How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
  2. A Closer Look at Each

UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969

PreviousJapan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936NextJapan Deleveraging, 1990-Present

Last updated 7 years ago

The charts below show debt levels against nominal GDP growth year over year (left chart) and against the total return of stocks (right chart). Debt levels as % of GDP are on the right axis of each chart. The line shows where a significant amount of “money printing” occurred. The first phase is labeled (1) and the second phase is labeled (2). The UK acquired lots of debt both before and during World War II and entered a recession at the end of World War II, pushing debt burdens higher. As shown, from the end of 1943 to the end of 1947 debt levels rose from just above 250% of GDP to 400%. While in 1948 debt burdens dipped a bit with a recovery in incomes, in September 1949 the UK printed money and devalued the pound by 30% against the dollar and gold, at the same time also keeping short rates basically at zero. As a result nominal growth rose above nominal interest rates, debt levels fell by 250% and stocks rallied between 1948 and 1969.

下面的图表显示了债务水平与去年的名义GDP增长(左图)和股票总回报(右图)。债务水平占GDP的百分比在每个图表的右侧。该行显示了大量“货币打印”发生的地方。第一阶段标记为(1),第二阶段标记为(2)。英国在第二次世界大战之前和之后获得了很多债务,并在第二次世界大战结束时进入了衰退期,从而使债务负担更高。如图所示,从1943年底到1947年底,债务水平从刚刚超过国内生产总值的250%上升到400%。1948年,债务负担有所回落,1949年9月,英国打印货币,贬值了英镑,兑美元和黄金上涨了30%,同时基准利率基本维持在零水平。因此,名义利率上升超过名义利率,债务水平下降了250%,股票在1948年和1969年之间上涨。

At the same time that the UK kept interest rates low with easy money during the period, there was a big currency devaluation in 1949 and the BOE increased asset purchases to about 1% GDP in 1950, both of which helped to keep nominal growth above nominal interest rates, which was the most important influence in lowering the debt/income ratio.

与此同时英国在这段期间保持低利率的低利率,1949年货币贬值较大,而京东方在1950年将资产购买增加到约1%,这两者都有助于保持名义增长超过名义利率是降低债务/收入比率的最重要影响因素。

The table below shows how the most important part of this deleveraging occurred. I broke it up into two parts – from 1947 to 1959 and from 1960 to 1969 because they were a bit different.

下表显示了这种去杠杆化的最重要的部分是如何发生的。我分为两部分 - 从1947年到1959年,从1960年到1969年,因为它们有所不同。

As shown below, as a result of this mix in policies, the decline in total debt in the post-war period occurred via a rise in nominal GDP which outpaced more modest increases in the amount of new borrowing. Inflation of around 4% from 1947-1970 drove nearly 2/3 of the decline in debt to GDP that is attributable to GDP growth. Net new borrowing was small as borrowing for interest payments was offset by paying down debts. This is shown in the chart below.

如下图所示,由于政策混合,战后债务总额的下降是通过名义GDP增长,新借款额上升幅度略有上升。1947 - 1970年间通货膨胀率约为4%,导致国内生产总值增长的债务下降近三分之二。新借款净额较小,借款利息支付被抵销。如下图所示。

The same is true for both the government and the private sector. The net new borrowing by the government was relatively small through the period, particularly from 1947-1960. The charts below show the attributions of the changes in the debt ratios.

政府和私营部门也是如此。这个时期,特别是1947 - 1960年间,政府的新借款净额相对较小。以下图表显示了负债比率变动的归属。