naturally those who experience runs, especially banks (though this is true of most entities that rely on short-term funding), have problems raising money and credit to meet their needs, so they often fail. At such times, governments are forced to decide which ones to save by providing them with money and whether to get this money through the central government (i.e., through the budget process) or through the central bank “printing” more money. Governments inevitably do both, though in varying degrees. What determines whether deleveragings are deflationary or inflationary is the extent to which central banks create money to negate the effects of contracting credit.

正如所暗示的那样，去杠杆化过程的很大一部分是人们发现他们认为的很多财富并不是真正的。当投资者试图将其投资转为资金以提取所需现金时，其投资的流动性进行了测试，如果投资流动性不足，发生恐慌导致的“运行”，并出售其证券。当然，那些经验丰富的人，特别是银行（尽管大多数依靠短期融资的实体都是如此），但是在筹集资金和信贷以满足他们的需求时，却有问题，所以经常失败。在这样的时候，政府被迫通过向他们提供资金，以及是否通过中央政府（即通过预算程序）或通过中央银行“印刷”更多的钱来获得这笔钱来决定哪些储蓄。尽管在不同程度上，政府不可避免地要做到这一点。什么决定了去杠杆化是通货紧缩还是通货膨胀是中央银行创造资金以否定承诺信贷影响的程度。

Governments with commodity-based monetary systems or pegged currencies are more limited in their abilities to “print” and provide money, while those with independent fiat monetary systems are less constrained. However, in both cases, the central bank is eager to provide money and credit, so it always lowers the quality of the collateral it accepts and, in addition to providing money to some essential banks, it also typically provides money to some non-bank entities it considers essential.

具有商品货币制度或挂钩货币的政府在“打印”和提供资金的能力方面更加有限，而具有独立的货币体系的国家则较少受到限制。然而，在这两种情况下，中央银行都渴望提供资金和信贷，所以它总是降低其接受的抵押品的质量，除了向一些必要的银行提供资金外，还通常会向一些非银行提供资金它认为必要的实体。

The central bank’s easing of monetary policy and the movement of investor money to safer investments initially drives down short-term government interest rates, steepens the yield curve and widens credit and liquidity premiums. Those who do not receive money and/or credit that is needed to meet their debt service obligations and maintain their operations, which is typically a large segment of debtors, default and fail.

中央银行放松货币政策和投资者货币流向更安全的投资最初导致政府短期利率下滑，使收益率曲线陡峭，扩大信贷和流动性溢价。那些没有收到贷款和/或信贷来履行债务偿还义务并保持业务的人，这通常是一大部分债务人，违约和失败。

In depressions, as credit collapses, workers lose jobs and many of them, having inadequate savings, need financial support. So in addition to needing money to provide financial support to the system, governments need money to help those in greatest financial need. Additionally, to the extent that they want to increase spending to make up for decreased private sector spending, they need more money. At the same time, their tax revenue falls because incomes fall. For these reasons, governments’ budget deficits increase. Inevitably, the amount of money lent to governments at these times increases less than their needs (i.e., they have problems funding their deficits), despite the increased desire of lenders to buy government securities to seek safety at these times. As a result, central banks are again forced to choose between “printing” more money to buy their governments’ debts or allowing their governments and their private sector to compete for the limited supply of money, thus allowing extremely tight money conditions.

在萧条时期，由于信贷崩溃，工人失业，其中许多人的储蓄不足，需要财政支持。因此，除了需要资金为系统提供财政支持之外，政府还需要资金帮助最有经济需求的人才。另外，为了增加开支以弥补私营部门的支出，他们需要更多的钱。同时，由于收入下降，税收的下降。由于这些原因，政府的预算赤字增加。不可避免的是，尽管贷款人在这些时候购买政府证券来寻求安全，但是在这些时候，向政府借出的资金数额要比他们的需求增加（即他们的资金不足）。因此，中央银行再次被迫选择“打印”更多的钱来购买政府的债务，或允许其政府和私营部门竞争有限的货币供应量，从而使货币条件极为紧张。

Governments with commodity-based money systems are forced to have smaller budget deficits and tighter monetary policies than governments with fiat monetary systems, though they all eventually relent and print more money (i.e., those on commodity-based monetary systems either abandon these systems or change the amount/pricing of the commodity that they will exchange for a unit of money so that they print more, and those on fiat systems will just print more). This “printing” of money takes the form of central bank purchases of government securities and non-government assets such as corporate securities, equities and other assets. In other words, the government “prints” money and uses it to negate some of the effects of contracting credit. This is reflected in money growing at an extremely fast rate at the same time as credit and real economic activity contract. Traditional economists see that as the velocity of money declining, but it’s nothing of the sort. If the money creation is large enough, it devalues the currency, lowers real interest rates and drives investors from financial assets to inflation-hedge assets. This typically happens when investors want to move money outside the currency, and short-term government debt is no longer considered a safe investment.

与货币系统相比，具有商品货币体系的政府，与具有法定货币制度的政府相比，被迫要有较小的预算赤字和更严格的货币政策，尽管它们最终都放弃了更多的资金（即那些基于商品的货币体系放弃这些制度或改变商品的数量/价格，他们将交换一个单位的钱，以便打印更多，而那些在法定系统将更多打印）。这种“印刷”的形式是中央银行购买政府证券和非政府资产，如公司证券，股票等资产。换句话说，政府“打印”钱，用它来否定承包信用的一些影响。这反映在信贷和实际经济活动合同同时以极快的速度增长。传统经济学家认为，随着货币的流入速度的下降，但它并不是这样。如果货币创造足够大，它会贬值货币，降低实际利率，推动投资者从金融资产转为通货膨胀对冲资产。这通常发生在投资者想要将货币移到货币之外时，短期政府债务不再被视为安全的投资。

Because governments need more money, and since wealth and incomes are typically heavily concentrated in the hands of a small percentage of the population, governments raise taxes on the wealthy. Also, in deleveragings, those who earned their money in the booms, especially the capitalists who made a lot of money working in the financial sector helping to create the debt (and especially the short sellers who some believe profited at others’ expense), are resented. Tensions between the “haves” and the “have-nots” typically increase and, quite often, there is a move from the right to the left. In fact, there is a saying that essentially says “in booms everyone is a capitalist and in busts everyone is a socialist.” For these various reasons, taxes on the wealthy are typically significantly raised. These increased taxes typically take the form of greater income and consumption taxes because these forms of taxation are the most effective in raising revenues. While sometimes wealth and inheritance taxes are also increased,7 these typically raise very little money because much wealth is illiquid and, even for liquid assets, forcing the taxpayer to sell financial assets to make their tax payments undermines capital formation. Despite these greater taxes on the wealthy, increases in tax revenue are inadequate because incomes – both earned incomes and incomes from capital – are so depressed, and expenditures on consumption are reduced.

因为政府需要更多的钱，而且由于财富和收入一般都集中在一小部分人口中，所以政府对富人征税。另外，在去杠杆化中，那些在繁荣期间赚钱的人，特别是那些在金融领域工作的大量资金帮助创造债务的资本家（特别是有些人认为有利于他人费用的卖空者）是怨恨。“有钱人”和“有无”之间的紧张关系通常会增加，而且往往是从右向左移动。其实有一个说法，基本上说“在繁荣的时候，每个人都是资本家，在大家都是社会主义者”。由于这些各种原因，富人的税收通常会大大提高。这些增加的税收通常采取更大的收入和消费税的形式，因为这些税收形式在提高收入方面是最有效的。虽然有时财富和继承税也有所增加，但由于许多财富流动性不足，甚至是流动资产，迫使纳税人出售金融资产，使其纳税减免资本形成，这些财富和继承税也有所增加。尽管对富人征税较多，但由于收入和资本收入都是如此沮丧，消费支出减少，所以税收增加不足。

The wealthy experience a tremendous loss of “real” wealth in all forms – i.e., from their portfolios declining in value, from their earned incomes declining and from higher rates of taxation, in inflation-adjusted terms. As a result, they become extremely defensive. Quite often, they are motivated to move their money out of the country (which contributes to currency weakness), illegally dodge taxes and seek safety in liquid, non-credit-dependent investments.

在通货膨胀调整的条件下，富有的经历，从所有形式的“真实”财富 - 从他们的价值下降，收入下降和税率上升的巨大损失。结果，他们变得非常防御。他们经常有动机将资金从国外转移（导致货币疲软），非法躲避税收，寻求流动性，非信贷投资的安全。

Workers losing jobs and governments wanting to protect them become more protectionist and favor weaker currency policies. Protectionism slows economic activity, and currency weakness fosters capital flight. Debtor countries typically suffer most from capital flight.

失业的工人和希望保护他们的政府变得更加保护主义，并且偏爱较弱的货币政策。保护主义减缓经济活动，货币疲软促使资本外逃。债务国通常受到资本外逃的影响最大。

When money leaves the country, central banks are once again put in the position of having to choose between “printing” more money, which lessens its value, and not printing money in order to maintain its value but allowing money to tighten. They inevitably choose to “print” more money. This is additionally bearish for the currency. As mentioned, currency declines are typically acceptable to governments because a weaker currency is stimulative for growth and helps to negate deflationary pressures. Additionally, when deflation is a problem, currency devaluations are desirable because they help to negate it.

当钱离开国家时，中央银行再次放弃了“打印”更多的钱，减少其价值，而不是打印钱，以保持其价值，但允许收紧货币。他们不可避免地选择“打印”更多的钱。这另外是对货币的看跌。如上所述，货币下跌通常是政府可以接受的，因为较弱的货币对增长是刺激的，有助于否定通货紧缩的压力。此外，当通缩是一个问题时，货币贬值是可取的，因为它们有助于否定它。

Debtor, current account deficit countries are especially vulnerable to capital withdrawals and currency weakness as foreign investors also tend to flee due to both currency weakness and an environment inhospitable to good returns on capital. However, this is less true for countries that have a great amount of debt denominated in their own currencies (like the United States in the recent period and in the Great Depression) as these debts create a demand for these currencies. Since debt is a promise to deliver money that one doesn’t have, this is essentially a short squeeze that ends when a) the shorts are fully squeezed (i.e., the debts are defaulted on) and/or b) enough money is created to alleviate the squeeze, and/or c) the debt service requirements are reduced in some other way (e.g., forbearance).

债务人，经常项目逆差国家特别容易受到资本提取和货币疲软的困扰，因为外汇市场货币疲软和资本回报良好的环境，外国投资者也倾向于逃离。然而，对于以本国货币计价的大量债务（如美国近期和大萧条）的国家来说，这些债务对这些货币构成需求就不那么真实了。由于债务是一个没有货币的承诺，这本质上是一个短暂的挤压，当a）短裤被完全挤压（即债务违约）和/或b）创造足够的资金减轻挤压，和/或c）以其他方式减少偿债服务需求（如忍耐）。

The risk at this stage of the process is that the currency weakness and the increased supply of money will lead to short-term credit (even government short-term credit) becoming undesirable, causing the buying of inflation- hedge assets and capital flight rather than credit creation. For foreign investors, receiving an interest rate that is near 0% and having the foreign currency that their deposits are denominated in decline produces a negative return; so this set of circumstances makes holding credit, even government short-term credit, undesirable.

这个过程的这个阶段的风险在于，货币疲软和货币供应量会导致短期信贷（甚至政府的短期信贷）变得不受欢迎，导致购买通货膨胀对冲资产和资本外逃而不是信用创造。对于外国投资者来说，接受接近0％的利率，外汇储备存在下降的外币产生负回报;所以这套情况使得持有信用，甚至政府的短期信贷也是不理想的。

Similarly, for domestic investors, this set of circumstances makes foreign currency deposits more desirable. If and when this happens, investors accelerate their selling of financial assets, especially debt assets, to get cash in order to use this cash to buy other currencies or inflation-hedge assets such as gold. They also seek to borrow cash in that local currency. Once again, that puts the central bank in the position of having to choose between increasing the supply of money to accommodate this demand for it or allowing money and credit to tighten and real interest rates to rise. At such times, sometimes governments seek to curtail this movement by establishing foreign exchange controls and/or prohibiting gold ownership. Also, sometimes price and wage controls are put into place. Such moves typically create economic distortions rather than alleviate problems.

同样，对于国内投资者来说，这种情况使得外币存款更为理想。如果发生这种情况，投资者加速他们出售金融资产，特别是债务资产，以获得现金，以便使用这种现金购买其他货币或通货膨胀对冲资产，如黄金。他们还试图以当地货币借款现金。再次，这使央行处于不得不选择增加货币供应量以适应这种需求或允许货币和信贷收紧和实际利率上升的地位。在这样的时候，有时政府通过建立外汇管制和/或禁止黄金所有权来设法减少这一运动。此外，有时也实行价格和工资控制。这种举动通常会造成经济扭曲，而不是缓解问题。

Though the deleveraging process, especially the depression phase of it, seems horrible and certainly produces great hardships – in some cases, even wars – it is the free market’s way of repairing itself. In other words, it gets the capital markets and the economy into a much healthier condition by rectifying the fundamental imbalance.

尽管去杠杆化过程尤其是抑郁症状似乎是可怕的，但肯定会产生很大的困难 - 在某些情况下甚至是战争 - 自由市场的修复方式。换句话说，通过整顿基本的不平衡，使资本市场和经济变得更加健康。

Debts are reduced (through bankruptcies and other forms of debt restructuring), businesses’ break-even levels are reduced through cost-cutting, the pricing of financial assets becomes cheap, and the supply of money to buy the assets and to service debts is increased by the central banks – so capital formation becomes viable again.

债务减少（通过破产和其他形式的债务重组），通过降低成本降低企业的盈亏平衡水平，金融资产定价变得便宜，购买资产和偿还债务的资金增加由中央银行 - 所以资本形成再次变得可行。

Deleveragings typically end via a mix of 1) debt reduction, 2) austerity, 3) redistributions of wealth, and 4) debt monetization. Additionally, through this process, businesses lowering their break-even levels through cost- cutting, substantial increases in risk and liquidity premiums that restore the economics of capital formation (i.e., lending and equity investing), and nominal interest rates being held under nominal growth rates typically occur.

通常会通过1）债务减免，2）紧缩措施，3）财富再分配，以及4）债务货币化来实现。此外，通过这一过程，企业通过降低成本降低盈亏平衡水平，大幅增加风险和流动性溢价，恢复资本形成的经济性（即贷款和股权投资），名义利率在名义增长下持有费率通常发生。

The decline in economic and credit creation activity (the depression phase) is typically fast, lasting two to three years. However, the subsequent recovery in economic activity and capital formation tends to be slow, so it takes roughly a decade (hence the term “lost decade”) for real economic activity to reach its former peak level. Though it takes about a decade to return the economy to its former peak levels, it typically takes longer for real stock prices to reach former highs, because equity risk premiums take a very long time to reach pre-deleveraging lows. During this time nominal interest rates must be kept below nominal growth rates to reduce the debt burdens. If interest rates are at 0% and there is deflation, central banks must “print” enough money to raise nominal growth. As mentioned, these cycles are due to human nature and the way the system works. Throughout this process, most everyone behaves pretty much as you’d expect in pursuing their self-interest, thus reacting to and causing developments in logical ways, given how the economic machine works.

经济和信贷创造活动（抑郁阶段）的下降通常很快，持续两三年。然而，随后的经济活动和资本形成的复苏趋于缓慢，因此实际经济活动达到前一个高峰期大概需要十年（因此就是“失去的十年”）。虽然将经济恢复到前一个高峰期大约需要十年时间，但实际股价通常需要更长的时间才能达到前一个高点，因为股权风险溢价需要很长时间才能达到去杠杆化的低点。在此期间，名义利率必须低于名义增长率，以减轻债务负担。如果利率为0％，通货紧缩，中央银行必须“打印”足够的资金来提高名义增长率。如上所述，这些周期是由于人性和系统工作原理。在整个过程中，大多数人的行为与您期望追求自身利益的行为大致相同，从而以经济机器如何运作为由，以合理的方式作出反应并引发发展。