How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
  2. Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes

Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity

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Last updated 7 years ago

Support from the state to an individual can happen through either direct transfer payments and the provision of government services (as we examined above), or by regulating companies to provide workers with supports, e.g., enforcing a minimum wage or making it difficult to fire individuals. Unions can also work to protect certain workers. To the extent that these structural labor market supports limit companies from engaging with employees in a free manner (making hiring and firing decisions), it limits the need for individual self-reliance. And this approach limits the dynamism of corporations and individuals to respond to conditions—which over time should make countries with high rates of labor market rigidity grow more slowly.

国家对个人的支持可以通过直接转移支付和提供政府服务(如上文所述),或通过规范公司向工人提供支持,例如执行最低工资或使其难以照射个人。工会也可以努力保护某些工人。在这些结构性劳动力市场支持下限制公司与员工自由接触(招聘和解雇)的情况下,限制了个人自力更生的需要。而这种做法限制了企业和个人对条件作出反应的动力 - 随着时间的推移,劳动力市场刚性高的国家的增长速度将会越来越慢。

We measure labor market rigidity by looking at unionization rates across countries, minimum wages, and limits to hiring and firing at will in a given economy. Unlike hard work or government supports, these measures tend to be fairly unrelated to a country's wealth and stage of development (which we proxy with income levels).

我们通过查看各国的工会化率,最低工资以及在特定经济体内的任意招聘和限制来衡量劳动力市场的僵化度。与艰苦的工作或政府支持不同,这些措施往往与一个国家的财富和发展阶段(我们以收入水平代替)相当无关。

On our aggregate measure of labor force rigidity, Singapore, India and the US rank as having the least rigid labor forces, followed by Mexico. Argentina and Italy score especially poorly along this measure. Within the developed world, Japan and peripheral Europe appear to have some of the more rigid labor markets. It's also interesting to note that China appears to have a fairly rigid labor market, which is generally the exception (most other measures indicate that China has a high degree of self-sufficiency). Since labor force rigidity isn't particularly related to a county's stage of development, excluding income's effect has little impact on the rankings.

在我们劳动强度总量的测算中,新加坡,印度和美国的劳动力劳动力最少,其次是墨西哥。阿根廷和意大利在这一措施上的得分尤为差。在发达国家,日本和外围的欧洲似乎有一些更加僵化的劳动力市场。还有趣的是,中国似乎有一个相当僵化的劳动力市场,这通常是例外(大多数其他措施表明中国的自给自足)。由于劳动力刚性与县的发展阶段并不相关,不包括收入效应对排名影响不大。