Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921

1918

Germany lost the war, so naturally stocks plunged and there was capital flight from Germany’s paper. As a result, the mark plunged from November 1918 to July 1919 264 and the debt soared. From the end of October 1918 to the end of March 1919, the floating debt of the Reich rose by 15.6 billion paper marks,265 an increase of 32%. In contrast with the war years, the mark’s depreciation occurred via the dollar exchange rate as the dollar became the world’s most important currency. As a result of this depreciation, prices of imported goods rose more rapidly than prices of domestic goods. From November 1918 until July 1919, M0 grew at an annualized rate of 102%, the price of gold in paper marks increased by 210%, the inflation rate averaged an annualized 48%, and industrial production fell at an annualized rate of 43%.

德国失去了战争，所以自然而然的是股市暴跌，德国的文件也出现了资本外流。结果，1918年11月至1919年7月6日 的债券大跌，债务飙升。从1918年10月月底至1919年3月结束，帝国的短期债务上升了15.6十亿纸上涂画，同比增长32％。与战争年代相反，随着美元成为世界上最重要的货币，该货币的贬值发生在美元汇率上。由于这种贬值，进口商品的价格比国内商品价格涨幅更快。从1918年11月至1919年7月，M0年均涨幅为102％，黄金价格上涨210％，通货膨胀率平均为48％，工业产值年均下降43％。

The signing the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919 triggered a new plunge in the exchange rate as it then became obvious the debts imposed on Germany by the Treaty would have a devastating effect on Germany’s balance of payments266 for years to come. At this point, Germany was saddled with a very large domestic debt and a large foreign debt.

1919年6月28日签署“凡尔赛条约”导致汇率大幅下滑，“条约”对德国实施的债务显而易见，将对德国今后几年的国际收支8造成破坏性影响。在这一点上，德国的债务很大，外债很大。

While from October 1918 through early 1919, share prices fell a lot, in the second half of 1919 they rose a lot in paper mark terms due to the very rapid depreciation of the mark. This was the beginning of the very classic dynamic of rapid depreciations in the value of money causing illusions of price gains of stocks and tangible assets. In the case of Germany’s stock market, at the time, the rise was much less than the currency’s depreciation and less than the rise in the price of gold (which reflects the value of money), stocks were a disastrous investment. The indexed value of stocks in gold terms fell from 69.3 in October 1918 to 8.5 in February 1920. Similarly, in inflation adjusted terms, stocks were a horrible investment, i.e., in February 1920, real share prices had fallen to only about 12 percent of their 1913 value.267 Similarly, from a foreign investor’s perspective, investing in Germany’s stock market was a losing proposition. So, during this time gold was the preferred asset to hold, shares were a disaster even though they rose, bonds were wiped out, and rent controls made real estate very bad. In other words, the market action was clearly consistent with that of an inflationary deleveraging.

从1918年10月到1919年初，股价下跌了很多，在1919年下半年，由于商标贬值非常迅速，纸张价格上涨了很多。这是货币价值快速贬值导致股票和有形资产价格涨幅幻想的开始。在德国股市的情况下，当时的涨幅远远小于货币的贬值，而不是黄金价格的上涨（反映了货币的价值），股票是一场灾难性的投资。黄金期货指数价格从1918年10月的69.3下跌至1920年2月的8.5点。同样，在通货膨胀调整后的情况下，股票是可怕的投资，即1920年2月，实际股价已经下降到只有12％他们的1913年价值。同样，从外国投资者的角度来看，投资德国股市是一个失败的主张。所以在此期间，黄金是首选的资产，即使股价上涨，债券被淘汰，房地产管理变得非常糟糕。换句话说，市场行为与通货膨胀去杠杆化的行为显然一致。

The end of World War I brought economic problems to almost everyone. As is typical of deleveragings, economic problems brought clashes between capitalists, “the haves,” and the proletariat, “the have-nots,” and these clashes caused big political shifts. These clashes were not confined to Germany—they were global. For example, the Russian Revolution occurred in November 1918, where the proletariat took wealth and power from the capitalists.

第一次世界大战的结束给几乎每个人带来了经济问题。经济问题正如典型的经济问题带来的资本主义者“无所事事”和无产阶级之间的冲突“无所事事”，这些冲突造成了巨大的政治转变。这些冲突并不局限于德国 - 他们是全球性的。例如，俄罗斯革命发生在1918年11月，无产阶级从资本家那里夺取财富和权力。

1919 – 1920

In 1919, the German government (i.e., the Reich) found it impossible to raise the money it needed without continuing to issue new floating debt at an accelerating rate. The revenues of the Reich had only a modest increase so this revenue increase didn’t do much to reduce their overwhelming reliance on deficit financing, which was then forced to be almost exclusively through short-term borrowing.269 At times when governments need more money than they can borrow from foreign investors, (i.e., when the economy is depressed and budget deficits are large), they are faced with the choice of directly taxing the rich (who are the only ones who can afford to “contribute”) or indirectly taxing them by printing money which devalues the claims of debt holders. They typically do both. Germany did both.

在1919年，德国政府（即帝国）发现，不必继续以更快的速度发行新的浮动债务，无需筹集资金。帝国的收入只有轻微的增长，所以这个收入增长并没有减少压倒性的对赤字融资的依赖，而后者被迫几乎完全通过短期借款。当政府需要比外国投资者借款更多的钱（即经济萧条和预算赤字很大时），他们面临着直接征税的选择（谁是唯一可以负担“贡献”）或通过打印贬低债务人债权的资金来间接征税。他们通常做两个。德国做了两个。

Big taxes of various forms were enacted. Specifically:

颁布了各种形式的大税 。特别：

(1) In 1919 and 1920 numerous new laws were put into place to create numerous and complex taxes. In fact, Matthias Erzberger, the finance minister at the time, proclaimed that in the future Germany the rich should be no more.

（1）在1919年和1920年，制定了许多新的法律，创造了许多复杂的税收。事实上，当时的财政部长马蒂亚斯·埃尔茨贝格（Matthias Erzberger）宣称，德国的财富应该不再是德国。

(2) In December 1919 the government passed the “War Levy on Capital Gains” and the “Extraordinary War Levy for Fiscal Year 1919,” creating wealth taxes that were strongly progressive, rising from 10% of the value of assets at five thousand marks to 65% at above seven million marks. According to original estimates, the tax was expected to take up to one third of German national wealth, which would then be used to redeem the state’s war debts. However, since the tax was for the most part payable in cash and those who were taxed couldn’t convert their wealth into cash fast enough, the Reich had no choice but to permit payment by installment. In fact in some cases it could be spread over up to 28 1⁄2 years, or in the case of landed property up to forty-seven years.271 The government treated these tax debts as mortgages.

(2) 1919年12月，政府通过“资本收益战争征收”和“1919年度特别战争征收”，创造了强劲进步的财富税，从五千万元的资产价值的10％上升至70％以上的65％。根据最初的估计，预计税收将占德国国家财富的三分之一，然后用于赎回国家的战争债务。然而，由于税收大部分是以现金支付的，那些被征税的人不能够将其财富转换成现金足够快，所以不得不允许分期付款。事实上，在某些情况下，它可能会扩展到28％以上，或者在地面物业达四十七年的情况下。政府处理这些欠税抵押。

(3) The Secretary of the State proposed that the taxes due should take the form of mortgages denominated in gold in favor of the State and should be imposed on all properties, though interest payments could be made in paper money that was price indexed (e.g., for farmers they were indexed to grain prices). However, when it came to paying its debts, the government did so in paper money that could depreciate. Clearly, the government was allowing itself, but not the taxpayers, to depreciate its debts through money creation. As an additional wealth tax, the government proposed that a certain percentage of the equity of public and private companies should be given to the State.

3）国务秘书提出，应缴纳的税款应采取黄金抵押贷款的形式，并对所有财产进行强制执行，但可以利用价格指数的纸币（例如：对农民而言，他们被指定为粮食价格）。但是，在偿还债务的时候，政府却用纸币来贬值。显然，政府允许自己，而不是纳税人，通过创造钱币来贬值债务。作为附加财富税，政府提出公私营公司的一定比例的股权应该交给国家。

(4) The “Reich Emergency Contribution” taxed the wealthier classes as part of the great Erzberger tax reforms. It was also payable in installments, which was contrary to the original conception, so it became a recurrent charge on wealth in addition to wealth holders’ existing liabilities under the “Defense Contribution” of 1919 and the extraordinary “War Levy” of 1917.273 Because of inflation and the method of valuing real property and industrial plants, those who owned securities or mortgages (i.e., financial assets) were worse off than landowners and industrialists (i.e., owners of tangible assets).

（4）“帝国紧急捐款”对富裕阶层征税是埃尔兹贝格伟大税收改革的一部分。它也分期付款，这与原来的概念相违背，所以除了1919年的“防务贡献”下的财富持有人现有负债和191 7的非凡“战争征费”之外，它也成为经常性的财富指控。由于通货膨胀和重视房地产和工业设备的方法，那些谁拥有证券或抵押（即金融资产）为又比地主和实业家恶化（即有形资产的所有者）。

At the time, economists recognized that the claims of those who held financial assets were too large to be paid back in the promised manner (i.e., with the value of money being maintained) without resulting in great hardship. So, rather than wanting to fight inflation, policy makers explicitly advocated accelerated inflation as a means of taxation. The plan was for the Reich to redeem its long-term debt prematurely at par value by obtaining the cash from the central bank, or to convert its long-dated bonds into treasury bills. This would eliminate the threat of the government going bankrupt. Also, it was widely recognized that depreciating the currency would have stimulative effects on the economy and make Germany more competitive in world markets. As one official put it, it was better "to exploit to the full the opportunities afforded by money creation, than to cripple the forces of production and the spirit of enterprise by a confiscatory tax policy.

当时经济学家认识到，持有金融资产的人的要求太大，无法以承诺的方式偿还（即保持金钱的价值），而不会造成巨大的困难。所以，决策者不是想打击通货膨胀，而是明确提出加快通货膨胀作为征税手段 。该计划是为了通过从中央银行获得现金或将其长期债券转换为国库券，以期提前赎回其长期债务的面值。这样可以消除政府破产的威胁。此外，人们普遍认为，贬值货币将会有刺激对经济的影响，使德国在世界市场上更有竞争力。正如一位官员所说，最好“充分利用货币创造所提供的机会，而不是通过没收税收政策削弱生产力和企业精神 ”

It was widely recognized that, though breaking the commitment to pay debts in money of stable value is evil, it is the lesser of two evils. For example, a German economist at the time, Dr. Bendixen, who favored printing money to devalue debtors’ claims said, “I have never denied that what I propose is an evil, but it is the only means of preventing a still worse evil...We may deprecate the fraudulent excesses of speculation and of entrepreneurial activity that the inflation would bring—and not without reason: but are we on this account to prefer the corpse- strewn battlefield into which the repudiation of the War Loans would turn our economy?” Bendixen believed it would be impossible, or at least extremely injurious to the economy, to repay the War Loans out of taxation. He also regarded inflation as preferable to the type of tax system that—under existing political conditions—was threatening wealth holders and high income groups in the manner proposed. Similarly, Keynes said, “The inflation is unjust and deflation is inexpedient. Of the two perhaps deflation is the worse, because it is worse in an impoverished world to provoke unemployment than to disappoint the rentier.”275 By “rentier” he meant the person who rented out his capital.

人们普遍认为，虽然打破了以稳定价值的货币偿还债务的承诺是邪恶的，但却是两种罪恶中的较小者。例如，当时的德国经济学家Bendixen博士赞成打印资金来贬低债务人的债权，他说：“我从来没有否认我提出的是一种邪恶，但它是防止更糟糕的罪恶的唯一手段...我们可能会否认通货膨胀带来的欺诈性过度的投机活动和创业活动 - 而不是没有理由：但是我们在这个帐户中是否喜欢将这个战争贷款的否定将会改变我们的战场经济？” Bendixen认为，不可能或至少对经济造成极大的伤害，要偿还战争贷款的税收。他还认为通货膨胀比现行政治条件下的税收制度更为可取，因为这种税收制度是以财富持有人和高收入群体的方式提出的。凯恩斯说：“通货膨胀是不公正的，通货紧缩是不合时宜的，其中通货紧缩情况更糟糕，因为贫穷的世界挑衅失业比失业更糟糕。“租金”他是指租出自己的资本的人。

Germany’s total debt—i.e., its external debt on top of its internal debt—was so huge that it must have been obvious to anyone with a sharp pencil that any attempt to service it, let alone to pay it off, would have caused a deflationary deleveraging of unimaginable severity, so it was not going to happen. No government could have survived such a policy. When there isn’t much chance that the government can service or pay back its debt via taxation there is always an implicit risk that it will print currency and depreciate the currency’s value. This is not just an observation of Germany at the time—it is a timeless and universal truth.

德国的债务总额，即其外部债务占其内部负债 - 这么大，这对于任何用铅笔来说都是显而易见的，任何试图服务的债务，更不用说支付债务就会造成通货紧缩去除不可想象的严重性，所以不会发生。没有政府能够幸免于难。当政府没有多少机会通过税收来偿还债务时，总会有一个隐含的风险，它会打印货币和贬值货币的价值 。这不仅仅是德国在当时的观察，而是一个永恒和普遍的真理。

In contrast with the easy money policies that existed in Germany at the time, tight money policies were being followed in other countries because, at the end of 1919 and beginning of 1920, Britain and the USA were in booms that had to be brought under control. For example, interest rates on three-month money, which were less than 6% in the first nine months of 1919, averaged about 8% in 1920 in the U.S.

与德国当时容易的货币政策相反，其他国家正在紧缩货币政策，因为在1919年底和1920年初，英美两国处于繁荣期，必须受到控制。例如，1919年头9个月的3个月利率不到6％，美国在1920年平均约为8％

Naturally, high tax rates on the wealthy coming at the same time as their net worths were being eroded in their investments and due to the bad economy, caused them to desperately try to preserve their rapidly shrinking wealth at all costs. This led to extremely high rates of tax evasion and the flight of capital abroad.277 This is typical in deleveragings. It also typically leads to governments establishing controls on both tax evasion and citizens of the country taking money abroad. As we will see shortly, that is what happened in Germany.

当然，富裕的高税率同时在其投资中被削弱，而且由于经济不景气，使得他们拼命地试图不惜一切代价来保持快速萎缩的财富。这导致了逃税率极高的国外资金流失 。这是在典型的去杠杆化。这也通常导致政府对逃税和国外公民进行国际收支的管制。正如我们将在短期内看到的那样，德国就是这样。

At the time, the Allies (i.e., the countries that won the war) were understandably worried that Germany would pay them back with worthless paper money, so on December 13, 1919, they reached an agreement with Germany that forbid the Reichsbank from disposing of its gold reserve.278 As we will see later, this gold stock was to play an important role in determining how events transpired in subsequent years.

当时，盟国（即赢得战争的国家）可以理解，德国将以无价值的纸币支付他们，所以在1919年12月13日，他们与德国达成了一项协议，禁止帝国银行处置其黄金储备。我们将在后面看到，这个黄金库存在确定随后几年事件如何发生中起重要作用。

The charts below show the exchange rate changes during this period and a longer-term chart to put these moves in context. As shown, this was a period of great weakness in the mark, which is obviously consistent with the fundamentals of the time.

下面的图表显示了这一时期的汇率变动以及将这些举措置于上下文中的长期图表。如图所示，这是一个很大的弱点，这显然与时间的基本一致。

Currency depreciation is, in cases other than hyperinflation, normally stimulative to short-term economic activity and bullish for inflation hedge assets and stocks. So, these declines in the mark stimulated the German economy in late 1919 and early 1920. They gave an especially strong stimulus to exports, which is normal.279 Also, the low real interest rates stimulated domestic demand. So, the German economy picked up, and the number of unemployed fell rapidly. Because of the mark’s decline, the divergence between German prices and world prices was large and German wages remained low. This caused German businesses to do well, so confidence in the stock market improved and prices rose. Because of the very rapid currency depreciation and price declines of Government securities, mortgages, and debentures—in fact, all securities with a fixed yield—declined in value.

在恶性通货膨胀的情况下，货币贬值通常会刺激短期经济活动，看涨通胀对冲资产和股票。那么这样的下跌呢就是在1919年末和1920年初刺激了德国的经济。他们特别强调出口，这是正常的。此外，低实际利率刺激了国内需求。所以德国经济回升，失业人数急剧下降。由于商标的下降，德国的价格与世界价格之间的差异很大，德国的工资仍然很低。这使得德国企业做得很好，所以对股市的信心有所改善，价格上涨。由于政府证券，抵押和债权证的货币贬值和价格下滑非常迅速 - 事实上，所有固定资产价值下降的证券。

So, in 1919, this decline in the value of debt instruments also drove investors to buy shares and other assets like gold for their “intrinsic” value. The public now saw that the paper mark and debt could no longer fulfill the function of the “store of value.”280 The period between the start of 1919 and spring 1920 was one when stock prices rose continuously (nearly doubling) because of buying for their intrinsic value, unemployment fell, and the currency entered a period of “relative stabilization.” The chart below shows stock prices during this period.

所以在1919年，债务工具的价值下降也促使投资者以“内在”价值购买黄金等股票和其他资产。公众现在看到纸标和债务不再能够实现“储值 ” 的功能 。

1921

As noted earlier, central banks in other countries pursued tight money policies in 1920. These tight money conditions in other countries in 1920 led to a bad world contraction in 1921. Though this was called a deleveraging, which was then the name for all economic contractions, it was primarily driven by monetary policies, so this contraction had some of the markings of what we refer to as a recession, though certainly it was a very bad recession. Between 1920 and 1921, industrial production fell by 20% in the US, by 18.6% in the UK, and by 11% in France, largely as a result of this monetary tightening. In the US, unemployment reached 12%. At the bottom of the contraction, which occurred around mid-1921, 22% of the total population was out of work. So it was certainly a very severe global contraction.

如前所述，其他国家的中央银行在1920年采取紧缩的货币政策。其他国家的货币紧张状况在1920年导致了1921年的世界萎缩。虽然这被称为去杠杆化，而这是所有经济收缩的名称，主要是由货币政策推动的，所以这种收缩有一些我们所说的经济衰退的迹象，虽然肯定是非常糟糕的衰退。在1920年至1921年间，美国的工业生产下降了20％，英国下降了18.6％，法国的工业生产下降了11％，主要是由于货币紧缩。在美国，失业率达到12％。在1921年中期发生的收缩底部，总人口的22％失业。所以当然是一个非常严峻的全球收缩。

However, economic conditions in Germany in 1920 and 1921 continued to be very different from those in the other leading industrial countries—most importantly, Germany did not suffer a severe contraction because of its reflationary policies—mostly because German monetary policies were easy (largely because of its easy money policies and the absence of a tie with gold), while those in other countries were tight.

然而，1920年和1921年德国的经济状况与其他主要工业国家的经济状况仍然非常不同 - 最重要的是，德国由于其通货膨胀政策而没有遭受严重的收缩 - 主要是因为德国的货币政策很容易其轻松的货币政策和与黄金没有关系），而其他国家则紧张。

As a result of these relative economic conditions and the differences in monetary policy that accompanied them, the German exchange rate became more stable between April 1920 and May 1921. That was because conditions in other countries were so bad that they drove investors to Germany. However this currency stability and weakness in other economies naturally created difficulties for German export-dependent industries. But domestic demand remained strong. As a result, German industrial production increased by 20.4% between 1920 and 1921, on the heels of the 46% increase that occurred between 1919 and 1920. So 1919-1921 was a period of strong growth for Germany. Average unemployment during 1921 declined to only 2.8% of trade union members, which was below the 1920 average of 3.8%.283 Still in 1921-22, German industrial production remained much lower than in 1913, so this period of growth was within the period of greater economic contraction for Germany.

由于这些相对经济条件和货币政策的差异，德国的汇率在1920年4月至1921年5月期间变得更加稳定。那是因为其他国家的情况如此糟糕，以至于把投资者带到了德国。然而，这种货币的稳定性和其他经济体的疲软自然就造成了德国出口依赖行业的困难。但国内需求依然强劲。结果，1920年至1921年间，德国的工业生产增长了20.4％，其中1919至1920年间增长了46％。所以1919-1921年德国是强劲增长的时期。1921年的平均失业率仅下降到工会成员的2.8％，低于1920年平均水平的3.8％。仍然在1921年至22年间，德国的工业生产依然比1913年低得多，所以这个增长期在德国经济萎缩的时期之内。

In that year, the money supply remained almost stable—e.g., the gold mark was worth 14.2 paper marks in April 1920 and 14.9 in March 1921, as the world's deflationary contraction and Germany's favorable relative growth supported the mark. In spite of that, the budget deficit was huge—roughly 15% of GDP—which equated to 60% of the total expenses (in the financial year of 1920-21) and that large deficit was financed by the issue of Treasury bills. So, in the period from February 1920 to May 1921, the supply of floating debt was increased a lot; however, the inflationary effects were mitigated by the global deflationary period.24

在那一年，货币供应量几乎保持稳定 - 例如，1920年4月的黄金价值为14.2美元，1921年3月为14.9美元，因为世界通货紧缩和德国有利的相对增长支撑了标志。尽管如此，预算赤字是巨大的 - 大约占国内生产总值的15％ - 这相当于总开支的60％（1920-21年财政年度），而且由于国库券的发行，大量的赤字得到了资助。所以在1920年2月至1921年5月期间，浮动债务的供应量增加了很多;然而，全球通货紧缩期间通货膨胀的影响却得到缓解。

In 2Q1920 the German economy began to weaken along with the global economy. The German currency had been stable until May 1921, but then it began to soften. Then, along with the economy weakening, the Allies restructured Germany's external debt via the "London Ultimatum". The "agreement" was called the "ultimatum" because the allies threatened to occupy the Ruhr Basin within six days if Germany didn't agree to the plan. It specified the final payments plan which set war reparations at 132 billion gold marks, with 50 billion in gold marks bonds up front and 2 billion gold marks in the first year, plus 1 billion gold marks over the next few months, and some other taxes.25 In other words, it solidified a huge debt burden for Germany. Naturally that implied that domestic debts and the currency would have to be depreciated because the government faced the choice of either (a) printing and taxing, or (b) having money and credit tighten and the weak economy contract, and it was obvious which they would choose.

二季度，德国经济与全球经济一起开始下滑。德国货币一直稳定到1921年5月，然后开始变软。那么随着经济的减弱，盟国通过“伦敦最后通atum”重组了德国的外债。“协议”被称为“最后通atum”，因为如果德国不同意这个计划，盟国将在六天内威胁要占领鲁尔盆地。指定了最终付款计划，确定了1330亿黄金的战争赔偿金，前五十亿黄金债券，第一年金额达20亿美元，未来几个月加上10亿美金，还有一些其他税款。换言之，它凝固了德国一个巨大的债务负担。当然这意味着国内债务和货币必须贬值，因为政府面临着（a）打印和征税的选择，或（b）收紧货币和信贷紧缩以及经济合作薄弱的情况。会选择

While the German government was being pressured by these circumstances to print more money, Allied governments wanted German currency stabilization because mark weakness made Germany more competitive.

虽然德国政府在这种情况下受到压力以打印更多的资金，但盟国政府希望德国货币稳定，因为标志的弱点使德国更具竞争力。

British industry wanted "the competitive advantage on world markets which the fall in the mark was giving to German industry to be curtailed" by a currency stabilization. At the time, unemployment in Britain reached 23.4%. But, as always, fundamentals won out over the Allies' wishes, and German "currency dumping" began in May 1921.

英国行业希望通过货币稳定，“对世界市场的竞争优势，这个标志下降到德国工业被削减”。当时英国的失业率达23.4％。但是，一如以往，基本面赢得了盟国的愿望，德国的“货币倾销”始于1921年5月。

The new tax sources, made available to the Reich between 1919 and 1921 under the "Erzberger Reforms", had increased the revenues of the Reich during fiscal year 1921. There were enough tax revenues to cover ordinary expenditures but not reparations. By the beginning of 1922, tax revenues had increased not only in nominal terms, but even in gold mark values, while expenditures were strictly controlled. In the first quarter of the new fiscal year (April-June 1922), Germany was able to finance not only its entire ordinary and extraordinary expenditure out of taxation, but even to apply a considerable sum from the same source to meeting reparations charges.

1919年至1921年在“埃尔兹贝格尔改革”期间向帝国提供的新税源在1921年财政年度增加了帝国的收入。有足够的税收来支付普通支出但不赔偿。到1922年初，税收收入不仅以名义价格上涨，而且在黄金价值上也有所增加，而支出则受到严格控制。在新财政年度（1922年4月至6月）的第一季度，德国不仅可以为其所有的普通和特殊支出提供资金，还可以从同一来源申请相当数量的资金用于赔偿费用。

So let's review. Economic weakness and the Ultimatum of London of May 1921 provoked the collapse of the mark.26 It was originally proposed that reparations would equal an annuity of eight billion gold marks which would have taken 23.2% of German national income in 1919, 21.3% in 1920, 19.8% in 1921 and 19.0% in 1922. But these burdens were reduced to three billion gold marks by the London Ultimatum due to a more realistic assessment of Germany's capacity to pay. Still, three billion gold marks represented an enormous burden of 7.4% of German national income in 1921, 7.1% in 1922 and 8.0% in 1923, especially on top of German's other debts.

所以让我们回顾一下。1921年5月的经济衰退和伦敦的最后通21激起了商标的崩溃。最初建议赔偿金将相当于1919年的德国国民生产总值的23.2％，1920年的21.3％，1921年的19.8％，1922年的19.0％，但这些负担减少到了由于对德国的支付能力进行了更为实际的评估，伦敦最高通行证达到了30亿美金。然而，在1921年，德国国民收入的百分之七十九仍是十九亿分之一，1922年为7.1％，1923年为8.0％，尤其是德国其他国家债务。

Between 1919 and 1922 Germany paid at least the eight billion, which is the amount credited to Germany by the Reparations Commission, though it is widely estimated that the payments were considerably more. The independent and unconnected estimates by Keynes and by Moulton and McGuire-twenty-six billion—are probably nearer the truth. In current gold marks aggregate German national income in the four years 1919-22 was 287.7 billion. Actual payments then ranged between 3.1% and 21.8% of this but were most likely (following the Keynes or Moulton/McGuire estimates) about 10%.28 A historian recently calculated that a level of taxation equal to thirty-five percent of national income would have been required to defray postwar expenditures on reparations, social welfare, and the general running costs of the government.29 The estimate of the gold mark value of the Reich's current payments on reparations account was 4.9 billions in 1919, falling to 2.1 billions in 1920. But with the London Ultimatum of May 1921, the gold mark value of payments began to rise again: 2.8 billions in that year and 3.4 billions in 1922.30 In other words, it was too much.

在1919年至1922年间，德国至少支付了八十亿美元，这是赔偿委员会记入德国的数额，但据估计，这笔款项大大增加。凯恩斯和Moulton和McGuire二十六亿的独立和不相关的估计可能更接近真相。目前的黄金总量德国国民收入在1919-22年的四年中为287.7亿。实际支付金额在3.1％至21.8％之间，但最有可能（按凯恩斯或莫尔顿/麦圭圭估计）约为10％。一位历史学家最近计算出，在国家收入的百分之三十五的税收水平将被要求支付战后赔偿，社会福利和政府一般运营成本的支出 。关于赔偿帐户帝国目前支付的金色标记值的估计是49个亿，1919年下降到2.1亿，1920年，但与1921年5月的伦敦最后通牒，支付的金色标记值开始再次上升：2.8那年的数十亿，在1922年有四十亿。30 换句话说，这太多了。

The next chart shows the exchange rate, M0, the CPI, and the velocity of money during the 1920-24 period. Notice that the decline in the currency value and the increase in the velocity of money led the increase in inflation, which led M0 growth as the central bank chose to accommodate these demands. This is typical in all monetary inflations, so you will also observe them to be true in the Brazilian, Argentine, Russian, and Thai cases. In other words, money supply growth did not cause these other things to happen; rather investors’ movements of capital out of debt and out of currency caused these changes, which the Reichsbank accommodated by printing money (i.e., M0). The sudden rise in the velocity of money after July 1921 was due to the outbreak of a new crisis of doubt in the value of holding cash.

下一个图表显示1920至24年期间的汇率，M0，CPI和货币流动速度。请注意，货币价值下降和货币流动速度上升导致通货膨胀率上升，随着央行选择适应这些需求，导致M0增长。这在所有的货币膨胀中都是典型的，所以你也会在巴西，阿根廷，俄罗斯和泰国的情况下遵守这些规定。换句话说，货币供应量的增长并不会导致其他的事情发生;相反，投资者的资本流出债务和货币出现导致了国际清算银行通过印刷货币 （即M0）所容纳的这些变化 。在1921年7月以后，货币汇率的突然上涨是由于持有现金价值的新危机爆发。

In August 1921 it was clear that getting adequate income and wealth taxes from the rich was difficult (largely because incomes were down and wealth was illiquid), and those who opposed the “taxation of material wealth” in the Reichstag were strong enough to be able to block many of the wealth tax attempts. The government then abandoned the idea of a mortgage tax in favor of heavy taxes on consumption goods because they were more effective. It is important to realize that wealth taxes are usually ineffective because much wealth is illiquid, and because collections on the “mortgage” don’t generate much cash.

1921年8月，显然从富人那里获得充足的收入和财富是困难的（主要是因为收入下降，财富流动不足），那些在国会大厦里反对“物质财富征税”的人力量足够强大阻止许多财富税的尝试。政府则因为更为有效而放弃了抵押税的理念，赞成对消费品重税。重要的是要认识到，财富税通常是无效的，因为很多财富是流动性不足的，而且由于“抵押贷款”的收款没有多少现金。

After the autumn of 1921, the depreciation of the German mark became even more rapid and economic activity strengthened further. It was clear that a falling mark and rising inflation produced prosperity. According to the official statistics, the number of unemployed, which was high at the beginning of 1919, fell continually until the summer of 1922, when unemployment practically disappeared. However, any time there was an improvement of the mark there then was an increase of unemployment (see March-July 1920; November 1920-February 1921; December 1921-January 1922), and every depreciation of the mark was followed by an improvement in conditions of the labor market (January-February 1920; July-November 1920; April-November 1921; and then during the first half of 1922.) So it was clear that monetary stimulation and the weak exchange rate stimulated the economy. When the mark depreciated, foreign and domestic demands for goods increased. Foreign purchasers wanted to profit by the greater purchasing power of their own money in the Germany market, and the prospect of continuous increases in prices stimulated the demand to buy goods as a means of getting out of a depreciating currency. When the mark improved, foreign demand declined and in Germany there occurred what in the summer of 1920 was called "the buyers' strike."

1921年秋天以后，德国商标的贬值更加迅速，经济活动进一步加强。显然，下降的标志和通货膨胀的上升带来了繁荣 。据官方统计，1919年初，失业人数持续高涨，直至1922年夏季失业几乎消失。然而，随着时间的改善，失业率就会有所增加 （见1920年3月至7月，1921年11月至1921年2月，1921年12月至1922年1月），商标的每次贬值均随之改善劳动力市场条件 （1920年1月至1920年; 1920年7月至11月; 1921年4月至11月;然后是1922年上半年）。因此，显而易见的是，货币刺激和汇率疲弱刺激了经济 。当商标贬值时，国内外货物需求增加。外国购买者希望通过德国市场自身的购买力获得更大的利润，价格持续上涨的前景刺激了购买商品的需求，作为摆脱贬值的货币。当商标得到改善时，外国需求下降，德国在1920年的夏天发生了什么叫做“买家罢工”。

The German press called the industrial and commercial situation between October 1921 and the summer of 1922 one of "general liquidation" because the shops were empty due to foreigners buying a lot because the mark was cheap, and Germans buying a lot because they worried about inflation. At the beginning of November 1921, the flight from the mark became a panic which rapidly spread through all classes of society.

德国新闻界称1921年10月至1922年夏天为“一般清算”的工商业情况，因为商店因为外国人买得很便宜，因为商品价格便宜，因为担心通货膨胀而购买了很多德国人。在1921年11月初，从标记的飞行变成了迅速蔓延到社会各阶层的恐慌。

In November, the depreciation of the mark provoked a big increase in orders, especially for inflation hedge and export items. The metallurgical industries were working at full capacity, so that they had to introduce overtime, and they refused to accept new orders. As cars are long-lived, the automobile industry had a period of peak prosperity. The textile trade had bookings for several months ahead, and the cotton firms refused to take new orders. It was clear that accelerating inflation and rising trade competitiveness from the depreciating value of the mark, rather than more sustainable drivers of growth, provided this demand.

11月份，商品贬值引发了订单大幅增长，特别是通货膨胀对冲和出口产品。冶金行业全力开展工作，不得不加班，拒绝接受新订单。汽车寿命长，汽车工业发展高峰期。纺织贸易已经预订了好几个月，棉花公司拒绝接受新订单。显然，加速通货膨胀和提高的贸易竞争力从商标的贬值，而不是更可持续的增长驱动力提供了这种需求。

Then, from November 26 to December 1, 1921, the mark strengthened by about a third—i.e., the dollar rate fell sharply from 293 to 190 paper marks.31 This big whipsaw appears to have been due to a short squeeze as the speculation against the mark in many ways (typically from borrowing it and Germans keeping money outside the country) became overdone. As always, the mark's strength hurt the economy. In fact, press reports from that time declared that the improvement of the mark had been a catastrophe for German industry.32 Trade orders rapidly diminished. Eventually, the shorts were squeezed and the impacts on trade and capital flows began to work against the mark.

那么，从1921年11月26日到12月1日，这个标记就增加了大约三分之一，即美元汇率从293张大幅下降到190纸币。这个大鞭子似乎是由于在许多方面（通常来自借贷和德国人在国外保存货币）的揣测，这个短暂的挤压已经过时了。与往常一样，商标的实力伤害了经济。事实上，当时的新闻报道说，这个商标的改善是德国工业的一场灾难。贸易订单迅速减少。最终，短裤被挤压，对贸易和资本流动的影响开始反对。

So in February 1922 the mark began to fall, and on March 7 it was all the way back to 262 paper marks to the dollar. And the economy picked up again. A new wave of commercial and industrial activity followed in the form of panic buying. "It is no longer simply a zeal for acquiring, or even a rage: it is a madness," according to one observer of the time. Merchants bought for fear that if they waited the stocks would be exhausted. As a result, 1922 was a boom year, though in 1922 (which was the year of greatest economic expansion after the war) the level of economic activity still was no more than 70-80% of production in 1913, so despite this strength, the economy was still in the contraction that began in 1918.33

所以在1922年二月，商标开始下降了，而在3月7日，这一直回到了262美元的纸币。经济再次回升。商业和工业活动的新浪潮以恐慌购买的形式出现。根据当时的观察家的说法，“获得甚至愤怒不再仅仅是一种热心，而是一种疯狂。”买家因为担心，如果他们等待的股票将被用尽。结果，1922年是繁荣时期，虽然在1922年（这是战后经济扩张最大的一年），经济活动水平仍然不到1913年的70-80％左右，尽管如此，经济仍处在始于1918年收缩33

While one might think that the boom of 1922 was good for workers, it wasn't. That is because there was a big contrast between the continual increase of German production and wages, which did not keep up with inflation. Also, there was a deficiency in agricultural production due to the lack of certain chemical fertilizers and a shortage of labor. At the time there was a widely reported "fall in the intensity of labor" in 1919-1923,34 which hurt productivity. However, what was good for the average man was that during the inflation, rents fell on an inflation adjusted basis to almost zero. This was obviously bad for those who owned rental properties.

虽然有人可能认为1922年的繁荣对工人来说是有益的，但并不是这样。那是因为德国的生产和工资不断增加，与通货膨胀没有紧密的对比。而且由于缺乏化肥和劳动力短缺，农业生产缺乏。当时在1919 - 1923年被广泛报道的“劳动强度下降” 34 ，这损害了生产力。然而，对一般人来说，有利的是在通货膨胀期间，通货膨胀调整后的租金几乎为零。对于拥有租赁物业的人来说，这显然是不利的。

The inflation and negative real interest rates encouraged borrowing to invest as well as to spend. Real investment was at least as high as before the war.35 The inflation stimulated a demand for "producers" goods because they were viewed as having relatively long income producing lives with these incomes tied to prices in the future (i.e., they were considered good inflation hedges). This market action is typical in high inflation environments. Similarly, it was widely recognized that short-term bank credits could be used to make long-term investments because, thanks to the increase of prices, the debtor could repay with depreciated money. It was thought that even if for the time being the new equipment was not utilized, it had an "intrinsic value". Similarly, at that time, the savings of entrepreneurs who readily adapted their behavior to make money went into tangible assets such as iron and stones. Also, to avoid the effects of the monetary depreciation, those in German agriculture continued to buy machines. The "flight from the mark to the machine", as it was called at the time, was one of the most convenient means of defense against the depreciation of the currency. Of course, those forms of investment were excessive and eventually did badly. For example, towards the end of the inflation, farmers realized that a great part of their capital was sunk in machines that were far more numerous than they needed.

通货膨胀和负实际利率鼓励借款投资和支出。实际投资至少与战前一样高。通货膨胀刺激了对“生产者”货物的需求，因为他们被认为拥有相对较长的收入生产，这些收入与未来的价格相关（即被认为是通货膨胀对冲）。这种市场行为在高通胀环境中是典型的。同样，人们普遍认识到，短期银行信贷可用于进行长期投资，因为由于价格上涨，债务人可以用折旧的资金偿还 。有人认为，即使现在新设备没有被利用，它具有“内在价值”。同样的，当时，那些容易调整自己的行为赚钱的企业家的储蓄就变成了有形资产，比如铁和石头 。另外，为了避免货币贬值的影响，德国农业部门继续购买机器。当时所谓的“从标记到机器的飞行”是对货币贬值的最方便的防御手段之一。当然，这些投资形式过多，而且最终还是做得不好。例如，在通货膨胀结束时，农民意识到，他们的大部分资本在机器上沉没，这些机器远远超过他们需要。

Those whose wealth was in fixed value monetary assets (e.g., bonds) and who did not learn to protect it by shifting into real assets or by contracting equivalent debts suffered devastating losses.

那些财富处于固定值货币资产（如债券）和没有通过转入实际资产或通过承担相等的债务来学习保护的人遭受了毁灭性的损失 。

During the inflation, all companies, with rare exceptions, continually increased their capital37 by borrowing because one of the rules of good management during these inflationary times was to take on as much debt as possible because debts could be repaid with depreciated currency. At that time, smart investors were buyers of shares, firms, securities, and merchandise—i.e., they were buyers of tangible rather than financial wealth.38 So, there was a big shift by capitalists toward producing "goods for production" rather than "goods for consumption", and toward getting "short money" via borrowing. Of course, those who provided these goods demanded very high prices for them, so there was a more rapid increase in prices of producers' good than in those of consumers' goods.

在通货膨胀期间，除少数例外情况外，所有公司通过借款不断增加资本37 ，因为在这些通货膨胀时期，良好管理规则之一是尽可能多地偿还债务，因为债务可以用折旧货币偿还 。那时候，聪明的投资者是股票，公司，证券和商品的买家，也就是说，他们是有形而不是财富的买家。因此，资本家转向生产“生产货物”而不是“消费品”，并通过借款“短暂的钱”转变 。当然，那些提供这些商品的人要求价格非常高，所以生产者的价格比消费者的价格要高得多。

Another reason for the high investment rates was to minimize taxes. By investing profits back in capital goods businesses could create expenses to lower their reported profits to escape onerous taxes.

投资率高的另一个原因是尽量减少税收。通过将利润投资在资本品业务中，可以创造费用来降低其报告的利润以逃避繁重的税收。

At times of rapid depreciation of the mark, such as in the autumn of 1921, the stock market rose sharply.39 Speculation in stocks was popular as a currencv/inflation hedge, and became rampant at the time. A newspaper at the time wrote, "Today there is no one—from lift-boy, typist, and small landlord to the wealth lady in high society—who does not speculate in industrial securities and who does not study the list of official quotations as if it were a most precious letter."40

有时唛头快速贬值，如1921年秋季，股市大幅上涨。投机股票受欢迎作为currencv /通货膨胀对冲，当时猖獗 。当时的一家报纸写道：“今天没有一个人 - 从电梯男孩，打字员和小地主到高社会的财富女士 - 谁不推测工业证券，谁不学习官方报价单如果是最宝贵的信件。“

Because stocks were driven by the value of money/currency at the time (in 1920-1921), prices of industrial shares stopped being a good barometer of economic activity. In fact, the opposite was true—events which were unfavorable to Germany caused a fresh depreciation of the mark which caused a rise in the prices of industrial securities.

由于股票是由当时（1920 - 2121年）的货币/货币价值驱动的，因此工业股价格不再是经济活动的晴雨表。事实上，相反的事实是对德国不利的事件造成了商品的新的贬值，造成工业证券价格上涨。

From mid-1920 through the end of 1921 share prices responded to the fluctuations in the value of the currency42 and nearly tripled in inflation adjusted terms. In the autumn of 1921, the mark collapsed and a fresh spurt in exports occurred.43

从1920年中至1921年底，股价反映了货币价值波动42 而通货膨胀调整后的数字翻了三倍。在1921年的秋天，商标崩溃，出口新出现爆发。

Then, in the first months of 1922, there was a relative stabilization of the mark. At the time, German exports were less than German imports. That is because exports consisted mainly of primary products, so when the exchange rate fell, the beneficial effects of increased exports were offset by the negative effects of rising import prices. So mark weakness hurt sectors such as food, drink and tobacco whose outputs were sold at home but whose raw material inputs were purchased abroad. Many people at the time believed that the real stimulus that arose from the mark's decline was from the inflation that came substantially as a result of the fall in real interest rates44 that led to inflation hedge buying.

然后，在1922年的头几个月里，这个商标相对稳定了。当时德国的出口比德国进口少。那是因为出口主要由初级产品组成，所以当汇率下降时，出口增加的有利影响被进口价格上涨所带来的负面影响所抵消。所以标记的弱点就会伤害到产品在国内销售但原料投入国外购买的食品，饮料和烟草等行业。很多人当时认为，从马克的下跌出现了真正的刺激是从来到实质上与下降的实际利率所造成的通货膨胀44 ，导致通货膨胀的避险买盘。

Germany ran a large trade deficit between 1919 and 1922, though quantifying it is not possible for that period because of the difficulty of ascertaining correct gold-mark valuations of the trade flows. Still, we know that the deficit was big. Estimates vary from 4.5 to 11 billion gold marks which equaled 12% to 28% of GDP. On top of that deficit Germany had to come up with 2.6 billion gold marks worth of cash reparations payments, which equaled 6.7% of GDP. While a small surplus might have been earned on invisible account during those years (chiefly from tourism) it was very small, so the sum of the trade deficit plus reparations represents the order of magnitude of the current account deficit which appears to be somewhere between 11% and 17% of GDP!!45 Though we don't know what it was exactly, we know that it was huge.

德国在1919年至1922年间出现了大量的贸易逆差，但由于难以确定贸易流量的黄金评级，因此在这一时期内不可能量化。不过，我们知道赤字很大。估计从4.5亿美元到110亿美元，相当于GDP的12％至28％。除此之外，德国还得出了26亿美元的现金赔偿金，相当于国内生产总值的6.7％。虽然这些年份（主要来自旅游业）可能在无形帐户上赚取了小额盈余，但这非常小，所以贸易赤字加赔偿金总额代表了经常项目赤字的数量级，似乎在11之间％和GDP的17％！ 45 虽然我们不知道是什么，但我们知道这是巨大的。

How did this get funded? It was funded by foreign countries, mostly via individual investors who were lured by higher German interest rates. They accumulated substantial paper-mark claims on Germany throughout the 1914-1922 period. So Germany became a debtor to other countries' investors with the debt largely denominated in its own currency. The table below shows estimated Weimar Germany balance of payments numbers.

这是如何得到资助的？它由外国资助，主要是由德国利率较高的个人投资者所吸引。他们在1914 - 1922年期间积累了对德国的实质性的纸质要求。所以德国成为其他国家的投资者的债务人，债务大部分以自己的货币计值。下表显示了魏玛德国国际收支数据的估计。

It's estimated that foreigners transferred capital to Germany to the amount of 15.7 billion gold marks over the period 1914-22 as a whole. J.M. Keynes and K. Singer estimated the unrequited resource transfer into Germany between 1919 and 1922 at between eight and ten billion gold marks. So Germany essentially borrowed money from private foreigners and in turn used the money it borrowed to pay foreign government reparations—so it was essentially a Ponzi scheme.308 While it looked like Germany was both making its reparation payments and providing investors with high returns, these payments came from borrowing money from foreigners. This is very much like the carry trade dynamic that was very popular in 2004-2007.

据估计，外国人在一九一二年至二十二年期间将资本转移至德国，金额达157亿美元。JM凯恩斯和K.辛格估计在1919年至1922年之间资源转移到德国的金额达八百万到十亿美元之间。所以德国本质上是从私人外国人那里借钱，反过来又用借来的钱支付外国政府的赔偿 - 所以这本来就是一个庞氏骗局。虽然看起来德国正在偿还赔偿金并为投资者提供高回报，但这些付款来自外国人借款。这非常像2004-2007年非常受欢迎的套利交易动态。

Foreigners also bought industrial or bank shares, houses, and, and in a lesser degree, land because prices were so low309 and the economy gave the appearance of being prosperous because it was relatively strong due to its large borrowings. So these capital flows helped to fill the gap.

外国人还买下了工业或银行股，房屋，而且在较小程度上也是因为价格低到309，而且由于借贷量较大，经济出现了繁荣景象。所以这些资本流动有助于弥补差距。

As long as foreigners were willing to invest funds in marks, they also helped to keep the German currency from being weaker than it would have otherwise been. This was the case from February 1920 to May 1921, the period when the mark was fairly stable on the foreign exchanges despite a nearly fifty percent growth of the high-powered money stock. Between 1919 and 1923 Germany transferred 2.6 billion gold marks in cash to the Allies.

只要外国人愿意投资于商标，他们也有助于保持德国货币不会比原来的要弱。这是1920年2月至1921年5月的情况，尽管大​​功率货币存量增长了近五十％，但外汇市场的相对稳定的时期。在1919年和1923年之间，德国向盟国转移了26亿美金现金。

However, this ended up being only one third of what foreigners lost through the depreciation of their German bank balances.310 Foreign investors in Germany, especially in German debt, ended up losing huge amounts of money. For example, foreign (non-German) losses on debt due to depreciation were estimated at between seven and eight billion gold marks.311

然而，这只是外国人通过德国银行余额贬值而损失的三分之一。德国的外国投资者，特别是德国债务，最终损失了大量资金 。例如，由于折旧造成的外债（非德国）债务损失估计为七八十亿黄金。

In 1921 the average inflation rate was 140%, the real growth rate was 8.6%, M0 growth was 51% the mark fell by 163% and the real stock market rose by approximately 13% in US dollar terms and 75% relative to domestic prices.

1921年平均通货膨胀率为140％，实际增长率为8.6％，M0增长率为51％，下降163％，实际股票市场以美元上涨约13％，相对于国内价格上涨75％ 。