Hyperinflation

January 1922- November 1923

First Half of 1922: The Transition to Hyperinflation 1922年上半年：过度恶化通货膨胀

The stock market crashes; foreigners pull out of investments; mark depreciation accelerates; liquidity crisis; Reichsbank prints money and makes loans directly to the private sector...

股市崩盘外国人退出投资;标记折旧加速;流动性危机;帝国银行打印资金并直接向私营部门贷款...

In 1922, as the rate of price increases accelerated towards hyperinflation, there was a labor scarcity that drove the unemployment rate below one percent.

1922年，随着价格上涨加剧恶性通货膨胀，劳动力短缺导致失业率下降到百分之一以下。

As inflation became hyperinflation, the currency weakness started to hurt the economy rather than to help it and stocks no longer seemed like a viable hedge against inflation. Also, in January the allies imposed fiscal restraints on Germany. Instead of there being a high correlation between the exchange rate of the dollar and the price of shares, there was an increasing divergence between share prices and the exchange rate.

由于通货膨胀成为恶性通货膨胀，货币疲软开始损害经济，而不是帮助它，股票似乎不再像通货膨胀一样可行。此外，1月份盟国对德国实行财政限制。而不是美元汇率与股价之间存在很高的相关性，股价和汇率之间的差距越来越大。

Foreigners pulled out in 1922, which caused a liquidity crisis, which led to the central bank to print the money to ease the crisis, which led to an increase in inflation. This is a classic dynamic of debtor countries when they experience foreign capital withdrawals and economic weakness at the same time. In other words, when money leaves a country, (typically when foreign and domestic investors fear that they will lose money in debt instruments due to a credit crisis being accommodated by the central bank aggressively providing liquidity typically to fund growing budget deficits), the central bank is forced to choose between tighter money and printing money. As the economy is weak and credit is already tight, there really is no choice.312

外国人在1922年退出，造成流动性危机，导致中央银行打印资金以缓解危机，导致通货膨胀率上升。这是债务国在经历外资退出和经济疲软的同时经典的动力。换句话说，当货币离开一个国家时（通常当外国和国内投资者担心由于中央银行积极提供流动性以资助日益增长的预算赤字而发生信贷危机时，他们将会亏损债务工具），中央银行银行被迫选择更紧密的货币和印刷货币。由于经济疲弱，信贷紧张，实在没有选择 。

As shown in the chart that follows, late in 1H22, the velocity of money accelerated, the mark depreciated, inflation rose and M0 growth increased to accommodate this increased demand for cash.

如下图所示，在二零零二年上半年，货币速度加快，货币贬值，通胀上升，M0增长增加，以适应现金需求的上涨。

In the spring of 1922, when foreigners' willingness to hold mark bank balances declined, this caused an acute liquidity crisis. Because such crises generally lead to bank and business collapses, in July 1922, the Reichsbank began to increase the supply of central bank money by stepping up its discounting of private bills. So the shift from inflation into hyper-inflation during 1922 was due to the decreased willingness of foreign and domestic investors to lend in marks, and the response of the central bank to replace this lost capital with printed currency

在1922年春天，当外国人持有商业银行余额的意愿下降时，引发了流动性紧张的危机。由于这种危机一般导致银行和业务崩溃，1922年7月，帝国银行开始增加中央银行的货币供应量，加紧贴现私人账单。所以在1922年期间，通货膨胀从过高通货膨胀的转变是由于外国和国内投资者放弃商标的意愿不足，中央银行的反应是用印刷货币来代替这一损失的资本

Holtfrerich p. 289

霍尔特弗里奇289

At this point German investors were subjected to foreign exchange controls and legislation against capital flight.313

在这一点上，德国投资者受到外汇管制和对资本外逃的立法 。

In January 1922, a deal was cut in which the Allies granted a reparations moratorium in exchange for a halt to Germany's printing of money and stabilizing its exchange rate. Consistent with this deal, increasing taxes and cutting expenditures were demanded as the means of balancing the Reich's budget. Also, the allies required that the Reichsbank be made autonomous, in the hope of stiffening its resistance to the Reich's demands for credit. The German side accepted these conditions.

1922年1月，一个协议减少，盟国暂停批准暂停使用德国的印钞和稳定汇率。根据这项协议，增加税收和削减支出被要求作为平衡帝国预算的手段。此外，盟友要求帝国银行自治，希望加强对帝国信贷要求的抵制。德国方面接受了这些条件。

After the ominous "Black Thursday" (December 1, 1921), shell shocked investors realized that not even the purchase of shares was a safe means of investing their savings, so stocks fell. By October 1922, the stock market index was at its lowest level since 1914.

在不祥的“黑色星期四”（1921年12月1日）之后，贝壳震惊的投资者意识到，即使购买股票也是安全的投资方式，所以股票下跌。到1922年10月，股市指数是自1914年以来的最低水平。

The enormous drop in share prices that started in December 1921 caused stocks to become extremely cheap by late 1922. One example that is given is that all the share capital of Daimler was worth a value of 327 cars though it had "considerable plant and equipment, an extensive area of land, its reserves and its liquid capital, and its commercial organization developed in Germany and abroad."

1921年12月开始的股价大幅下跌导致股票在1922年底之前变得非常便宜。其中一个例子是，戴姆勒的所有股本都值327欧元，尽管它拥有“相当大的工厂和设备，广泛的土地面积，其储量和流动资金，以及在德国和国外开发的商业组织。

In the period of relative stabilization of the exchange, which occurred in the first months of 1922, the recovery of the national finances made some progress as the German Government adopted some financial measures to reduce expenditures. But confidence in the mark, which the event of September 1921 had profoundly shaken, could not be re-established.

在1921年/ 1992年熊市中，股东投资减少了75％。下表显示股价反对货物价格，传达股东实际亏损，即使名义价格上涨。如图所示，货币（即标记）下降，批发价格上涨幅度相似，总体生活成本指数略有下降，股价大幅下跌，M0涨幅更小。这反映了M0的增长不是通货膨胀和货币贬值的原因，而是由于货币供应量增加以适应较高的通货膨胀和货币贬值。换句话说，发展了一种自我增长的通货膨胀周期，其中中央银行更多的货币需求不断增加，导致货币疲软，通货膨胀率上升，资本金减少，造成更多的货币需求，中央银行银行容纳。

After June 1922, a new wave of pessimism swept over Germany. German speculation renewed its attacks against the mark, which once again suffered a sharp fall. The number of people who positioned themselves to benefit from a continuous depreciation of the mark increased continually in Germany. Not only the great industries and the large merchant firms, but also numerous classes of investors, hoarded foreign bills or currency, which they bought with borrowed marks. Investors also wanted to escape the mark and the government’s confiscatory taxes so anyone who had wealth invested it in foreign currencies, bills, securities, etc., which were easily concealed. The “flight of capital,” which in Germany became a ‘”mass phenomenon” that restrictions did not succeed in stopping, continually removed a huge amount of taxable wealth from Germany. Producers protected themselves by forcing their customers to pay in foreign money, or to pay amounts in paper marks which were computed at the rate of the day on which the producer could convert them into foreign money. The retail trader at that time tried to protect himself by fixing a basic price in gold marks or dollars which he converted into paper marks at the daily rate.

1922年6月以后，新一波的悲观情绪席卷德国。德国的投机更新了对这个商标的袭击，这次再次遭遇了大幅度的下滑。定位自己的人数受益于德国商标不断贬值。不仅伟大的行业和大型商人，还有众多的投资者，囤积了他们借用的商标买下的外国票据或货币。投资者也想逃避标价和政府的征收税，所以任何有财富的人都会以容易隐藏的外币，票据，证券等方式投资。在德国成为“限制不成功”的“大规模现象”，不断从德国消除了大量的应税财富。生产者通过强迫客户支付外国货款来保护自己，或者按照生产者将其转换为外国货币的日期的比率计算的纸币支付金额。当时的零售商试图通过以黄金或美元固定基本价格来保护自己，他以每日换算成纸币。

The disequilibrium between the demand and supply of foreign bills was the result of the following factors:

外国票据的供求不平衡是以下因素造成的：

(a) Having little faith in the political and economic future of Germany and desiring to avoid taxes, German industrialists left abroad a part of the profits from exports; that is, the difference between the cost of production and the price which they received by selling abroad. 德国的工业家对德国的政治和经济前景缺乏信心，希望避免税收，从出口到国外的部分利润;也就是生产成本与海外销售收到的价格差异。

(b) A lot of the foreign money which was obtained by German sales to foreigners of securities, houses, land, etc., was either left abroad (the "flight of capital'') or hoarded at home, so that it did not come on to the exchange market. 德国向外国人出售证券，房屋，土地等方面所获得的大量外国资金被留在国外（“首都”）或在国内囤积，来到交易市场。

(c) The numerous laws that prohibited the buying of foreign exchange helped to lessen the supply of it because the possessor of foreign exchange would not give it up at any price, fearing that he would be unable to repurchase it later when the need arose. 禁止买卖外汇的许多法律有助于减少供应，因为外汇拥有人不会以任何价格放弃，担心在需要时以后不能再回购。

(d) A brisk demand for foreign exchange on the part of the German possessors of paper marks. More and more, as the mark depreciated the phenomenon was understood by the public and the mark ceased to be wanted as a "store of value." 德国拥有纸张的外汇需求急剧增加。越来越多的人因为这个现象被公众所理解，商标被贬值，不再被认为是“价值储存”。

(e) As depreciation progressed, the mark became unfit as a medium of exchange. For example, the practice of calculating prices in foreign money became widespread in the second half of 1922 because it was more practical. 随着折旧的进行，商标不适合作为交换媒介。例如，1922年下半年，外币计价的做法普遍存在，因为更为实际。

The chart below shows how the exchange rate's depreciation outpaced wholesale price increases, which outpaced the cost of living increases, which outpaced both M0 growth and stock price increases, from May 1922 through December 1922. As explained, that was because capital flows out of marks were accommodated by money growth in a self-reinforcing inflationary spiral—and not because money growth pushed prices higher.

The chart below shows how the exchange rate’s depreciation outpaced wholesale price increases, which outpaced the cost of living increases, which outpaced both M0 growth and stock price increases, from May 1922 through December 1922. As explained, that was because capital flows out of marks were accommodated by money growth in a self-reinforcing inflationary spiral—and not because money growth pushed prices higher.

下面的图表显示了汇率的贬值如何超过批发价格上涨，超过了生活成本增长，超过了M0增长和股价涨幅，从1922年5月至1922年12月。正如所解释的那样，这是因为资本流出了商标由于货币增长受到自强的通货膨胀螺旋的影响，而不是因为货币增长推高价格。

The price movements of stocks are shown below. As shown by either measure, the real stock price fell by 80% to 90% from the end of the war in 1918 until mid-1920. Then inflation adjusted prices doubled to quadrupled (depending on which measure you use). Then inflation adjusted prices plunged to new lows in late 1922. Then in 1923, they rose by a factor of four or five. Imagine these whipsaws and what it must have been like to navigate through them.

股票价格走势如下所示。由两种措施可见，1918年至1920年中期，实际股价从战争结束以来下降了80％至90％。然后，通货膨胀调整价格翻了一番，翻了两番（取决于你使用哪种措施）。然后，通货膨胀调整后的价格在1922年末下降到新的低点。然后在1923年，他们上涨了四五点。想象一下这些鞭子，以及它们必须如何浏览它们。

It was clear that Germany’s reparations debt needed to be restructured so a conference to explore how to do this occurred in Cannes in January 1922. The allies demanded that Germany stabilize its public finances by bringing its revenues and expenditures toward balance as the precondition for a reparations moratorium.314 Finally on March 9, 1922, a compromise was concluded between the parties and authorization was given to the Government to impose a forced loan of a billion gold marks. This was executed in July 1922, when the wealthy classes were forced to make a “loan” to the government. However, they secured the right to make this loan payable in paper marks because there was no other viable means of making payment. This scared investors who were afraid of having their wealth confiscated, and because this fiscal tightening would certainly hurt economic growth. This development hurt the stock market and briefly stabilized the mark between March and May 1922.315 For example, on the Berlin foreign exchange market the dollar exchange rate averaged 284.19 marks in March, 291.00 in April, 290.11 in May and, on June 9, 289.25. But it also caused businesses to suffer from illiquidity. The demands for bank credit increased as an attempt to raise liquidity by businesses. However, since at the same time the flow of funds to the banks fell, their own liquidity declined. At the same time the structure of their deposit liabilities shifted rapidly towards shorter term because depositors didn’t want to grant longer term credit because they also were worried about their liquidity. So this increased bank liquidity risks. Banks in Germany were desperate for liquidity. In June, the Reparations Commission postponed consideration of loans to Germany until after a revision of reparations claims. That was the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back”—i.e., it dashed hopes of an early stabilization of the mark which destroyed foreigners' willingness to accept payment in marks or to buy mark-denominated securities.

显然，德国的赔偿债务需要重组，所以在1922年1月在戛纳举行的一次会议探讨如何发生。盟国要求德国稳定公共财政，将其收支平衡作为赔偿的前提条件暂停。最后在1922年3月9日，双方缔结妥协，授权政府强制执行十亿黄金标记贷款。这是在1922年7月执行的，当时富有的阶级被迫向政府提供“贷款”。但是，由于没有其他可行的付款方式，他们有权以纸币形式支付这笔贷款。这吓倒了那些害怕没收财富的投资者，而且这种财政紧缩一定会伤害经济增长。这种发展伤害了股市，并简要稳定三月和五月1922年315之间的标记例如，柏林外汇市场上美元汇率平均为284.19马克在三月，四月291.00，在290.11五月，6月9日，289.25。但也导致企业遭受流动性不足。银行信贷的需求增加，企图提高流动性。但是，由于同时银行资金流动下降，自身流动性下降。与此同时，存款负债结构迅速转向短期，因为存款人不想给予长期信贷，因为他们也担心其流动性。所以这增加了银行的流动性风险。德国银行绝望流动性。6月份，赔偿委员会在修改赔偿要求之后推迟对德国的贷款考虑。那就是谚语“打破了骆驼背的稻草” - 它打破了早日稳定商标的希望，破坏了外国人愿意接受商标付款或购买商标价值的证券。

Once foreigners were no longer prepared to buy German securities or real estate, and/or once the depreciation of the mark had so reduced the real value of these balances that they no longer mattered, this source of refinancing dried up. Then the choice was between extreme illiquidity and printing money at an accelerating rate, and the path was again obvious – i.e., to print. Then, since no one wanted to hold on to the currency in this rapidly depreciating inflationary environment, the velocity of money accelerated.317 A rapidly accelerating velocity with rapid growth in the money supply is a classic sign of an inflationary deleveraging. This point was reached in spring 1922. At this point the mark and domestic prices entered the hyperinflationary phase.

一旦外国人不再准备购买德国证券或房地产，和/或一旦贬值，这些余额的实际价值就不再重要了，这种再融资来源枯竭。那么选择是极端流动性和印刷货币之间的加速，路径又是显而易见的 - 即打印。那么，由于没有人想在这个迅速贬值的通货膨胀环境中坚持货币，货币的速度加快了 。货币供应量快速增长的快速增长速度是通货膨胀去杠杆化的经典标志。这一点在1922年春天达成。此时，商标和国内价格进入了恶性通货膨胀阶段。

The economy's demand for credit intensified as price and cost increases accelerated and the central bank satisfied them by printing money as credit growth collapsed. In June and July 1922, the supply of bank credit reached a standstill as saving through this medium dried up. In fact, savings banks actually experienced a decline in the nominal value of their savings deposits during July as investors did not see savings deposits as a viable option. The Reichsbank tried to encourage commercial bills as a way of supplying business with the liquidity which it did by discounting such bills and by a propaganda campaign in the press.

随着价格和成本的上涨，经济对信贷的需求加剧，中央银行在信贷增长崩溃的情况下，通过印钞来满足他们。1922年6月和7月，通过这种干涸的储蓄，银行信贷供应陷入停滞。事实上，由于投资者没有看到储蓄存款是可行的选择，所以储蓄银行实际上在7月份的储蓄存款名义下降了。帝国银行试图鼓励商业票据作为通过打折这些票据和在新闻界进行的宣传活动来为业务提供流动性的方式。

With credit from banks no longer available to businesses, the Reichsbank was faced with the classic choice all central banks in this situation face—to either allow illiquidity to cause businesses to collapse or to allow businesses to have direct access to the central bank's credit facilities. The latter alternative was not necessarily more inflationary than the former because the central bank giving money to businesses directly wasn't much different from the central bank giving it to the banks to give to the businesses. And, there was no doubt that the liquidity had to be provided. In fact, since evidence of illiquidity intensified the domestic and foreign flight from the currency as investors wanted to run from default risks, it was argued that providing the liquidity to businesses directly (because the banks were ill-equipped to provide it) would help to stabilize the situation. At the time, the higher inflation rate raised government expenditures faster than tax revenues. As long as the rising domestic price level kept raising the paper mark value of government domestic expenditures, and as long as the falling exchange rate kept raising the paper mark value of reparations obligations, and as long as the Reichsbank continued to finance the Reich budget deficit without restraint, there was no liquidity crisis to have a counterinflationary effect, so the spiral accelerated.1

由于银行的贷款不再适用于企业，帝国银行面临着经典的选择，所有中央银行在这种情况下都面临着流动性，导致企业崩溃或允许企业直接进入中央银行的信贷融资 。后一种选择不一定比前者更具通货膨胀，因为中央银行直接向企业提供资金与中央银行给予银行业务的差距并不大。而且，毫无疑问，必须提供流动性。事实上，由于流动性不足的证据加剧了国内外的投资者希望从违约风险中逃离的货币，所以有人认为，直接向企业提供流动资金（因为银行提供的资金不足）将有助于稳定局面当时较高的通货膨胀率使得政府支出比税收收入更快。只要国内价格水平不断提高，政府国内支出的纸币价值不断上涨，只要汇率不断提高，赔偿义务的纸币价值就会上升，只要帝国银行继续资助帝国的预算赤字没有限制，没有流动性危机有反通货力的影响，所以螺旋加速。

There was some talk about the allies relieving Germany of some of the reparations burden. But on June 10, 1922 the mark rate broke when the Reparations Commission chaired by J.P. Morgan made public its refusal to recommend long-term foreign lending to Germany until her reparation liabilities had been adjusted to her capacity to pay.2 Then depreciation turned into hyperinflation.

有一些关于盟国的谈话，解除了德国的一些赔偿负担。但是在1922年6月10日，由摩根大通担任主席的赔偿委员会公开拒绝向德国提供长期外国贷款，直到赔偿责任调整到她的支付能力为止，这个标记率才爆破。然后贬值变成恶性通货膨胀。

It was impossible to squeeze each year from the German people two billion gold marks, plus a sum equivalent to 26% of the value of exports,3 so something had to be done. The British representative on the Reparations Commission proposed something similar to the Brady Restructuring of debt in 1991—i.e., that the German government should make its payment in the form of treasury certificates with a five year term and the Allied governments should place these on the market, adding their own guarantee to them. In this way Germany would defer its 1923 and 1924 reparation payments for five years.4 In July 1922 reparation payments in foreign exchange were suspended. In spite of this, the depreciation of the German exchange continued.5

德国人每年挤压二十亿黄金是不可能的，加上相当于出口价值26％的总和，3 因此必须做一些事情。赔偿委员会的英国代表在1991年提出了类似于布莱德重组债务的做法，即德国政府应以五年期的国库券形式支付债务，而盟国政府应将其列入市场给他们加上自己的保证。德国将推迟其1923年和1924年的赔偿金五年。1922年7月，外汇管理局暂停赔偿。尽管如此，德国交易所的贬值仍在继续。五