How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  • More detail 更多细节
  • Productivity 生产力
  1. Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
  2. Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply

Korea's Future Growth

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Last updated 7 years ago

Based on our economic health index, we project that Korea's real growth rate over the next 10 years will be in the vicinity of 2.7% to 3.1%. This growth rate is somewhat above the global average, ranked 7 out of 20 major economies, and 6 out of 9 emerging countries. As a reminder, this estimate (and this writing) is based on our computer-generated analysis of the statistics detailed in Part 1, and doesn't account for exogenous shocks (like commodity or political shocks, or wars). In Korea's case, our growth estimate comes from combining our expectation of a 3.4% growth rate per worker, which is somewhat above the global average, and a labor force growth rate of -0.3%, which is somewhat below other major economies. The growth in output per worker is driven significantly by productivity and indebtedness. Over the long-term productivity matters most, while swings in indebtedness tend to be an important driver in the short-term. Given we are looking at a 10 year time frame, we weigh our productivity measures about two thirds and our indebtedness measure about one third (though there is no precision here). Over the next 10 years, we expect Korea's productivity to be somewhat better than most major countries (implying a growth rate of 3.5% on its own), and indebtedness conditions to be slightly better than other countries (implying a growth rate of 2.3% on its own). As shown below, Korea's biggest relative strengths are the value its workers provide relative to education levels and its level of innovation/commercialism, and its biggest relative problems are how hard its people work and its monetary policy. The various gauges and weights are shown below. The individual indicators that are behind them are explained in Part 1 of this section, and listed in the appendix of this section. Please review this table to understand our comments.

根据我们的经济健康指数,我们预计韩国未来10年的实际增长率将在2.7%至3.1%附近。这一增长率略高于全球平均水平,在20个主要经济体中排名第7,9个新兴国家中有6个。作为提醒,这个估计(和这篇文章)是基于我们对第1部分详细统计的计算机分析,并不考虑外部冲击(如商品或政治冲击或战争)。在韩国的情况下,我们的增长预期来自于我们对每位工人增长3.4%的预期,这远高于全球平均水平,劳动力增长率为-0.3%,略低于其他主要经济体。每个工人的产出增长主要受生产力和负债的驱动。在长期生产力方面,大多数情况下,负债波动往往是短期的重要驱动力。鉴于我们正在研究10年的时间范围,我们将生产力措施称为三分之二,而我们的债务衡量约三分之一(尽管这里没有精确度)。在接下来的十年中,我们预计韩国的生产率要比大多数主要国家好一点(意味着自己增长率为3.5%),债务条件比其他国家稍好一些(意味着增长率为2.3%它自己的)。如下图所示,韩国最大的相对优势是工人提供的教育水平和创新/商业主义水平,最大的相对问题是人民的工作和货币政策的难度。各种规格和重量如下所示。其背后的各个指标在本节的第1部分进行了说明,并在本节的附录中列出。请查看此表以了解我们的意见。

More detail 更多细节

Productivity 生产力

I. Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get 分数显示为与国家和时间的平均观测值的标准偏差数。

A country's productivity and competitiveness is mostly a function of the relative value it offers, especially for its labor. As shorthand for this, we refer to our gauge of this relative value as "what you pay versus what you get"; it reflects a) the cost and value of employees and b) the levels of investment. Countries that have well-educated workers that are relatively inexpensive and that have higher investment rates grow faster than those that don't.

一个国家的生产率和竞争力主要是其所提供的相对价值,特别是劳动力的一个功能。作为这方面的简写,我们将这个相对价值的衡量指标称为“你所付出的与你所得到的”;它反映了a)员工的成本和价值,以及b)投资水平。拥有受过良好教育的工人比较便宜,投资率高的国家比没有受过良好教育的工人要快。

Korea offers somewhat better than average value, ranked 7 among the countries we measure. Its workers are somewhat inexpensive, taking into consideration Korea's high levels of education and very good quality of education. Further, people in Korea don't work especially hard relative to the cost of their labor - the average male of working age works 29 hours per week (8 out of 20 countries), and the demographics of the workforce are unfavorable. Levels of saving and investing are roughly average given Korea's about average per capita income levels, with investment at about 27% of GDP (2 out of 20 countries).

韩国的平均价值略高于我们衡量的国家中的7个。考虑到韩国的高水平教育和非常好的教育质量,工人的价格便宜些。此外,韩国人的工作成本并不算特别努力 - 平均每个工作年龄的男性每周工作29小时(20个国家中有8个),而且员工人数不利。韩国的平均人均收入水平约为平均水平,投资约占国内生产总值的27%(20个国家中有2个)。

II. Culture 文化

Just looking solely at the relative value of a country's workers misses the role that the culture plays in determining how much a country will grow. As I've discussed, culture influences the decisions people make about factors like savings rates or how many hours they work each week, which we measure in the previously shown indicators, but culture can also influence work attitudes, levels of efficiency, reliability and other such influences on whether countries underperform or outperform.

仅仅看一个国家工人的相对价值,就忽略了文化在确定一个国家将有多大增长的作用。正如我所讨论的,文化影响人们对储蓄率或每周工作几个小时的决策,这在我们以前显示的指标中是衡量的,但文化也可以影响工作态度,效率水平,可靠性等对国家是否表现不佳或跑赢的影响。

Korea's culture looks to be a support to growth in coming years because it is ranked 5 out of 20 countries in this culture gauge. Note that our culture measures compare Korea to countries of similar levels of economic development. Starting with self-sufficiency, Korea is rated pretty well on this measure, weighing that its workers have a roughly average work ethic, its level of government support is low (with government outlays at 22% of GDP), and its labor markets are moderately flexible. Korea also seems to value savoring about the same as it values achieving - again, its work ethic is roughly average, and surveys suggest that its people moderately value accomplishment and achievement. Furthermore, innovation and commercialism are very strong in Korea relative to income. We see the country investing very heavily in research and innovation, and its outputs from innovation, including inventions and earnings, are high. Finally, according to the international measures we are using, Korea has somewhat low bureaucracy and red tape, somewhat high corruption, and average rule of law relative to its income.

韩国的文化似乎是对未来几年增长的支持,因为它在这个文化规模的20个国家中排名第5。请注意,我们的文化措施将韩国与经济发展水平相似的国家进行比较。从自给自足的角度来看,韩国在这一举措上的表现相当不错,称其工人的工作态度大致一般,其政府支持水平较低(政府支出占国内生产总值的22%),劳动力市场适度灵活。韩国的价值取向似乎也值得品尝 - 再次,其工作伦理大致平均,调查显示,人民适度地取得成就和成就。此外,韩国的创新和商业主义相对于收入来说非常强劲。我们看到国家在研究和创新方面投入巨资,其创新产出,包括发明和收益都很高。最后,根据我们正在使用的国际措施,韩国的官僚主义和繁文。节,腐败程度偏高,平均法治相对于其收入来说。

Indebtedness 债务

Think of debt growth that is faster than income growth as being like air in a scuba bottle-there is a limited amount of it that you can use to get an extra boost, but you can't live on it forever. When you are taking it out, you can spend more than is sustainable, but when debts can no longer be raised relative to incomes and the time for paying back comes, the process works in reverse. You can get a picture of where countries stand in the long-term debt cycle and the likelihood of debt being a support or detriment to future growth by assessing the past reliance on debt to support incomes and the attractiveness of taking on new debt.

认为债务增长速度比收入增长速度快,就像像潜水艇一样,空气有限,你可以用来增加额外的收益,但是你永远不会生活在这个水平上。当你把它拿出来的时候,你可以花费更多的可持续性,但是当债务不能相对于收入和偿还时间再提高时,这个过程是相反的。您可以通过评估过去依赖债务来支持收入和承担新债务的吸引力,了解各国在长期债务周期中的地位和债务是否支持未来增长的可能性。

The other major piece of our economic health index looks at the likelihood of debt being a support or detriment to future growth. Korea's indebtedness position is slightly better than other countries, ranked 8 out of the 20 countries we look at. The country has a bit of room to lever up in the future, with a total debt burden of around 277% of GDP, compared to the global average of 200-250%. In the past few years, its growth was neither supported nor depressed by credit creation, which is neutral for growth going forward. Lastly, the stance of monetary policy is generally neutral.

我们的经济健康指数的另一个重要部分是看债务是支持或有害于未来增长的可能性。韩国的债务状况略好于其他国家,在20个国家中排名第8。该国在未来有一定的空间,总债务负担约为国内生产总值的277%,而全球平均水平为200-250%。近几年来,信贷创新的增长既不支撑,也不是压力,对于未来的增长是中立的。最后,货币政策的态度一般是中立的。