How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
  2. Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes

Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports

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Last updated 7 years ago

A country's government policy both tells you something about what it values, and also shapes the incentives and motivations of its citizens. In general, societies that value self-reliance highly will provide less public support. And large government supports, directly through transfers that redistribute incomes or indirectly through services, are the primary means of enabling individuals to consume more than they earn. These supports risk undermining self-reliance, which is such a fundamental value in a market-based system (i.e., the drive to earn your keep). To be clear, we aren't arguing for or against such payments; we are just measuring self-sufficiency and, since this is one of the biggest influences on it, it is a significant part of our gauge. For these reasons, we would expect countries that have fewer transfers, smaller welfare systems and more limited social services to grow faster than those that place a higher priority on redistribution and government safety nets.

一个国家的政府政策都会告诉你一些关于它的价值观,并且也塑造了公民的激励和动机。一般来说,高度重视自力更生的社会将会减少公众的支持。大型政府直接通过转移重新分配收入或通过服务间接的支持,是使个人消费超过他们所赚取的主要手段。这些支持有可能破坏自力更生,这是一个基于市场的系统的基本价值(即获得收益的驱动力)。要明确的是,我们不是争取或反对这种付款;我们只是衡量自给自足,由于这是其中最大的影响之一,它是我们衡量标准的重要组成部分。由于这些原因,我们预计转移次数较少,福利制度较小,社会服务有限的国家的增长速度要高于再分配和政府安全网优先考虑的国家。

We measure the degree of government supports in a society in a few ways, looking at the magnitude of its outlays (which often include indirect transfers in the way of services, for example) and the magnitude of its direct transfers to households. As countries develop and get richer, they tend to weigh considerations like redistribution more heavily, so this is another measure where we expect and find a fairly strong relationship between the country's income and its level of government supports, which we control for to account for the stage of development the country is in and get a sense of the underlying ethic.

我们以几种方式来衡量政府在社会中的支持程度,考察其支出的幅度(例如通常包括以服务的方式间接转移)以及直接转移给家庭的程度。随着国家的发展和变得越来越富裕,他们往往会把重新分配的重点放在比较重的地方,所以这是另一个措施,我们期望和发现国家的收入和政府支持水平之间有很强的关系。国家的发展阶段,并得到了基本伦理观念。

In our current rankings, emerging Asia holds the top four spots, with European countries ranking as the least selfsufficient along this measure. Once you exclude the effect of income, this pattern basically holds, though the developed English-speaking world moves up some, particularly Singapore, whose limited amount of government supports is unusual given the wealth of the country. Italy and France end up looking particularly bad on this measure.

在我们目前的排名中,新兴亚洲占据前四名,欧洲国家在这一举措中排名最低。一旦你排除了收入的影响,这种模式基本上是持之以恒的,虽然发达的英语世界向上升了一些,特别是新加坡,由于国家的财富,政府的有限的支持是不寻常的。意大利和法国最终对这一措施看起来特别糟糕。