Second Half of 1922

Liquidity crisis, Reichsbank policy, and monetary factors in the transition to hyperinflation...

Liquidity crisis, Reichsbank policy, and monetary factors in the transition to hyperinflation...

流动性危机，帝国银行政策和货币因素过渡到恶性通货膨胀...

The spiral accelerated in 2H1922. The sudden rise in prices caused an intense demand for cash. At the same time the government's need of money increased rapidly. Private banks, faced with withdrawals, found it practically impossible to meet the demand for money, so it had to ration the cashing of checks presented to them. On some days, they had to suspend payments or open their offices for a few hours only. Naturally this caused panic, especially among the industrial and commercial classes who were no longer in a position to fulfill their contracts because of their cash shortages. Private checks were refused because it became known that the banks would be unable to cash them. Business stopped. The panic spread to the working classes when they learned that their employers did not have the cash with which to pay their wages.6

螺旋在二零二二年下半年加速。价格突然上涨导致了对现金的强烈需求。同时政府需要的钱也快速增长。私人银行面临提款，发现实际上不可能满足货币需求，所以必须配合提供的支票。有一段时间，他们不得不暂停付款或开办办公室几个小时。当然，这引起了恐慌，特别是因为现金短缺而不能履行合同的工商阶级。私人支票被拒绝，因为知道银行将无法兑现。业务停了当他们知道雇主没有支付工资的现金时，恐慌蔓延到工人阶级。6

As credit was non-existent, money had to be produced to replace it and, as rapid money growth caused inflation, people didn't want to hold on to cash, so the velocity accelerated as cash was exchanged like a hot potato. As one economist on the time described it, "It was clear then that to stop the printing press would mean that in a very short time the entire public, and above all the Reich, could no longer pay merchants, employees, or workers. In a few weeks, besides the printing of notes, factories, mines, railways and post office, national and local government, in short, all national and economic life would be stopped."7

由于信贷不存在，必须要花钱来取代，而随着货币增长迅速导致通货膨胀，人们不想持有现金，所以随着现金兑换成热土豆，速度加快。正如一位经济学家所描述的那样，“显然的是，停止印刷机将意味着在很短的时间内，整个公众，尤其是帝国，不能再向商人，雇员或工人付款。几个星期之外，除了笔记，工厂，矿山，铁路和邮局，国家和地方政府的印刷外，总而言之，所有国家和经济生活都将被停止。7

The government increased salaries in proportion to the depreciation of the mark, and employers in turn granted continual increases in wages, to avoid disputes, on the condition that they could raise the prices of their products. As is normal in such cases of prices and wage indexing, a vicious circle was established: the exchange depreciated; internal prices rose; note-issues were increased; the increase of the quantity of paper money lowered once more the value of the mark in terms of gold: prices rose once more: and so on.8

政府增加了与商标贬值比例的工资，雇主反过来又不断提高工资，避免争议，条件是可以提高产品的价格。在这种价格和工资指数的情况下是正常的，造成了恶性循环：交易贬值;内部价格上涨;票据增加;纸币数量的增加再次降低了黄金价值：价格再次上涨：等等 。8

Meanwhile, banks continued to have a shortage of cash to meet withdrawals.9

同时，银行继续出现现金缺货以取款。9

However, as alternative forms of money emerged, and the velocity of money accelerated, the real supply of money fell. Towards the end of 1922 this real value of currency in circulation had become less than the value of the gold reserve of the Reichsbank. Similarly, in certain other countries, where the legal currency in circulation fell to very low levels, the gold cover of the notes (the gold being valued according to the foreign exchange), was much greater than in countries where the currency depreciation had not gone to such lengths.

然而，随着货币的替代形式出现，货币的速度加快，实际货币供应量下降。到1922年底，流通货币的这个实际价值已经低于帝国银行黄金储备的价值。同样，在某些其他国家，流通中的法定货币下降到非常低的水平，黄金价格（按外汇交易价值计算的黄金）远高于货币贬值尚未消失的国家到这样的长度。

During 1922, the management of the Reichsbank tenaciously refused to allow the gold reserve to be used for monetary reform.10 Throughout this period the Reichsbank continued to finance government deficits by accepting Reich treasury bills. In fact, as the demand for Treasury bills shrank, the percentage held outside the Reichsbank fell, signaling the final failures of all credit instruments as a storehold of wealth, hence the hyperinflation.11

1922年，帝国银行的管理层顽强拒绝允许黄金储备用于货币改革。10 在这段期间，帝国银行通过接受帝国国债来继续融资政府赤字。事实上，随着对国库券的需求减少，帝国银行以外的百分比下跌，表明所有信贷工具的最终失败是财富的存储，因此恶性通货膨胀。11

The chart below shows how the role of private banks fell from 1920 to 1923 as banks were faced with liquidity problems and the Reichsbank replaced it by lending directly. Until the summer of 1922 the Reichsbank exercised, almost exclusively, the function of a State bank, discounting Treasury bills presented to it. The increasing needs of trade were satisfied by private banks which could discount directly at the Reichsbank the Treasury bills in which they had largely invested the money of depositors during and after the war.12

下图显示了银行在面临流动性问题时，1920年至1923年间的私人银行的作用如何下降，帝国银行则通过直接贷款来取代银行。直到1922年夏天，帝国银行几乎完全行使了国家银行的职能，贴现了向其提交的国库券。私人银行满意的需求日益增加，私人银行可以直接在帝国银行打折国债，在战争期间和之后大量投资存款人的国库券。12

As mentioned, in July of 1922 the Reichsbank began to supply liquidity to businesses—i.e.. the Reichsbank allowed big businesses to borrow via commercial bills, which the Reichsbank discounted at a much lower rate than the rate of the depreciation of the mark and even lower than the rates charged by private banks. so essentially a subsidized rate. As a result, these companies could borrow on terms that were essentially the same as the Reich. They even had direct access to the Reichsbank. These moves were quite similar to recent moves by the Fed and motivated by similar reasons.

如上所述，在1922年7月，帝国银行开始向企业提供流动性 - 即。帝国银行允许大企业通过商业票据借款，帝国银行的折价幅度远低于商品折旧率，甚至低于私人银行的收费率。所以基本上是补贴率 。因此，这些公司可以借用与帝国基本相同的条款。他们甚至可以直接进入帝国银行。这些举动与美联储最近的举动非常相似，并且有类似的原因。

The official discount rate in Germany remained fixed at 5% from 1915 until July 1922, so as inflation rose, real interest rates fell to very negative levels. The discount rate was raised to 6% at the end of July, to 7% at the end of August, to 8% on September 21, to 10% on November 13, to 12% on January 18, 1923, and to 18% in the last week of April 1923. However, these rates of interest were still all much less than the rate of depreciation in the value of money so they didn't dissuade the borrowing and other shorting of marks. So inflation hedge assets and other currencies continued to rise. For example, a gold mark was worth 160 paper marks at the end of July 1922, 411 paper marks at the end of August, 1,822 at the end of November, and 7,100 at the end of April 1923.13 However, as conveyed in the following chart, these increases in interest rates were the beginning of a major increase in rates that occurred in 1923.

德国的官方贴现率自1915年至1922年7月份固定为5％，因为通货膨胀上升，实际利率下降至非常负的水平。7月底的贴现率上升至6％，至8月底的7％，9月21日的8％，11月13日的10％，1923年1月18日的12％，1823％在1923年4月的最后一个星期。然而，这些利率仍然远远低于货币贬值率，所以他们没有劝阻借款和其他短缺商标。所以通货膨胀对冲资产和其他货币继续上涨。例如，1922年7月底的黄金纪念碑价值为160纸币，8月底为411纸，11月底为1,822，1923 年 4月底为7,100。 然而，如下图所示，这些利率上升是1923年发生的利率大幅上涨的开始

While the liquidity of the banking system was high during the inflation since money itself was generally so plentiful, in 1922 this changed when a crisis of liquidity at the banks accompanied hyperinflation. See the table that follows. Note how deposits as a percent of the monetary base fell sharply and continuously at banks except for the Joint Stock banks in Berlin.

在通货膨胀期间，银行体系的流动性很高，因为货币本身一般如此丰富，在1922年，当银行的流动性危机伴随着恶性通货膨胀时，银行体系的流动性也发生了变化。见下表。请注意，除柏林股份有限公司外，银行存款占银行存款总额的百分比急剧下降。

As inflation worsened, bank depositors understandably wanted to be able to get their funds on short notice so they shortened their lending to banks. This is reflected in the following tables331 which show how over 90% of bank deposits were for seven days or less in 1922-1923 and how over 80% of deposits moved to short-term checking accounts rather than longer-term savings. During inflationary deleveragings, average maturities of debt always fall, so this is typical.

随着通货膨胀的恶化，银行存款人可以理解，希望能够在短时间内获得资金，从而缩短了对银行的贷款。以下表331反映在下表331中 ，其中显示了1922 - 1923年超过90％的银行存款为七天或更短时间，以及超过80％的存款转入短期支票账户而不是长期储蓄。在通货膨胀的杠杆化过程中，债务的平均期限总是下降，所以这是典型的。

Also, because it had become impractical to transact in marks, foreign currency (especially dollars) replaced the mark as the means of settlement of large transactions, though small transactions continued to be in marks. The economic situation in October 1922, was described by the newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung: "German economic life is now dominated by a struggle over the survival of the mark: is it to remain the German currency, or is it doomed to extinction? During the past few months foreign currencies have replaced it as units of account in domestic transactions to a wholly unforeseen extent. The habit of reckoning in dollars, especially, has established itself, not only in firms' internal accounting practice, but above all as the method of price quotation in trade, industry and agriculture."332 This discussion of the prospects for the mark concludes by emphasizing the degree to which foreign currencies also served as "stores of value", used to protect the real value of money balances.

此外，由于以商标交易变得不切实际，外币（特别是美元）将该商标替换为大额交易的手段，尽管小额交易仍然持续上涨。1922年10月的经济形势由“ 法兰克福特泽报 ”描述： “德国的经济生活现在主要是争夺生存的标志：是否保持德国的货币，还是注定要灭绝？过去几个月的外币在国内交易中已经取代了它们的账户单位，尤其是以美元计价的习惯，不仅在企业的内部会计实务中，更重要的是作为价格的方法贸易，工业和农业报价“。332这个关于商标前景的讨论的结论强调了外币也被用作“有价值的商店”的程度，用于保护货币余额的实际价值。

On October 12, 1922, strictly enforced limits were put on FX purchases making transactions impractical, essentially eliminating foreign currencies as an alternative. Investors who were investing their available resources in foreign exchange to escape inflation once again had to turn to the share market. The shift from foreign money to stocks arising from the decree of October 12 was obvious in that it caused a heavy fall in the supply of foreign exchange333 and a rise in stock prices suddenly in the second half of October. This dynamic was similar to the frenzied bull speculation in the autumn of 1921.

1922年10月12日，对外汇采购进行严格执行限制，使交易不切实际，从根本上消除外币作为替代。投资自己的现有资源进行外汇以逃避通货膨胀的投资者必须转向股市。10月12日的法令从外资转为库存显而易见，导致外汇供应量333大幅下滑，10月下旬突然上涨。这种动态与1921年秋季疯狂的牛市猜测相似。

One of the most important drivers of hyperinflation in the second half of 1922 was wage indexation because it produced a wage-cost spiral. In the second half of 1922, the resistance of the workers to reductions in their real wages increased. The working classes sought to re-establish the earlier level of real wages and to keep them stable, so wages were often indexed to inflation. As a result, the profits which entrepreneurs334 derived from real wages falling evaporated. As the chart below shows, the real wage declines that occurred in 1921 to late 1922, ended in late 1922 at levels that were down 50% to 75% from pre-war levels, and shot up in 1923.

1922年下半年恶性通货膨胀最重要的驱动因素之一是工资指数化，因为它产生了工资成本的螺旋 。1922年下半年，工人对实际工资下降的抵抗力增加。工人阶级试图重新建立早期的实际工资水平，保持稳定，所以工资往往是通货膨胀的指标。因此，企业家334从实际工资中获利的利润下降。如下图所示，实际工资下降，发生在1921年到1922年底，在1922年底结束，水平从战前水平下降了50％至75％，并在1923年爆发。

While the inflation had a devastating effect on the wealth of debt and equity holders and it slashed real wages to workers, it generally helped agile entrepreneurs and the owners of material means of production and strengthened the positions of industrial capitalists.335 But it was terrible for productivity. For example, the entrepreneur, instead of concentrating his attention on improving the product and reducing his costs often became a speculator in goods and foreign exchanges.

虽然通货膨胀对债务和股权持有人的财富造成破坏性影响，并将工资削减给工人，但它通常帮助敏捷企业家和物质生产资料的拥有者，加强了工业资本家的地位。335但生产力是可怕的。例如，企业家，而不是将注意力集中在改善产品和降低成本上，往往成为商品和外汇交易中的投机者。