How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
  2. A Closer Look at Each

US Deleveraging, 2008-Present

PreviousJapan Deleveraging, 1990-PresentNextThe Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present

Last updated 7 years ago

Like the US deleveraging in the 1930s, the lead-up consisted of a debt driven boom, and the deleveraging has transpiredintwostages:acontractioninincomesfollowedbyreflationandgrowth. However,becauseofaswift policy response from the Fed, which was prompt in guaranteeing debt and aggressively printing money, the contractionary period only lasted six months (versus over three years in the 1930s), and since then there has been reflation and debt reduction through a mix of rising nominal incomes, default and debt repayment.

20世纪30年代的美国去杠杆化一样,上涨主要是由债务驱动的繁荣,去杠杆化的趋势在下降趋势中:通过缩减和增长而得到的收益。然而,由于美联储在保证债务和积极打印资金方面迅速采取政策措施,紧缩期只持续了6个月(而在20世纪30年代为3年),从那时起,通过混合通货膨胀和减债名义收入上升,违约和还本付息。

As shown in the charts below, unlike both the US in the 1930s and Japan since 1990, the US has quickly entered a reflation and ended the “ugly deflationary deleveraging” phase of the process (which lasted from July 2008, just before Lehman fell, to March 2009, when the Fed instituted its aggressive program of quantitative easing to monetize the debts). During the “ugly” phase, incomes fell, debt burdens rose from about 340% GDP to 370% and stocks lost almost half their value. Because so much debt around the world is dollar denominated, the contraction in global credit and dollar liquidity created a squeeze for dollars, and the dollar strengthened significantly against a trade-weighted basket. Exports collapsed faster than domestic demand. Following the reflation that began in March 2009, incomes recovered, debt burdens fell below their initial starting level to around 335% and stocks recovered all of their losses. At this time, the credit markets are largely healed and private sector credit growth is improving. Thus far, this deleveraging would win my award of the most beautiful deleveraging on record. The key going forward will be for policy makers to maintain balance so that the debt/income ratio keeps declining in an orderly way.

下图所示,不同于20世纪30年代的美国和1990年以来的日本,美国很快进入了通货膨胀,并结束了这个过程的“丑陋的通货紧缩的去杠杆化”阶段(从2007年7月开始,就在雷曼兄弟下跌之前,到2009年3月,当时美联储采取积极的量化宽松计划,从而从债务中获利。在“丑”阶段,收入下降,债务负担从国内生产总值的约340%上升到370%,股价几乎下跌了一半。由于世界各地的债务是美元计价的,全球信贷和美元流动性的收缩造成了美元的挤压,美元在贸易加权篮子上大幅增长。出口下滑比国内需求快。在2009年3月开始的重新通货膨胀之后,收入回升,债务负担低于初始起步水平,达到335%左右,股票收回了所有的亏损。目前,信贷市场受到很大程度的治愈,私人部门信贷增长正在改善。到目前为止,这种去杠杆化将赢得我的最美丽的去杠杆化的纪录。未来的关键是决策者要保持平衡,使债务/收入比率有序地下降。

The magnitude of the easing by the Fed has been substantial. Not only did the Fed cut rates and backstop essential credit during the liquidity crisis, but it pursued one of the most aggressive easing policies by pushing money into risky assets. The Fed began to push money into the system with the announcement of a significant QE1 in March 2009 with the purchase of Treasuries and agency-backed bonds. The Fed further increased its holdings of longer duration government debt (mostly Treasuries) with QE2 starting in August 2010 and Operation Twist starting in the fall 2011. During these three periods, changes in asset holdings on a duration- adjusted basis (equivalent to 10-year duration) peaked at 8%, 5% and roughly 2% of GDP annualized pace respectively.

美联储宽松的幅度是巨大的。在流动性危机期间,美联储不但降低利率和支撑基本信贷,而且通过将资金投向风险资产,实行最积极的宽松政策之一。美联储在2009年3月公布了重要的QE1,并购买了国债和代理支持债券,才开始将资金投入系统。美联储进一步增加持有的长期政府债务(主要是国库券),2010年8月开始实行QE2,2011年秋季开始实施扭曲操作。在这三个时期内,资产持有量按期间变动(相当于10年)年均达到GDP的8%,5%和2%左右。

As shown below, during the contractionary period, nominal growth fell at an annualized rate of -5.4% due to a collapse in real activity between July 2008 and February 2009. Falling incomes sent the debt to GDP level higher, even as credit creation collapsed.

下图所示,在紧缩期间,由于2008年7月至2009年2月期间实际活动崩溃,名义增长率年均下降至-5.4%。收入下降使得债务到GDP水平更高,即使信贷创造崩溃。

In March 2009, the Fed eased aggressively through QE, as discussed, buying government bonds and pushing a massive amount of money into the system (more than $1.5 trillion). This push of money and the subsequent reflation of assets stimulated a recovery in economic activity, which rebounded at a rate of 3.5% per year. Nominal growth has been marginally higher than nominal government rates. Debt levels have fallen 13% of GDP per year, because the private sector has deleveraged while government borrowing has risen. Nominal growth contributed to an annualized 12% decline in the debt/income ratio, defaults contributed to a 6% reduction and repayments contributed to a 15% reduction while interest payments contributed to a 20% increase in the debt/income ratio.

2009年3月,美联储通过量化宽松政策积极缓和,购买政府债券,大量资金投入系统(超过1.5万亿美元)。这种资金推动和随后的资产重组刺激了经济活动复苏,每年以3.5%的速度反弹。名义增长略高于名义上的政府利率。债务水平每年下降了GDP的13%,因为私营部门在政府借款上升的同时已经去杠杆化。名义增长导致债务/收入比率年均下降12%,违约减少6%,偿还额减少15%,利息支付导致债务/收入比率上升20%。

As shown, debt levels increased during the contraction phase but declined in response to reflation so that they are now down a bit from the starting point. With debt levels so high, interest payments have been a significant burden, but they have been offset by a mix of paying down debts, moderate inflation and defaults, with debt repayment the largest component.

如图所示,债务水平在收缩阶段增加,但由于对通货膨胀的反应而下降,因此现在已经从起点下降了一点。由于债务水平如此之高,利息支出一直是一个重大的负担,但是由于偿还债务,温和通货膨胀和违约的组合,偿还债务是最大的组成部分。

The private sector has reduced its debt level by 37% GDP. Debt repayment has been the biggest factor here, with defaults and inflation also making contributions, more than offsetting the interest burden.

私营部门的债务水平降低了国内生产总值的37%。债务偿还一直是这里的最大因素,违约和通货膨胀也作出了贡献,抵消了利息负担。

Private sector debt repayment has been somewhat (less than half) offset by government borrowing beyond interest payments.

私人部门的债务还款(少于一半)由政府借款超出利息支出抵消。

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