How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
  2. A Closer Look at Each

United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937

PreviousA Closer Look at EachNextJapan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936

Last updated 7 years ago

United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937 美国经济衰退与通货膨胀,1930 - 1937年

As explained, the US Great Deleveraging in the 1930s transpired in two phases – a deflationary depression from 1930 through 1932, and a reflationary deleveraging from 1933 to 1937. The charts below show debt levels against nominal GDP growth year over year (left chart) and against the total return of stocks (right chart). Debt levels as % of GDP are on the right axis of each chart. The line shows where there was a significant amount of “money printing”. The first phase is labeled (1) and the second phase is labeled (2). During the first phase (the “ugly deflationary depression” phase), income and credit collapsed, with nominal growth rates falling significantly below nominal interest rates, and the economy contracted while the debt/income ratio rose. As shown, it followed the stock market bubble bursting in September 1929. As a result of that private sector deleveraging, incomes collapsed, to the point that they were declining by nearly 30% per year at the end of 1932. Because of the fall in incomes, debt/GDP rose from roughly 150% to 250% of GDP (as shown on the left).

如上所述,20世纪30年代的美国大消失分为两个阶段:经济衰退从1930年到1932年,以及从1933年到1937年的通货膨胀的去杠杆化。下面的图表显示了债务水平与去年的名义GDP增长(左图)和反对股票的总回报(右图)。债务水平占GDP的百分比在每个图表的右侧。该线显示了大量“钱印”的地方。第一阶段标记为(1),第二阶段标记为(2)。在第一阶段(“丑恶通货紧缩”阶段),收入和信贷崩溃,名义增长率明显低于名义利率,经济收缩,债务/收入比上升。如图所示,它是在1929年9月的股市泡沫破灭之后。由于私营部门去杠杆化,收入下滑,到了1932年底,它们每年下降了近30%。由于下降收入,债务/国内生产总值从大约150%上升到国内生产总值的250%(如左图所示)。

Through this time stocks fell by more than 80% (as shown on the right). This first phase ended and the second phase began when the money printing started in March 1933. FDR broke the peg to gold and the dollar fell 40% from 21 dollars/ounce to 35 over the course of the year. This reflation also led to rising economic activity, and nominal growth to be above nominal interest rates. 1937 is when it ended in response to the Fed turning restrictive which caused a “re”cession (which is when the term was invented).

此时股票跌幅超过80%(如右图所示)。第一阶段结束,第二阶段开始于1933年3月开始印花.FDR打破了黄金,美元在一年中从21美元/盎司下跌了40%,至35美元。这种通货膨胀也导致经济活动上升,名义增长率高于名义利率。1937年是为了回应美联储转向限制,导致“重新”(这是发明的时期)。

In March of '33, the Fed eased by devaluing the dollar against gold and kept interest rates low for many years. Most of the additional balance sheet expansion was to buy gold to keep the value of the dollar depressed. While the Fed made money easy through low rates and currency, it did not directly buy many risky assets (unlike today as I discuss further below).

33年3月,美联储因美元贬值黄金,多年来维持低利率而放缓。大部分额外的资产负债表扩张是为了维持美元贬值的黄金。虽然美联储通过低利率和货币容易地赚钱,但并没有直接购买许多风险资产(不像我下面进一步讨论)。

The table below tells this story more precisely. During the “ugly deflationary depression”, incomes collapsed as nominal GDP fell 17% per year, about half from deflation and half from the collapse in real demand. As a result, nominal growth was 20.4% below nominal rates, and debt to GDP rose at a rate of 32% per year. Beginning March 1933, the government devalued the dollar against gold and from ’33-‘37 it increased money supply roughly 1.7% of GDP. Nominal growth recovered at a rate of 9.2% in this period, a combination of 7.2% real growth and moderate 2% inflation. Nominal GDP rose to 6.3% above rates. The private sector reduced its debt burdens, while government borrowing grew with incomes.

下表更准确地讲述了这个故事。在“丑陋的通货紧缩抑郁症”中,由于名义GDP每年下降17%,收入下降了约一半,通货紧缩约为一半,实际需求下降了一半。因此,名义增长率低于名义利率20.4%,债务与国内生产总值每年以32%的速度上升。政府从1933年3月开始,贬值美元兑黄金,而从33-37开始,货币供应量大约增加了国内生产总值的1.7%。这一时期的名义增长率为9.2%,实际增长率为7.2%,通货膨胀率为中等的2%。名义GDP升幅高于百分之六点三。私营部门减轻债务负担,而政府借款随着收入增加。

The chart below shows an over time picture of the same basic attribution shown earlier. Relative to GDP, total debt was the same in 1937 as in 1930. In between, it ballooned because of a contraction in incomes from deflation and negative real growth. The reversal of the debt burden was driven by a rise in incomes to 1930 levels in nominal terms. Borrowing for interest payments was mostly offset by paying down of debts.

下图显示了与之前显示的相同基本归因的过时照片。相对于国内生产总值,1937年的债务总额与1930年相同。在此之间,由于通货紧缩收入和负实际增长收缩,其发展迅速。债务负担的逆转是由名义上的收入上升到1930年的水平推动的。借款用于支付利息大部分被偿还债务抵消。

This reversal in incomes was also the primary driver of changes in debt burdens for the private sector, along with debt pay-downs. Defaults were a small driver.

收入的这种逆转也是私营部门债务负担变化的主要动力,以及债务减免。默认是一个小司机。

The stock of government debt was small at the onset of the depression. Initially, this debt burden rose because of the collapse in income. Nominal government debt levels increased following 1933 because of larger fiscal deficits, while the income recovery cushioned the increase in these burdens.

在抑郁症发作时,政府债务存量很小。最初,这笔债务负担由于收入的崩溃而上升。名义上的政府债务水平在1933年以后增加,因为财政赤字较大,而收入回升缓解了这些负担的增加。

As shown below, the catalyst for the recovery was the printing and dollar devaluation against gold. Price levels turned at this point, from declining at an average rate of 8% to increasing roughly 2% per year. This is a good example of how printing negated deflation rather than triggering high inflation.

如下图所示,经济复苏的催化剂是印度和美元对黄金的贬值。此时价格水平转为平均水平,下降8%,每年上涨约2%。这是打印否定通货紧缩而不是触发高通胀的一个很好的例子。

As shown below, real economic activity also rebounded after the announcement.

如下图所示,实际经济活动也在公布后反弹。

Credit stopped declining at this point and stabilized at low levels of creation, while money printing increased moderately.

信贷在这一点上停止下滑,稳定在低水平的创造水平,而金钱印刷则适度增长。

With the different policy steps taken from 1933 through 1937, nominal GDP growth moved substantially above government rates, greatly reducing debt burdens.

随着从1933年到1937年采取的不同政策步骤,名义GDP增长大大高于政府利率,大大减轻了债务负担。

This nominal GDP growth consisted of strong real growth (from a depressed level) and moderate inflation.

这个名义GDP增长包括强劲的实际增长(从萧条的水平)和温和的通货膨胀。