How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
  2. Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes

Summary Observations

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Last updated 7 years ago

On the basis of productivity and indebtedness alone, the countries which have the elements to grow incomes per worker fastest today are India, China, Thailand, Singapore and Korea. Based on these elements, European countries and Japan are expected to grow slowest. While, the different pieces that go into this view are described above, we’ll also describe them briefly here. We expect India to grow strongly (6% or so), primarily because of India’s low indebtedness and significant cost advantage relative to the rest of the world even accounting for its poor education (its income per capita is just $1,000, 4x less than China’s). While incomes have grown very fast in China and there has been a material leveraging, we still expect fairly strong growth of 5% due to China’s strong competitive position. The Chinese labor force remains highly attractive as a result of their work ethic and how educated they are relative to the cost, and they continue to save at a high rate, providing capital that is invested in projects that will improve productivity in the future. China’s culture of self-sufficiency and achievement also provides a material support. Of course the policies of these countries can shift these growth rates. Most importantly in China the implementation of reforms and the management of the debt will be important and in India the reforms will be important. In both cases shifts in policies should be reflected in our indices.

只有在生产力和债务的基础上,目前有增长收入的每个工人的国家是印度,中国,泰国,新加坡和韩国。基于这些要素,欧洲国家和日本预计增长最慢。虽然上面描述了进入这个视图的不同的部分,但我们也将简要介绍一下。我们预计印度强劲增长(6%左右),主要是因为印度相对于世界其他国家而言,低负债率和显着的成本优势,即使是教育程度不高(人均收入仅为1000美元,比中国低四倍) 。虽然中国的收入增长非常快,而且存在物质杠杆化,但由于中国的强大竞争地位,我们仍然预期5%的增幅将相当强劲。中国的劳动力由于工作的伦理道德和相对于成本而受到教育,仍然具有很高的吸引力,他们继续高速挽救,为投资于提高未来生产力的项目提供资金。中国的自给自足和成就文化也提供了物质支持。当然,这些国家的政策当然可以改变这些增长率。最重要的是在中国,实行改革和管理债务将是重要的,在印度,改革将是重要的。在这两种情况下,政策转变应反映在我们的指数中。

This formula projects productivity growth in the US to be around 1.5%-2%, in the middle of the pack globally but ahead of most other rich nations. The US is now one of the more competitive developed world economies, with a well-educated but expensive workforce, despite an increasing preference for leisure and very low savings rates. While it is managing its deleveraging beautifully, it remains relatively highly indebted. We expect growth in Germany to be a bit lower than in the US. Germany is expensive relative to the US and central bank (ECB) stimulation has been less aggressive. At the same time, healthy household savings rates, a culture of innovation and commercialism, and good governance are positive supports for Germany's productivity growth. And Germany has not been reliant on credit expansion for its growth, and monetary policy is relatively stimulative relative to German conditions. On the lowest end we see Japan and the southern European countries, all of which are globally uncompetitive and highly indebted, and have a history of experiencing monetary policy that is tight relative to conditions. The growth prospects of Italy and Spain, along with France and a number of Latin American countries are also hindered by a culture that values savoring life over achievement or self sufficiency.

该公式将美国的生产率增长率预计在1.5%-2%左右,处于全球中位数,而在其他富裕国家之前。美国现在是竞争激烈的发达世界经济体之一,拥有受过良好教育但昂贵的劳动力,尽管休闲和储蓄率非常低。虽然它精美地管理其去杠杆化,但它仍然相当高负债。我们预计德国的增长将略低于美国。德国相对于美国而言是昂贵的,中央银行(ECB)的刺激一直较不积极。同时,健康的家庭储蓄率,创新文化和商业主义以及善政是德国生产率增长的积极支撑。德国的增长并不依赖信贷扩张,而货币政策相对于德国的情况则相对较为激化。在最低端,我们看到日本和南欧国家,这些国家在全球都没有竞争力和高度负债,并且有一个经历相对于条件紧张的货币政策的历史。意大利和西班牙以及法国和一些拉丁美洲国家的增长前景也受到一种文化的阻碍,这种文化反映出对成就或自给自足的品味。