How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
  2. A Closer Look at Each

Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present

PreviousUK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969NextUS Deleveraging, 2008-Present

Last updated 7 years ago

As shown below,Japan has been stuck in a moderate “ugly deflationary deleveraging” for over 20years. In 1989 the private sector debt bubble burst and government sector debt/fiscal expansion began, but there was never adequate “money printing/monetization” to cause nominal growth to be above nominal interest rates and to have the currency devalue. While Japan has eased some, nominal income growth has been stagnant, with persistent deflation eroding moderate real growth. Meanwhile, nominal debts have risen much faster, pushing debt levels higher, from about 400% of GDP at the end of 1989 to 500% today. Equities have declined by nearly 70%.

如下图所示,日本二十多年来一直处于温和的“丑化通货紧缩的去杠杆化”状态。1989年私人部门债务泡沫破灭,政府部门债务/财政扩张开始,但从来没有足够的“货币印刷/货币化”,使名义增长率超过名义利率,并使货币贬值。虽然日本已经放缓,名义收入增长停滞不前,持续的通货紧缩导致温和的实质增长。同时,名义债务上涨速度更快,推高债务水平较高,从1989年底的国内生产总值的400%上升到今天的500%。股票下跌近70%。

The BOJ has “printed/monetized” very little in duration-adjusted terms throughout the deleveraging process, with most of the printing that it has done going to short-term cash-like assets of little duration. As result, it has failed to reflate and the government is building a terrible debt burden.

日本央行在整个去杠杆化过程中,经过长时间调整的条款,“印刷/货币化”很少,大部分的印刷已经完成了持续时间短的类似现金的资产。因此,它没有重组,政府正在构建可怕的债务负担。

As shown in the table below, money creation has been limited at 0.7% of GDP per year, and the yen has appreciated 2.9% per year against the dollar. As a result, since 1990 real growth has averaged 1.1% with persistent deflation (averaging -0.5%). This has left nominal growth 2% below nominal interest rates which cumulatively has led to a large increase in the debt/income ratio. While the private sector has delevered modestly, Japan’s total debt level has climbed from 403% to 498% because of government borrowing and deflation.

如下表所示,创造金额每年限制在国内生产总值的0.7%,日元兑美元每年升值2.9%。因此,1990年实际增长平均为1.1%,持续通缩(平均为-0.5%)。这使得名义利率低于名义利率2%,累计导致债务/收入比大幅增长。虽然私营部门有所缓和,但由于政府借款和通货紧缩,日本债务总额已从403%上升至498%。

The charts below show how the Japan case developed over time, breaking out the cumulative contributions of different drivers to changes in debt burdens relative to incomes. In aggregate in the economy, new borrowing has merely covered continued debt service and no more. Persistent deflation has added to debt burdens, while defaults and real growth have reduced them.

下面的图表显示了日本案件如何随着时间的推移而发展,打破了不同司机对债务负担相对于收入变化的累积贡献。总的说来,新借款仅仅涵盖持续的债务偿还,不再有。持续的通货紧缩增加了债务负担,而违约和实际增长已经减少。

Debt levels for the private sector have fallen modestly. Defaults, real growth and paying down debt after paying interest have helped. Interest payments have been substantial and deflation has also added to debt burdens.

私营部门的债务水平略有下降。预期,实际增长和支付利息后偿还债务有所帮助。利息支出一直很大,通货紧缩也增加了债务负担。

Government borrowing has gone up significantly, mostly to cushion the weak private sector.

政府借款大幅上涨,主要是为了缓解私营部门疲软。

Weak nominal GDP growth has resulted from the combination of mediocre real GDP growth and deflation.

国内生产总值的平均增长是由平均的实际GDP增长与通货紧缩相结合造成的。

And nominal GDP growth rates have remained below Japanese government rates for most of this period, creating a persistent upwards pressure on debt burdens.

在这个时期的大部分时间里,国内生产总值的名义增长率一直都低于日本的政府利率,给债务负担带来了持续的上涨压力。