The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present

As shown below, Spain has been going through the first and “ugly deflationary” phase of the cycle and has not yet moved on because it can’t “print/monetize”; it is dependent on the ECB to do this. As shown, incomes also began to fall in Spain from July 2008 and debts rose from that point from about 365% to close to 400%. Debt burdens have since stabilized but are still higher than at the start of the deleveraging. Equities initially fell nearly 45% and are still 25% below July 2008 levels.

如下图所示，西班牙一直在经历这个周期的第一个和“丑陋的通货紧缩”阶段，还没有转移，因为它不能“打印/货币化”;它依赖于欧洲央行这样做。如图所示，2008年7月以来西班牙的收入也开始下降，债务从这一点上升到约365％，接近400％。债务负担已经稳定下来，但仍高于去杠杆化开始。股价最初下跌近45％，比2008年7月以来还低25％。

Though Spain has not been able to print money directly, the ECB has pushed a significant amount of money into Spain by buying its bonds and providing liquidity to its banks which prevented a more severe deleveraging. It provided this support in the summer of 2010 and again in the fall of 2011, when credit tightened. During both these periods, peak purchases by the ECB pushed money into Spanish risky assets at a rate of more than 10% of Spanish GDP (adjusted to a 10-year duration). The push of money has come from a mix of sovereign and covered bond purchases, and shorter-term loans, such as the recent LTRO. Despite this printing the ECB has not pushed Spanish sovereign spreads and interest rates down enough so that nominal growth is above nominal rates (as shown later).

虽然西班牙不能直接打印货币，但欧洲央行通过购买债券并为其银行提供流动性，将大量资金投入西班牙，阻止更严格的去杠杆化。它在2010年夏天提供了这种支持，而在2011年秋天，当信贷紧缩时，它提供了这种支持。在这两个时期期间，欧洲央行采购高峰将西班牙的风险资产投入西班牙国内生产总值的10％以上（调整为10年）。货币的推动来自主权债券和覆盖债券购买以及近期LTRO等短期贷款。尽管这样印刷，欧洲央行并没有把西班牙的主权利差和利率下调到足以令名义增长率高于名义利率（如下图所示）。

Understandably, in Spain the policy response has been much slower than in the US because the policy options are limited, most importantly because Spain cannot print money. And understandably, Spain has seen its credit spread climb and rising debt service costs have sent debt/income levels much higher. Unlike in our other cases, Spain’s government bond yield has a substantial credit risk component because of Spain's inability to print.

可以理解，在西班牙，政策反应比美国慢得多，因为政策选择有限，最重要的是因为西班牙不能打印资金。可以理解的是，西班牙已经看到其信贷蔓延攀升，债务偿还成本上涨已经使债务/收入水平高得多。与其他情况不同，由于西班牙无法印刷，西班牙政府债券收益率有很大的信用风险。

Nominal growth has been negative during the Spanish deleveraging because inflation has been 0.6% and real growth has been -1.1%. As a result, nominal growth has been 5.5% below government bond yields. The euro has devalued 20% against gold on an annualized basis, but much less against the dollar as all major currencies have devalued against gold.

由于通货膨胀率为0.6％，实际增长率为-1.1％，西班牙去杠杆化下的名义增长一直为负。因此，名义增长比政府债券收益率低5.5％。欧元兑美元年均跌幅为20％，但与所有主要货币贬值黄金相比，欧元兑美元大幅下挫。

As shown below, Spain’s debt level has increased due to a high and rising interest burden, new borrowing above interest payments and negative real growth. Rising interest payments are the largest component here as higher Spanish credit spreads have increased debt service costs. Inflation and defaults have moderately reduced debt burdens.

如下图所示，西班牙的债务水平由于利息负担高，利息支出上升的新借款和实际增长负增长而上升。由于西班牙信贷利差上升，债务偿还费用增加，因此利息支付上升是最大的一部分。通货膨胀和违约减轻了债务负担。

While the private sector has been repaying debt, even with debt repayment, private sector debt levels are above where they were in June 2008 (though they have recently declined) because of borrowing for interest payments and negative real growth.

虽然私营部门已偿还债务，即使还本付息，私人部门债务水平高于2008年6月份（尽管最近有所下降），因为借款用于支付利息和负增长。

The government has levered up during the period. Government debt was relatively low at the start of the crisis and still remains a fraction of aggregate debt in Spain.

政府在此期间已经飙升。危机开始时政府债务相对较低，仍然是西班牙总债务的一小部分。

At this time, while the ECB’s moves have helped, the prospects remain poor for Spain because, with monetary policies where they are, nominal growth will remain weak and too much of the adjustment process will depend on austerity and debt reduction.

在这个时候，虽然欧洲央行的举动有所帮助，但西班牙的前景仍然很差，因为货币政策是名义增长，而且调整过程中的调整过程将依赖于紧缩和减债。