Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward

Now that we've seen how this inflationary deleveraging came about, let's see how it was extinguished. By late 1923 virtually all debts were extinguished by inflation, and there was a great deal of betting on inflation and being short the mark.

现在我们已经看到了这种通货膨胀去杠杆化的发生，让我们看看它是如何消除的。到1923年年底，通货膨胀几乎全部债务都消失了，通货膨胀大幅下滑，标价短暂。

Starting in August 1923 there was a feverish attempt to devise a new currency or stabilize the old one. The plans for stabilizing the currency fell into three groups.

从1923年8月开始，出现了一种设计新货币或稳定旧货币的狂热企图。稳定货币的计划分为三类。

(1) Plans to use taxation policy, a ban on credit, and restrictions on foreign-currency holdings.

（1）计划使用税收政策，禁止信贷，限制外汇持有。

Along these lines, in August 1923 the government introduced an "index-linked" tax assessment, it issued "value-maintaining loans", it sought to acquire foreign-currency holdings, and it urged banks and the Reichsbank to offer their clients gold-mark accounts, i.e., accounts in which the borrower promises to calculate the value based on the price of gold.

按照这些方面，1923年8月，政府出台了“指数挂钩”税收评估，发行“维持贷款”，试图收购外币持有量，并敦促银行和帝国银行向客户提供金融 - 标记账户，即借款人承诺根据黄金价格计算价值的账户。

(2) Plans to return to a gold currency.

（2）计划回到黄金货币。

(3) Plans to secure the currency by mortgaging of land or commodities.18

（3）计划通过抵押土地或商品来确保货币。

On August 14, 1923, the government passed a law that created a Gold Loan of 500 million gold marks. This law contained only this promise: "In order to guarantee the payment of interest and the redemption of the loan of 500 million gold marks, the Government of the Reich is authorized, if the ordinary receipts do not provide sufficient cover, to raise supplements to the tax on capital..." The word "wert-bestandig" which meant "stable-value" was written on the new paper money. And the public accepted and hoarded these notes. In other word, the gold loans seemed to be believed and thus created a vehicle for financial savings. The German monetary law of August 30, 1924, fixed the conversion rate of the new Reichsmark (whose weight in fine gold was equal to that of the old mark) at one trillion paper marks.19

1923年8月14日，政府通过了一项法律，创造了5亿黄金的黄金贷款。这项法律只包含这一承诺：“为了保证支付利息和赎回5亿美金的贷款，帝国政府授权，如果普通收据没有提供足够的保障，可以补充补贴资本税...“这个意思是”稳定价值“的”wert-bestandig“一词写在新的纸币上。公众接受并囤积这些笔记。换句话说，黄金贷款似乎相信，从而创造了一种经济节约的手段。1924年8月30日的德国货币法确定了新帝国标志（其黄金重量与旧商标相同）的转换率为万亿纸币。

Creating a new currency with very hard backing, and phasing out the old currency, is the most classic path that countries that are suffering from inflationary deleveragings follow in order to end them. On October 15, a decree was issued which instituted a new money, the rentenmark, to begin from November 15, 1923. The key was to issue very little of it and to have it be backed by gold. At this time the money supply was so reduced by the abandonment of marks—e.g., the total amount of floating debt was only 200 million gold marks—that creating a real backing was possible. Towards the end of October 1923 the total sum of paper marks issued in Germany equaled scarcely 150 million gold marks, so they were essentially out of circulation. Going to new currencies with hard currency on gold backings is a classic step in inflationary deleveragings to bring about stability. The chart below shows the monetary base in dollars fell to equal Germany's gold reserves in dollars in 1923.

创造一种新的货币，非常坚定的支持，逐步淘汰旧货币，是为了结束通货膨胀的杠杆作用而遭受通货膨胀的杠杆的最经典之路 。10月15日，颁布了一项法令，从1923年11月15日起开始实行新的贷款，其价值是发行很少，并获得黄金支持。在这个时候，由于放弃了商标，货币供应量减少了 - 例如，浮动债务总额只有2亿美元，创造了真正的后盾。到1923年10月底，德国发行的纸标记总额几乎不到1.5亿黄金，所以基本上没有流通。通过黄金背负货币兑换新货币是通货膨胀杠杆化来实现稳定的经典步骤。下图显示了1923年美元兑美元的货币基础相当于德国的黄金储备。

The government chose to make the gold value of the new currency identical to that of the prewar mark. Also the government imposed a credit limit of 1.2 billion marks on the new bank's dealings with the private sector—not least in order not to make the Reichsbank wholly redundant—and it reduced the ceiling on credit to the Reich to 1.2 billion marks as well. The "Currency Bank" became the "Rentenbank" and the "rye mark" became the "rentenmark".348 The "rentenmark experiment"—i.e., this move to a new, gold-backed currency—met with astounding success. Since the new currency was identical to the former national gold currency, and the government did almost everything in its power to ensure that its value remained stable, it maintained its value. The new currency was almost completely stable from the outset.

政府选择使新货币的黄金价值与战前商标相同。此外，政府对新银行与私营部门的交易实施了12亿美元的信贷限额，尤其是为了不使德里希克银行完全重复，并将信贷上限降至12亿美元。“货币银行”成为“Rentenbank”，“黑麦”成为“租金”。“租金实验” - 这一举动，以金价为主的新货币迎来了惊人的成功。由于新货币与前国家黄金货币相同，政府几乎全力以赴确保其价值保持稳定，维持其价值。新货币从一开始就几乎完全稳定 。

The old currency lost its value and the disappeared. The dollar was worth 160,000 paper marks on July 3, 1923, on the Berlin Bourse, 13 million on September 4, and 420 billion on November 20. From then onwards the exchange rate of the dollar remained stable; so also did the ratio of the value between the new rentenmark and the dollar (1 dollar - 4.2 rentenmarks). During 1924 the German and Austrian exchanges were the most stable in Europe.349

旧货币失去价值，消失了。美元在1923年7月3日，柏林证券交易所的价格为16万纸币，9月4日为1300万美元，11月20日为420亿美元。从此以后，美元汇率仍然保持稳定;新租金与美元（1美元 - 4.2租金）之间的价值比也是如此。在1924年期间，德国和奥地利交易所在欧洲是最稳定的。

It was not the decree of the October 15, 1923, but the monetary law of August 30, 1924 (which became effective on October 11, 1924) which sanctioned the legal reduction of the value of the paper mark.350

这不是1923年10月15日的法令，而是1924年8月30日（1924年10月11日生效）的货币法，它批准了纸张价值的合法减少。

"The miracle of the rentenmark" became a common expression because the improvement occurred so rapidly that people could not easily find an explanation for it.351

“租金的奇迹”成为一个普遍的表达，因为改善发生得很快，人们不能轻易找到解释。

Some economists attribute the success of the German monetary reform to discontinuing the issuance of paper marks, strict limitations of the quantity of the new money, and the calling-in of paper marks in proportion to the issues of new money. Also, on November 16 the discounting of Treasury bills by the Reichsbank was stopped.

一些经济学家将德国货币改革的成功归功于停止发行纸币，严格限制新货币数量，以及与新货币相关的纸币标记。此外，11月16日，帝国银行的国库券贴现已经停止。

However, the issuing of paper money for commercial purposes continued after November 16. At that date the quantity of paper marks in circulation amount to 93 million trillion. By November 30 it had already passed 400 million trillion, it reached 496 million trillion on December 31, 690 million trillion on March 31, 1924, 927 million trillion on May 31, and 1,211 million trillion on July 31. At the same time the issues of new rentenmarks increased.and their circulation amounted to 501 million on November 30, 1923, 1,049 million on December 31, 1,760 million on March 31, 1924, and 1,803 million on July 31.

但是，11月16日以后持续发行用于商业用途的纸币。截至当日，流通纸张数量达到9300万亿美元。截至11月30日已经超过4亿万亿，其中12月31日达到4.96亿兆，1924年3月31日达6.9亿亿，5月31日为9.27亿亿，7月31日为12.11亿亿。同时，的新租金增加，1923年11月30日的流通量为5.11亿，12月31日为10.49亿，1924年3月31日为17.6亿，7月31 日为 18.33亿。

So the introduction of the new currency rentenmark occurred with old marks still in circulation so it was accompanied "by the most colossal monetary inflation ever recorded in the history of the world'' in old-mark terms, while the rentenmark was stable. This currency stability might have been due to other countries experiencing similar rapid increases in their money supplies.21

因此，新货币的出现是因为旧货已经流通，伴随着“世界历史上历史上最大的货币通货膨胀”，而旧货币的价格稳定，这个货币稳定性可能是由于其他国家的经历在他们的货币供应类似的快速增长。

Of course, with the abandonment of the old currency, accounting laws had to be changed. On December 28, 1923, a decree compelled industrial companies to compile new balance sheets, valuing their assets and liabilities in "gold marks". With 500 rentenmarks one could obtain at any moment a bond with the nominal value of 500 gold marks, which was guaranteed by a legal mortgage on German property and which yielded a rate of interest at 5 percent in gold (actually payable in paper at the exchange rate of the gold mark.)22

当然，随着旧货币的放弃，会计法律也不得不改变。1923年12月28日，一项法令强制工业公司编制新的资产负债表，以“金标”估值其资产和负债。拥有500个租金，任何时候都可以获得一个名义价值500金币的债券，这是由德国房地产的法定抵押担保，并以黄金5％的利率计算（实际上是在交易所的纸上支付）金标准率。） 22

Of course, the stability of the value of the rentenmark could not have been due to the possibility of converting the currency into mortgage securities because, at the time, the market value of the mortgage bonds was lower than the nominal value and the market rate of interest was much higher than 5 percent. During 1924 the prices of "stable-value loans" yielded an effective interest of as much as 15-20%. And of course, issuing more rentenmarks would add to the Government's burden on interest on mortgage bonds, for which the public would exchange increasing quantities of rentenmarks.23 However, as shown in the chart on page 26, interest rates were raised dramatically which changed the economics of borrowing and lending in marks. The lack of confidence in the paper mark gradually lessened and, as a result, consumers, producers, and merchants ceased to be preoccupied with the necessity of reducing their holdings of paper marks to a minimum. As a result, after the stabilization of the mark exchange in November 1923, the velocity of paper mark circulation declined. In other words, the money supply could rise and velocity could drop because of increased confidence in marks for saving.

当然，租金价值的稳定性不可能是由于将货币转换为抵押证券的可能性，因为当时抵押债券的市场价值低于名义价格和市场利率利息远高于5％。1924年，“稳定贷款”的价格实现了15-20％的实际利率。当然，发行更多租金会增加政府对按揭债券的利息负担，市民会交换越来越多的租金。然而，如第26页的图表所示，利率大幅上涨，改变了借款和借贷的经济性。纸质标志的缺乏信心逐渐减弱，因此消费者，生产者和商人不再专注于将纸品持有量减少到最低限度。结果，在1923年11月的商标交易稳定之后，纸币流通速度下降。换句话说，货币供应可能会上升，速度可能会下降，因为对储蓄商品的信心增加。

At the same time the Reichsbank energetically set about eliminating the illegal emergency monies from circulation. The government also fixed wages.24

与此同时，帝国银行也大力遏制流通中的非法应急资金。政府也固定工资。

As the mark gained credibility as a medium of exchange, foreign currencies were turned in for it. This showed up in the balance sheets of the Reichsbank, which showed a continuous and noticeable rise in the item "other assets," in which, as experts know, was that foreign exchange. According to the balance sheets of the Reichsbank, "other assets" amounted to 18.8 million gold marks on November 15, 1923, 285.8 million on January 7, 1924, 702.3 million on June 30, and 1,183 million on October 31, 1924.25 It also appears that those who were short it in various forms got squeezed, adding to the upward pressure on it.

随着商标作为交易媒介获得信誉，外币兑换了。这显示在帝国银行的资产负债表中，其中“其他资产”项目持续上涨，据专家所知，这是外汇。据德国国家银行的资产负债表，“其他资产”达880万金马克的2.858亿1923年11月15日，在702300000 1924年1月7日，6月30日，以及1183万美元10月31日，1924年25 这也看到那些以各种形式缩小的人们受到挤压，给它带来了上升的压力。

Nonetheless, the stability of the German exchange rate gave way in February and March 1924 as the credit policy of the Reichsbank was not strict enough, and symptoms of a new "inflation" appeared in the first quarter of 1924.26 However, on April 7, 1924, the Reichsbank, now convinced that it was heading for a fresh inflation, which would cause a new depreciation of the paper mark and the rentenmark, decided to restrict credit severely, which worked. The shortage of marks caused a supply of hoarded foreign exchange to come to the market for sale for marks. At the same time the demand for foreign exchange on the Berlin Bourse declined considerably.27

尽管如此，德国汇率的稳定在1924年二月和三月由于帝国银行的信贷政策不够严格，在1924 年第一季度出现了新的“通货膨胀”的症状。26 但是，4月7日，1924年，帝国银行现在确信将要通过新的通货膨胀，这将导致纸币和租金的新的贬值，决定严重限制信贷，这是有效的。商标短缺导致囤积的外汇供应品出现在市场上。同时柏林证券交易所的外汇需求大幅下滑。

The decree of February 14, 1924, "revalued" some debts i.e., required debtors to give creditors more than their face value. For example, debentures and mortgages were revalued at about 15 percent of their original gold value. Mortgage bonds, savings bank deposits, and obligations arising from life assurance contracts were revalued at a rate corresponding to the revaluation of mortgages and other claims held by the Land Credits Institute, assurance companies, and savings banks.

1924年2月14日的法令“重估”一些债务，即要求债务人给予债权人超过其面值。例如，债权证和抵押贷款被重新估值为其原始黄金价值的约15％。抵押债券，储蓄银行存款和人寿保险合同产生的义务按照土地信贷研究所，保证公司和储蓄银行持有的抵押贷款和其他索赔的重估价格进行重估。

The decree of February 14, 1924, was a good concept but it ran into some problems in application. Creditors had lost virtually all value to inflation and were angry about how their trust was abused, and the government wanted to renew the rewards for lending, which was the intention of this plan. Creditors induced the German Government to announce a new plan which became law on July 16, 1925. The chief provisions of the new law were as follows: (a) The normal rate of revaluation of mortgages was raised to 25% of the original gold value, (b) the law applied to extinct mortgages, if the creditor had accepted the reimbursement with a reservation, (c) for mortgages taken up after June 15, 1922, the law had retroactive effect even if the reimbursement had been accepted without reservation, (d) the payment of sums due on the basis of this law could be demanded after January 1, 1932: in the meantime debtors paid interest at 1.2% after January 1, 1925, 2.5% after July 1, 1925, 3% after January 1, 1926, and 5% after January 1, 1928, (e) the debtor could obtain a reduction in the rate of revaluation to 15% in cases of straitened economic conditions, (f) those who had bought industrial debentures before July 1, 1920, received (besides 15% of the gold value of the security) a small share in the dividends of the company, (g) for securities taken up after January 1, 1918, there was used, as a coefficient for the transformation from paper value to gold value, an average between the dollar exchange rate and the index number of wholesale prices. Just as debt reductions have the effect of easing credit, weakening the currency and increasing inflation (or lessening deflation), debt revaluations tighten credit, support currencies and lower inflation.28

1924年2月14日的法令是一个很好的概念，但在应用中遇到一些问题。债权人几乎全部失去了通货膨胀的价值，并对他们的信任被滥用感到愤怒，政府想要重新获得贷款的回报，这是这个计划的意图。债权人引诱德国政府宣布1925年7月16日成为法律的新计划。新法律的主要规定如下：（a）按揭贷款的正常升值率提高到原始金值的25％ （b）如果债权人已经接受了保留的偿还，（c）在1922年6月15日以后接受抵押的情况下，法律适用于灭绝的抵押贷款，法律即使在没有保留的情况下接受报销也具有追溯效力，（d）1932年1月1日以后可以要求支付应付的款项：与此同时，债务人在1925年1月1日之后支付利率为1.2％，1925年7月1日以后为2.5％，1月份为3％ 1928年1月1日以后的1％，1926％，5％;（e）在经济困难的情况下，债务人可以将重估率降低到15％;（f）7月1日前购买工业债券的人，1920年，收到（除安全金的价值的15％）一小部分公司股利，（g）1918年1月1日以后收回的证券被用作从纸值转换为黄金价值的系数，美元汇率与批发指数之间的平均值价格。正如减债有减轻信贷，削弱货币和增加通货膨胀（或减缓通货紧缩）的作用，债务重估收紧信贷，支持货币和降低通货膨胀。

Under the Loan Redemption Act that came into force on the same day, July 16, 1925, as the Revaluation Act, certain holders of public bonds gained a revaluation, as they had not under the Third Emergency Tax Decree.29

根据1925年7月16日同一天生效的“贷款赎回法”，作为“重估法”，某些公共债券持有人获得了重新评估，因为他们没有按照第三次紧急税法令。

Throughout 1924, the supply and demand for foreign exchange were largely dependent on the credit policy of the Reichsbank. The connection between the abundance of credit and the depreciation of the exchange rate in the first quarter of 1924, which was followed by the tightening of credit and strengthening of the mark in the succeeding months, was obvious and confirmed the ideas of the Quantity Theory.

在整个1924年，外汇供求在很大程度上取决于帝国银行的信贷政策。1924年第一季度的信贷丰富与汇率贬值之间的联系，显而易见，证实了数量理论的观点。

On October 15, 1923, the German government took the step of completely suspending loans for "Passive Resistance". These excessively generous subsidies, which were granted by the German government, were the principal cause of the enormous deficit in 1923, so eliminating them reduced the budget deficit. Also in the autumn of 1923, the German government tried to free the budget temporarily from the burden of reparations by putting the burden on to private industry. On November 23, 1923, the "Micum" (Mission Interalliee de Controle des Usines et des Mines) and the leading heavy industries concluded an agreement about the supply of coal on reparations account.30 This fiscal tightening also supported the currency and helped to reduce inflation.

1923年10月15日，德国政府采取全面暂停“被动抵制”贷款的措施。德国政府给予的这些过度慷慨的补贴是1923年赤字巨大的主要原因，因此消除这些赤字减少了预算赤字。同样在1923年秋天，德国政府也试图将预算从负担中解放出来，把负担放在私营企业身上。1923年11月23日，“Micum”（Mission Interalliee de Controle des Usines et des Mines）和主要重工业缔结了关于补偿煤炭供应的协议。财政紧缩也支持货币，并有助于减少通货膨胀。

Control over the foreign exchange market was gradually relaxed—e.g., the "Foreign Exchange Commissioner" ceased to function. However, certain restrictions (based on the decrees of October 31 and of November 8, 1924) remained. They (a) specified the process for making foreign payments (which had to be done through an authorized bank), (b) prohibited forward contracts in foreign exchange (c) prohibited the buying or selling of foreign exchange at a higher rate than the official rate in Berlin, and (d) required banks to furnish the authorities with information on foreign exchange business concluded in their own names or for a third party.

对外汇市场的控制逐渐放松 - 例如“外汇专员”停止运作。然而，一些限制（根据1924年10月31日和11月8日的法令）仍然存在。（a）规定了外国付款的过程（必须通过授权银行进行），（b）禁止的外汇远期合约（c）禁止以高于官方的方式买卖外汇（d）要求银行向当局提供以自己的名义或第三方缔结的外汇业务信息。

Whenever the Rentenbank gave direct loans, it imposed the so-called "constant value clause" which required the borrower to repay them in gold marks.

每当Rentenbank直接贷款时，都会强制所谓的“恒定值条款”，要求借款人用金币偿还。

According to a new law that was passed August 30, 1924, and effective on October 11, 1924, a new German currency called the "reichsmark" was created. Its value was set at 1 reichsmark = 1 trillion paper marks, and 1 reichsmark = 1 rentenmark. The old paper mark was then completely withdrawn from circulation and ceased to be legal tender on June 5, 1925. The transition to a stable German currency was complete.

根据1924年8月30日通过的新法律，1924年10月11日生效，新的德国货币被称为“reichsmark”。其价值设定为1个标志= 1万亿纸币，1个reichsmark = 1租金。1925年6月5日，旧的纸标记被完全退出流通，不再合法。向稳定的德国货币的过渡已经完成。

通，但仍然是不可转变的。通过这一过程，德国的货币体系基本上是以美元汇率为标准。

The Reich budget was quickly balanced to everyone's amazement. This occurred via: (a) the strict cutting down of expenses, and (b) the introduction of new taxes and the revaluation of existing taxes and tariffs. The expenses of civil administration were reduced by dismissing a great number of employees. The laws passed on October 15 and November 23 that were previously mentioned had a big effect. But other moves also helped. In Germany, after the war, the heaviest item in the Reich expenditure was the service of public loans. Of the 17.5 billion marks estimated expenditure for the financial year 1919, interest on loans of the Reich represented a good 10 billion. But the monetary depreciation caused the pre-war debt and debts contracted during and after the war to disappear almost completely. To deal with this, the consolidated debt of the Reich (58.5 billion gold marks) was entirely annulled, and the floating debt in paper marks, which amounted to 197 trillion paper marks on November 15, 1923 was paid by the transfer to the Reichsbank of 197 million rentenmarks lent by the Rentenbank with the Reich not paying any interest on this.32

帝国的预算很快平衡每个人的惊奇。这是通过以下方式发生的：（a）严格削减开支，（b）引入新税和重新估价现有税费。解散了大量的员工，减轻了民政部门的费用。以前提到的10月15日和11月23日通过的法律效果很大。但其他举动也有所帮助。在德国战后，帝国支出中最重的项目就是为公共贷款服务。在1919年财政年度的175亿马克估计支出中，帝国的贷款利息为100亿美元。但货币贬值导致战前债务和战后债务合约几乎完全消失。为了解决这个问题，帝国的合并债务（585亿美元）完全被取消，1923年11月15日的纸币浮动债务达到197万亿纸币，由转让给帝国银行伦敦银行向瑞典银行提供的1.97亿租金不会对此产生任何利益。

Once the exchange rate was stabilized, the yield of taxes increased rapidly primarily because of increased tax revenue arising from the economy's improvement. Tax revenues rose from 14.5 million gold marks in October 1923 to 63.2 millions in November, 312.3 millions in December 1923, and to 503.5 millions in January 1924. Thanks to this marked increase in receipts and controls on spending, the budget was balanced in January 1924, for the first time since the outbreak of the war.33

汇率一旦稳定，税收收益率就会快速增长，主要是因为经济改善所带来的税收增加。1923年10月份的税收收入从1423万美元增加到11月份的6320万，1123年12月的3.133亿，1924年1月的503.5百万。由于1924年1月的预算收支平衡。是自战争爆发以来的第一次。

The charts below show (1) the real and nominal stock market, (2) the Y/Y CPI, (3) M0, the velocity of money and total credit, and (4) the exchange rate; and (5) industrial production from 1920 though 1927.

One of the common characteristics of countries that stabilized their currencies and controlled their inflations after an extended period of rampant inflation has been a lack of working capital and a high rate of interest.34 That set of circumstances existed in Germany through most of 1924.

在长期的通货膨胀期间稳定货币和控制其膨胀的国家的共同特征之一是缺乏流动资金和高利率 。 这种情况在德国大部分时间都存在于1924年。

Until August 23, 1926, the Reichsbank kept the exchange rate of the dollar steady in German marks. In the financial year 1924-25, there was a considerable surplus of receipts over expenses.

直到1926年8月23日，帝国银行保持美元汇率稳定在德国马克。在一九四二年至二十五年度的财政年度，收支收益相当可观。

During the years between 1925 and the financial crisis of 1931 the fluctuating amounts of foreign loans were the main driver in determining the value of the mark in terms of other currencies. For long periods, the persistent supply of foreign exchange arising from long or short-term loans had the effect of maintaining an exchange rate favorable to Germany. Also, the Reichsbank was able to replenish its gold reserves rapidly.

在1925年和1931年的金融危机之间，外债贷款的波动是确定其他货币价值的主要动力。长期来看，长期或短期贷款持续供应的外汇汇率有利于维持有利于德国的汇率。此外，帝国银行能够迅速补充黄金储备。

Through numerous banks that were created by the Reich itself, funds which had accumulated in the Reich or State Treasuries were lent to German business generally as short-term loans, though the Reich and States often granted special long-term loans to industry and agriculture. The government also invested money in the purchase of firms and industrial shares.

由帝国本身创造的许多银行，在帝国或国库中积累的资金一般都是借给德国企业的短期贷款，尽管帝国和国家经常给予工业和农业特别的长期贷款。政府还投资购买公司和工业股。

Also, tightening credit to make it profitable to be long the currency and painful to be short it is a classic means of stabilizing the currency and lowering inflation. This happened in Germany at the time. While interest rates rose slower than inflation early in the upswing in inflation, interest rates rose faster than inflation at the end. In December 1923, complete confidence in German money was not yet re-established and the premium for the risk of depreciation remained high. According to the statements of a well-known banker, the interest rate on overnight paper mark loans in December 1923 was typically not lower than 3-5% per month. On the other hand, for rentenmark loans (which had a clause that guaranteed the lender against the risk of the depreciation of the rentenmark itself), interest was 1-1.5% per month. This interest rate shows that the guarantee was given some credence (which is why the interest rate was lower than the paper mark rate), but not discounted as being certain (which is why the rate was still high). During 1924, the highest rates of interest occurred in April and May. Interest rates rose to very high levels that produced a high premium relative to the expected future depreciation of the currency.35

另外，信贷紧缩使货币长期盈利，短暂而痛苦，是稳定货币和降低通货膨胀的经典手段 。这发生在德国当时。虽然利率在通货膨胀上升的早期通货膨胀率早于通货膨胀，但利率上升速度高于通货膨胀。1923年12月，对德国货币的完全信心尚未重新确定，贬值风险的溢价仍然很高。据一位知名银行家的陈述，1923年12月的隔夜纸标贷款利率一般不低于每月3-5％。另一方面，对于租金贷款（其中有一个条款，保证贷方不承担租金本身贬值的风险），利率为每月1-1.5％。这个利率表明，担保得到了一定的信誉（这就是为什么利率低于纸币的利率），但是并没有被确定（这是为什么这个比率仍然很高）。1924年4月和5月期间利率最高。利率上升至非常高的水平，相对于货币的预期未来贬值产生高溢价。

This tightening was reflected in the divergence between the official discount rate and the market rate. In normal times the market rate was lower than the rate fixed by the Reichsbank, but in 1924 the situation was reversed36 because money was so tight. After the stabilization of the mark and the monetary reform of November 1923, the shortage of capital became really serious causing those who had bet on the mark's depreciation to be squeezed. For example, those who borrowed marks to buy inflation hedge assets were squeezed as borrowing costs and the mark rose at the same time as the prices of inflation hedge assets fell.37

这种收紧反映在官方贴现率和市场利率之间的差异。在正常情况下，市场利率低于帝国银行确定的利率，但在1924年，情况反转了36 因为钱太紧了。在1923年11月的稳定和货币改革之后，资本短缺变得非常严重，导致那些赌注贬值的人被挤压。例如，借款买入通货膨胀对冲资产的人被迫作为借款成本，同时通货膨胀对冲资产价格下跌的同时上涨。

While in late 1923 inflation was practically the only form of taxation and it weighed almost exclusively on capitalists, workers, and private and Government salaried employees, after stabilization that all changed. Those penalized by the inflation benefited and high direct taxes became effective.

虽然在1923年年底，通货膨胀实际上是唯一的税收形式，它几乎完全重视资本家，工人和私人和政府的受薪雇员，在稳定之后，所有这些都变了。通货膨胀受到惩罚，直接税高效生效。

As the profits from inflation disappeared, the tremendous waste of inflation hedge activities became apparent and those who engaged in them lost a lot. Numerous entrepreneurs who had bought firms with debt lost everything when the currency was stabilized.38 Due to the insufficiency of working capital and the fall in inflation hedging activities, industries reduced their demands for instruments of production to free up working capital. For example, during the period of inflation, there was the accumulation of stocks of unsold coal and iron, but after it subsided, these were dumped at losses. "The prosperity of the industries consuming coal, which had been dependent on the inflation, caused rapid development of all the mines,"39 but with the stabilization now in place, the mining industry found itself heavily burdened with very small or negative returns, and those that produced coal of poor quality found that it was no longer saleable. Between the end of 1923 and October 1925, 63 mines in the Ruhr area were closed.40 One report at the time described the situation as follows: "We have some very extensive factories which are nothing but rubbish. It is not sufficient, if we wish to restore our business, to close these establishments, in the hope of reopening them later. Even factories not working cost money...Therefore our slogan must be: Demolition!" It was estimated that three quarters of the existing plant in shipyards was useless. More than a hundred thousand bank employees were discharged during 1924 and

随着通货膨胀的利润消失，通货膨胀对冲活动的巨大浪费变得显而易见，从事这些活动的人员的损失也很大。许多企业家谁买了债务的公司，当货币稳定时，一切都失去了一切。由于流动资金不足和通货膨胀对冲活动的下降，行业减少了对生产工具的需求，以释放流动资金。例如，在通货膨胀期间，未售出的煤炭和铁的库存积累，但在平息之后，这些被倾销了。“取决于通货膨胀的消费煤炭行业的繁荣，导致了所有矿山的快速发展”，39 但随着现在的稳定，采矿业的负担回报非常小或负，那些生产质量差的煤，发现它不再是可销售的。在1923年底至1925年10月期间，鲁尔地区的63个地雷已经关闭。当时的一个报告描述了如下情况：“我们有一些非常广泛的工厂，只不过是垃圾 ，如果我们希望恢复业务，关闭这些机构是不够的，希望能够重新开放甚至连工厂都不花钱，所以我们的口号必须是：拆除！据估计：几十万个员工在 1924-1925 年被辞退。

On the other hand, goods for direct consumption were very scarce at the beginning of 1924. While the industries producing instruments of production and raw materials were in a crisis, broadly speaking, industries that produced goods for direct consumption, or the raw materials especially used by these industries did well. During 1925, the deleveraging of share prices was especially marked for the mining and iron and steel industries, and for some branches of the engineering trade such as that of making railway goods. It was felt less by industries that produced direct consumption goods, such as textiles and beer. Stocks fell, especially in industries that did relatively well in inflation.42

另一方面，直接消费的物品在1924年初是非常稀缺的。生产和原材料生产工具的行业正处于危机中，广义上说，生产直接消费品的行业或特别使用的原材料这些行业做得很好。1925年，矿业，钢铁行业以及工程贸易等部门，如铁路货物的分拆，股价下滑特别明显。产生直接消费品的行业，如纺织品和啤酒，都感觉不到。股票下跌，特别是在通货膨胀率相对较好的行业。

One of the immediate and most typical consequences of the monetary stabilization was the sudden rise in the purchasing power of the working class. While rent controls and inflation had made the working class' expenditures on rent practically disappear by 1923, after the stabilization rents were raised rapidly. As rents rose, it became economic to build houses to rent out, and for those who had rented to own instead. While during the period of inflation the building trade was practically limited to the building of mansions for the newly rich who were profiting from the monetary depreciation, in 1924 there was a revival of the building of houses for the working and middle classes.43

货币稳定的直接和最典型的后果之一是工人阶级的购买力突然上升。在租金控制和通货膨胀使得工人阶级的租金支出在1923年之后几乎消失，稳定租金迅速上涨。随着租金上涨，建房出租成为经济，对于租用自有房屋的人来说，这是经济的。在通货膨胀期间，建筑贸易实际上仅限于为从货币贬值中获利的新富人建造豪宅，1924年，工作和中产阶级的房屋建筑复兴。

The chart below shows how housing construction accelerated started in 1924.

下图显示了1924年房屋建设如何加速。

As shown below, this boom in housing continued until the bubble burst in 1929 and the 1930’s deleveraging began.

如下图所示，住房的这一热潮持续到1929年泡沫破灭，1930年的去杠杆化开始。

Labor productivity also increased rapidly after stabilization. For example, it was reported that in June 1926 in the Ruhr coal area, 389,037 employees produced more coal, and of better quality, than was produced by 581,054 in 1923.376

稳定后劳动生产率也快速增长。例如，据报道，在1926年6月在鲁尔煤区，389037名员工生产更多的煤，质量也更好，比由581054在1923年生产376

There was a big increase in wages in the first months of 1924 as wage restrictions were lifted and there was a reaction against the excessively low wages which had been fixed at the beginning of the monetary stabilization.

1924年头几个月的工资大幅上涨，因为工资限制被取消，反而是在货币稳定初期固定的过低的工资。

During 1924 the big increase in the average income of workers was the combined effect of the rise in wage-rates and the fall in unemployment. But from 1925 to 1928 the general movement of workers' incomes was principally influenced by the rise in wage-rates rather than increased employment. For example, while in June 1925 the monthly unemployment rate was 4.6% of the members of trade unions and the index of workers incomes was 110.8, in June 1928 the percentage of unemployed was 7.5%44 and the index of workers' incomes rose to 124.

1924年，工人平均收入大幅增长是工资率上涨和失业率下降的综合影响。但从1925年到1928年，工人总收入主要受工资率上涨而不是增加就业的影响。例如，在1925年6月的月度失业率为工会会员和职工收入的指数的4.6％，为110.8，1928年6月失业人数的比例为7.5％，44 和工人的收入的指数升至124 。

As domestic money and credit was tight and there was a need for it, the German industrialists drew on their reserves of foreign exchange, which they had deposited in foreign banks during the depreciation of the mark. Besides helping to stabilize the mark and contain inflation, it supported business activity.

由于国内货币信贷紧张，有需求，德国工业家利用外汇储备在外汇储备贬值期间存入外汇储备。除了有助于稳定商品和遏制通货膨胀之外，它还支持商业活动。

Both the government and the Director of the Reichsbank agreed that the stabilization of the value of the currency was a necessity which should have precedence over any other matter.45

政府和帝国银行董事都同意，货币价值的稳定是必须的，这应该优先于任何其他事项。

As a result of this stable currency policy, German foreign trade in 1924 and 1925 was characterized by an enormous increase in imports of food and unprocessed goods, while there was no growth in manufactured goods imports (see below). In 1924 and 1925, exports remained stationary.46

由于这种稳定的货币政策，1924年和1925年的德国对外贸易的特点是食品和未加工品的进口大幅增加，而进口制成品则没有增长（见下文）。1924年和1925年，出口保持平稳。

Though I will not continue this chronology beyond 1925, I have included the following charts to convey the picture of what happened in Germany into the Great Depression in 1932. As the previous chronology of the Great Depression includes a description of Germany until 1938, those who are interested in how this operatic drama continued through then can pick up the story there. The charts below show (1) the nominal and real stock prices, (2) the mark/dollar exchange rate and the price of gold in marks, (3) the inflation rate and changes in M0, and (4) the growth rate of industrial production from 1923 through 1932.

虽然我不会在1925年以后继续这个年表，但我已经列出了以下图表，将德国发生的事情传达给1932年的大萧条。由于大萧条以前的年表包括德国至1938年的描述，那些谁有兴趣这个戏剧继续通过，然后可以拿起那里的故事。下图显示（1）名义和实际股价，（2）商标/美元汇率和黄金价格，（3）通货膨胀率和M0变化，（4）增长率1923年至1932年的工业生产。