How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  • More detail 更多细节
  • Productivity 生产力
  1. Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
  2. Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply

United Kingdom's Future Growth

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Last updated 7 years ago

Based on our economic health index, we project that UK's real growth rate over the next 10 years will be in the vicinity of 1.5% to 1.7%. This growth rate is roughly at the global average, ranked 10 out of 20 major economies, and 3 out of 11 developed countries. As a reminder, this estimate (and this writing) is based on our computergenerated analysis of the statistics detailed in Part 1, and doesn't account for exogenous shocks (like commodity or political shocks, or wars). In UK's case, our growth estimate comes from combining our expectation of a 1.5% growth rate per worker, which is roughly in line with the global average, and a labor force growth rate of 0.2%, which is somewhat above other major economies. The growth in output per worker is driven significantly by productivity and indebtedness. Over the long-term productivity matters most, while swings in indebtedness tend to be an important driver in the short-term. Given we are looking at a 10 year time frame, we weigh our productivity measures about two thirds and our indebtedness measure about one third (though there is no precision here). Over the next 10 years, we expect UK's productivity to be somewhat worse than most major countries (implying a growth rate of 1.0% on its own), and indebtedness conditions to be slightly worse than other countries (implying a growth rate of 1.9% on its own). As shown below, UK's biggest relative strengths are its monetary policy and its low reliance on credit flows for growth, and its biggest relative problems are its debt and debt service levels and how hard its people work. The various gauges and weights are shown below. The individual indicators that are behind them are explained in Part 1 of this section, and listed in the appendix of this section. Please review this table to understand our comments.

根据我们的经济健康指数,我们预计英国未来10年的实际增长率将在1.5%至1.7%附近。这一增长速度大致处于全球平均水平,在20个主要经济体中排名第10,11个发达国家中有3个。作为提醒,这个估计(和这篇文章)是基于我们对第1部分详细统计资料的电子分析,而不考虑外部冲击(如商品或政治冲击或战争)。在英国的情况下,我们的增长预期来自于我们对每名工人的增长率为1.5%的预期,大致符合全球平均水平,劳动力增长率为0.2%,略高于其他主要经济体。每个工人的产出增长主要受生产力和负债的驱动。在长期生产力方面,大多数情况下,负债波动往往是短期的重要驱动力。鉴于我们正在研究10年的时间范围,我们将生产力措施称为三分之二,而我们的债务衡量约三分之一(尽管这里没有精确度)。在接下来的十年中,我们预计英国的生产率会比大多数主要国家的要差一些(意味着自己的增长率为1.0%),债务状况会比其他国家稍差一些(意味着增长率为1.9%它自己的)。如下图所示,英国最大的相对优势是其货币政策和信贷流动对经济增长的依赖度较低,其最大的相对问题是债务和偿债能力以及人民的劳动水平如何。各种规格和重量如下所示。其背后的各个指标在本节的第1部分进行了说明,并在本节的附录中列出。请查看此表以了解我们的意见。

More detail 更多细节

Productivity 生产力

I. Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get 分数显示为与国家和时间的平均观测值的标准偏差数。

A country's productivity and competitiveness is mostly a function of the relative value it offers, especially for its labor. As shorthand for this, we refer to our gauge of this relative value as "what you pay versus what you get"; it reflects a) the cost and value of employees and b) the levels of investment. Countries that have well-educated workers that are relatively inexpensive and that have higher investment rates grow faster than those that don't.

一个国家的生产率和竞争力主要是其所提供的相对价值,特别是劳动力的一个功能。作为这方面的简写,我们将这个相对价值的衡量指标称为“你所付出的与你所得到的”;它反映了a)员工的成本和价值,以及b)投资水平。拥有受过良好教育的工人比较便宜,投资率高的国家比没有受过良好教育的工人要快。

UK offers somewhat worse than average value, ranked 15 among the countries we measure. Its workers are neither expensive nor inexpensive, taking into consideration UK's about average levels of education and good quality of education. Further, people in UK don't work especially hard relative to the cost of their labor - the average male of working age works 23 hours per week (15 out of 20 countries), and the demographics of the workforce are unfavorable. Levels of saving and investing are somewhat low given UK's high per capita income levels, with investment at about 13% of GDP (17 out of 20 countries).

英国的平均价格差于一般,在我们衡量的国家中排名第15。其工作人员既不昂贵也不廉价,考虑到英国的平均教育水平和良好的教育质量。此外,英国人不会因劳动成本而努力工作 - 平均每个工作年龄的男性每周工作23小时(20个国家中有15个),而且员工人数不利。由于英国的高人均收入水平,储蓄和投资水平有所降低,投资额约占国内生产总值的13%(20个国家中有17个)。

II. Culture 文化

Just looking solely at the relative value of a country's workers misses the role that the culture plays in determining how much a country will grow. As I've discussed, culture influences the decisions people make about factors like savings rates or how many hours they work each week, which we measure in the previously shown indicators, but culture can also influence work attitudes, levels of efficiency, reliability and other such influences on whether countries underperform or outperform.

仅仅看一个国家工人的相对价值,就忽略了文化在确定一个国家将有多大增长的作用。正如我所讨论的,文化影响人们对储蓄率或每周工作几个小时的决策,这在我们以前显示的指标中是衡量的,但文化也可以影响工作态度,效率水平,可靠性等对国家是否表现不佳或跑赢的影响。

UK's culture looks to be neutral for growth in coming years because it is ranked 7 out of 20 countries in this culture gauge. Note that our culture measures compare UK to countries of similar levels of economic development. Starting with self-sufficiency, UK is rated pretty poorly on this measure, weighing that its workers have a weak work ethic, its level of government support is high (with government outlays at 45% of GDP), and its labor markets are moderately flexible. UK also seems to value savoring a bit more than achieving - again, its work ethic is weak, and surveys suggest that its people don't especially value accomplishment and achievement. Furthermore, innovation and commercialism are about average in UK relative to income. We see the country investing heavily in research and innovation, and its outputs from innovation, including inventions and earnings, are about average. Finally, according to the international measures we are using, UK has somewhat low bureaucracy and red tape, somewhat low corruption, and very strong rule of law relative to its income.

英国的文化在未来几年对于增长来说是中立的,因为它在这个文化规模的20个国家中排名第7。请注意,我们的文化措施将英国与经济发展水平相似的国家进行比较。从自给自足开始,英国在这一措施上的评价相当差,称其工人工作态度薄弱,政府支持水平很高(政府支出占国内生产总值的45%),劳动力市场适度灵活。英国的价值观似乎比实现要好一些 - 再次,其工作伦理薄弱,调查显示,人们并没有特别重视成就和成就。此外,英国的创新和商业主义相对于收入来说是平均水平。我们看到国家在研究和创新方面进行了大量投资,其创新成果,包括发明和收益,都是平均水平。最后,根据我们正在使用的国际措施,英国的官僚主义和繁文has节,腐败程度偏低,相对于其收入而言,法治相当强大。

Indebtedness 债务

Think of debt growth that is faster than income growth as being like air in a scuba bottle-there is a limited amount of it that you can use to get an extra boost, but you can't live on it forever. When you are taking it out, you can spend more than is sustainable, but when debts can no longer be raised relative to incomes and the time for paying back comes, the process works in reverse. You can get a picture of where countries stand in the long-term debt cycle and the likelihood of debt being a support or detriment to future growth by assessing the past reliance on debt to support incomes and the attractiveness of taking on new debt.

认为债务增长速度比收入增长速度快,就像像潜水艇一样,空气有限,你可以用来增加额外的收益,但是你永远不会生活在这个水平上。当你把它拿出来的时候,你可以花费更多的可持续性,但是当债务不能相对于收入和偿还时间再提高时,这个过程是相反的。您可以通过评估过去依赖债务来支持收入和承担新债务的吸引力,了解各国在长期债务周期中的地位和债务是否支持未来增长的可能性。

认为债务增长速度比收入增长速度快,就像像潜水艇一样,空气有限,你可以用来增加额外的收益,但是你永远不会生活在这个水平上。当你把它拿出来的时候,你可以花费更多的可持续性,但是当债务不能相对于收入和偿还时间再提高时,这个过程是相反的。您可以通过评估过去依赖债务来支持收入和承担新债务的吸引力,了解各国在长期债务周期中的地位和债务是否支持未来增长的可能性。

The other major piece of our economic health index looks at the likelihood of debt being a support or detriment to future growth. UK's indebtedness position is slightly worse than other countries, ranked 13 out of the 20 countries we look at. The country has very little room to lever up in the future, with a total debt burden of around 465% of GDP, compared to the global average of 200-250%. In the past few years, its growth was depressed by low credit creation, which is supportive for growth going forward. Lastly, the stance of monetary policy is generally a bit stimulative.

我们的经济健康指数的另一个重要部分是看债务是支持或有害于未来增长的可能性。英国的债务状况略逊于其他国家,在20个国家中排名第13。国家未来的空间很小,债务总额约占国内生产总值的465%,而全球平均水平为200-250%。近几年来,由于信贷创造低迷,其增长受到抑制,这对未来的增长是有支撑的。最后,货币政策的态度一般有点刺激。