How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
Powered by GitBook
On this page
  1. Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
  2. Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes

Our Productivity Gauge

PreviousProductivity and Competiveness MeasuresNextValue: What You Pay Versus What You Get

Last updated 7 years ago

For these reasons, when we look at gauging the productivity of a country we create a measure of 1) the relative value it offers and 2) its culture. We weigh the relative value of a country the most since it is the most important determinant.

由于这些原因,当我们考虑衡量一个国家的生产力时,我们创造了一个措施:1)提供的相对价值,2)其文化。我们认为一个国家的相对价值是最重要的决定因素。

Our productivity gauge is just based on the logic we have described. It is mostly a function of the relative value of a country’s workers (the labor arbitrage aspect): how educated they are relative to their cost and how hard the people work relative to their cost. These measures give us a sense of whether a country’s workers have the ingredients to grow their productivity by working harder or smarter. To triangulate the cost of an educated worker we look at two measures, one that adjusts for the quality of education and one that looks at their observed productivity today. Moving beyond a country’s human capital, we also look at investment relative to the cost, which gives us a lens into whether a country is investing to grow its productivity in the future and whether the returns are likely to be attractive (i.e., another perspective on the “cost of production arbitrage”).

我们的生产率计只是基于我们描述的逻辑。它主要是一个国家工人的相对价值(劳动套利方面)的函数:他们相对于他们的成本有多高的教育程度,以及人们相对于他们的成本工作的难度。这些措施使我们了解一个国家的工人是否有通过更加努力或更聪明地加强生产力的成分。为了对受过教育的工人的成本进行三角测量,我们研究了两项措施,一种是调整教育质量的措施,另一种是衡量当今观察到的生产力的措施。超越一个国家的人力资本,我们也会考虑相对于成本的投资,这让我们看到一个国家是否投资来提高未来的生产力,以及回报是否有吸引力(即另一个观点“生产套利成本”)。

To measure culture, we create a gauge for each of the concepts we have outlined: 1) whether a country values self-sufficiency, 2) whether it values savoring the fruits of life or achieving, 3) whether it is innovative and commercially oriented, 4) its degree of bureaucracy, 5) corruption and 6) rule of law. Self-sufficiency encourages productivity by tying the ability to spend to the need to produce. The concept of savoring life versus achieving captures how much the people in a country are focused on enjoying the things they have versus trying to increase their success and achieve, earn, and create more. Innovation and commercialism capture whether a society is oriented towards seeking profit or generating new insights. The last three get at the basic questions of how difficult it is to get business done in a country—i.e., whether a given country is one where businesses could get off the ground and operate smoothly, where business can be conducted fairly (without corruption) and whether investors and businesses can be confident that contracts and laws will be well enforced.

为了衡量文化,我们为每个我们概述的概念制定了一个衡量标准:1)一个国家是否重视自给自足,2)它是否珍视品尝生活或实现的成果,3)创新和商业导向,4)官僚程度,5)腐败6)法治。自给自足通过将花费的能力与生产需求挂钩来鼓励生产力。品味生活与实现的概念捕获了一个国家的人们多少集中在享受他们所拥有的东西,并试图增加他们的成功,实现,赚取和创造更多。创新和商业主义捕捉到一个社会是寻求利润还是产生新的见解。最后三个问题是在一个国家完成业务困难的基本问题 - 即一个给定的国家是否是企业能够顺利进行的业务,公平地进行业务(没有腐败)投资者和企业是否可以相信合同和法律将得到很好的执行。

Together our indicators of productivity were 64% related to countries’ subsequent growth rates. To repeat, these estimates were made by applying the exact same factors to all countries in all time periods to determine their subsequent growth.

我们的生产力指标共同达到64%,与国家随后的增长率有关。重复一遍,这些估计是通过在所有时间段内对所有国家应用完全相同的因素来确定其随后的增长。

The chart below gives a picture of how we would rate countries today on productivity based on the same logic described above. Our ratings are represented in terms of what a given country’s productivity would imply for that country’s future growth in income per worker over the next 10 years.

下面的图表显示了我们如何按照上述相同的逻辑对当今国家的生产率进行评估。我们的评级代表了一个国家的生产力意味着该国未来10年的每个工人的未来收入增长。

According to our measures, India is best placed to see productivity growth at this point—driven by a very cheap and achievement-oriented labor force, even accounting for poor education, chronic corruption and a generally ineffective system. Together these factors imply India has the ingredients to grow income per worker around 9% annually over the next decade. It also has sizable potential to boost its growth rate if it can reduce its inefficiencies through reforms. China is also highly competitive by our measures, with a growth rate implied by its competitiveness/productivity of about 6% or so. Its workforce is inexpensive and fairly well educated relative to its cost, works hard and provides huge savings for investments. Moreover, as a country that is becoming rich and starting to realize it, China has a huge amount of potential to realize by adopting existing technologies, building out its infrastructure in the underdeveloped parts of the country, and investing in businesses to serve a massive population that is quickly accumulating spending power. Nearly all developed world countries are measured to be relatively uncompetitive, with Italy, France, Spain and Greece uniquely uncompetitive for reasons that will be apparent in the indicators that follow. Most importantly, these countries’ labor is expensive, they don’t work that hard, and they invest less than most other countries. This is compounded by a social system that prioritizes savoring life over achieving and insulates workers from market forces with rigid labor markets and substantial government safety nets, low levels of innovation and high levels of bureaucracy. It should be noted that we are starting to see some structural reforms to improve productivity and competitiveness, especially in Spain, and that such reforms have the potential of considerably boosting growth because the barriers that reforms would bring down are such drags on growth. Japan is also somewhat uncompetitive but more because its labor is expensive and investment levels stagnant, as opposed to cultural reasons (the work ethic in Japan and level of innovation, for example, remain quite supportive). In such cases, declines in the exchange rate can help. Also, Prime Minister Abe’s “three arrow” policies can help a lot if pursued forcefully—more forcefully than currently pursued. The US is the most competitive of the major developed countries we measure. Labor is more competitively priced compared to other developed countries (though expensive compared to many emerging countries), and the culture is supportive, including elements like relative hard work, a drive to achieve and orientation to innovate.

根据我们的措施,印度最适合在这一点上看到生产力增长,这是由一个非常便宜和成就型劳动力驱动的,即使是教育不良,慢性腐败和一般无效的制度。这些因素一起意味着印度在今后十年中每年每年增加收入增长约9%。如果可以通过改革来降低效率,也有可能提高其增长率。我们的措施也是中国的竞争激烈,其竞争力/生产力意味着增长率约为6%左右。相对于其成本,劳动力成本低廉,受过良好教育,努力工作,为投资节省巨额资金。而且,中国作为一个富裕而开始实现的国家,通过采用现有技术,在欠发达地区建设基础设施,投资企业服务大量人口,具有巨大的潜力这很快就积累了消费力。几乎所有发达世界国家都被认为是相对无竞争力的,意大利,法国,西班牙和希腊是独一无二的,因为在以后的指标中将会明显。最重要的是,这些国家的劳动力是昂贵的,他们不努力工作,而且投资少于大多数其他国家。这种社会制度更加重要,这种社会制度优先考虑通过严格的劳动力市场和强大的政府安全网,低水平的创新和高度的官僚作风来实现工人和市场力量的平衡。应该指出的是,我们正在开始进行一些结构性改革来提高生产率和竞争力,特别是在西班牙,这种改革有可能大大推动增长,因为改革所带来的障碍是增长的拖累。日本的竞争力也有所降低,但更多的原因是劳动力昂贵,投资水平停滞不前,而不是文化原因(例如日本的工作伦理和创新水平仍然相当支持)。在这种情况下,汇率的下降可以帮助。此外,安倍晋三的“三箭”政策如果强力推动,比现在追求的更有力,可以帮助很多。美国是我们测量的主要发达国家中最具竞争力的。与其他发达国家相比,劳动力价格更具竞争力(与许多新兴国家相比价格昂贵),文化支持,包括相对艰苦的工作,实现创新和取向创新的因素。

The following two charts give you a summary of where countries stand on our assessment of value (i.e. what you pay for what you get) in each country and whether its culture are a support to or drag on income growth. Overall, the strong value proposition of Asia’s workers—especially how hard they work and their level of investment relative to their expense—is supported by cultural attitudes around achievement. In contrast, Europe, once on the frontier of productivity, now invests little and takes more leisure than any other region. And after years of incomes rising faster than underlying productivity, its workers are some of the most expensive in the world and the vibrancy of its labor market is undermined by a system of protections. Japan and Singapore are in the middle of the pack when you look at their high cost of labor and low levels of investment, but we expect them to be helped by cultural factors (e.g., their orientation toward innovation and commercialism and rule of law). In contrast, cultural factors—like corruption, a desire for leisure over achievement—act as a drag for otherwise competitive workforces in Russia and Argentina. We will examine each of the components of these gauges next.383

以下两张图表汇总了各国对每个国家的价值评估(即您所获得的所得)以及其文化对收入增长的支持或拖累。总的来说,亚洲工人的强大价值主张 - 特别是他们工作的努力程度和投资水平相对于他们的费用 - 都是文化对成就态度的支持。相比之下,欧洲一度处于生产力的前沿,现在投资少,比其他地区多休闲。经过多年的收入增长快于基本生产力,其工人是世界上最昂贵的一部分,劳动力市场的活力受到保护制度的破坏。日本和新加坡在考虑到劳动力成本高,投资水平低的时候,正处于中间阶段,但我们期望他们得到文化因素的帮助(例如,他们对创新和商业主义和法治的定位)。相比之下,文化因素,如腐败,休闲超越成就的欲望,是俄罗斯和阿根廷其他有竞争力的劳动力的拖累。接下来我们将检查这些仪表的每个部件。