How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
  2. Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes

Projections

PreviousA Formula for Future GrowthNextProductivity and Competiveness Measures

Last updated 7 years ago

I will start with our projections and then explain how they were derived.

我将从我们的预测开始,然后解释它们是如何衍生的。

As discussed, by looking at the elements that drive productivity and indebtedness you can arrive at a view of how fast a country will grow its output per worker. Since economic growth is mechanically just a function of growth in its a) output per worker and b) number of workers, it’s then a simple step for us to estimate economic growth. In the following section we quickly scan what our projections show. We will then go into depth on the reasons behind them.

正如所讨论的,通过研究促成生产力和负债的因素,你可以看出,一个国家每个工人的产出会有多快。由于经济增长在机械上只是其a)a的产出和b)工人的增长的一个函数,那么我们估计经济增长是一个简单的步骤。在下一节中,我们将快速扫描我们的预测。然后,我们将深入了解其背后的原因。

The chart below shows our estimate in aggregate for real GDP growth in these major countries. We provide two estimates: one that is based on the exact same formula for all countries and one that is that estimate corrected for the average past error. This additional step notes whether we were systematically over-optimistic or pessimistic in our predictions for a given country, and adjusted for that, to account for the fact that we may be missing a factor specific to that country.382 We simply found how much the universal formula was off in the past on average (e.g., 1%) and assumed that it would be off by that amount over the next ten years. That adjustment is meant to account for unexplained factors. These two estimates typically don’t yield meaningful differences and typically don’t affect the order of the countries’ rankings. We don’t know which one is better so we look at both. Overall, we expect India to grow fastest, followed by China, Singapore and Mexico. Our expectation is for the US and the UK to be among the fastest-growing developed nations and for Japan and southern European countries to be the slowest growing in the world.

下图显示了我们对这些主要国家实际GDP增长的估计。我们提供两个估计:一个是基于所有国家的完全相同的公式,一个是针对平均过去错误修正的估计。这个额外的步骤指出,我们对某一国家的预测是否有系统地过度乐观或悲观,并对此进行调整,以解释我们可能缺少该国具体因素的事实。3 我们简单地发现过去平均普遍公式是多少(例如,1%),并假定在未来十年内将减去这个数字。这种调整是为了解释不明原因。这两个估计通常不会产生有意义的差异,通常不会影响国家排名的顺序。我们不知道哪一个更好,所以我们看两者。总体而言,我们预计印度增长最快,其次是中国,新加坡和墨西哥。我们期望美国和英国成为发展最快的发达国家之一,日本和南欧国家成为世界增长最慢的国家。

Because GDP is just output per worker times the number of workers, that estimate includes two major pieces: demographic trends (or more specifically the expected change in workers), and an estimate of future growth per worker. We show the chart of the expected change in workers first, below. On this measure, you can see that Europe, Russia and Japan’s challenges are compounded by an aging and shrinking workforce, while countries like Mexico and India will enjoy a growth in workers as a support to their potential growth.

由于国内生产总值只是工人的产出,而是工人的数量,估计数包括两大部分:人口趋势(或更具体地说是工人的预期变化),以及对每个工人未来增长的估计。我们在下面显示了工人预期变化的图表。在这个措施上,你可以看到欧洲,俄罗斯和日本的挑战由于老龄化和劳动力萎缩而更加复杂,而像墨西哥和印度这样的国家将会增加工人的增长,作为对其潜力增长的支持。

The next chart gives a picture of what we would project income growth per worker to be over the next 10 years, again highlighting our estimates with and without the error adjustment.

下图显示了我们将在未来10年内为每个工人预测收入增长的情况,再次强调我们在有和没有错误调整的情况下的估计。

Our future growth per worker estimate includes two major components: a productivity estimate, and an indebtedness estimate. We show both of these estimates below. They highlight the general attractiveness of the labor arbitrage between most emerging countries relative to the developed world. There is also much more room for these countries to leverage up whereas much of the developed world has reached its long-term debt top and is del

我们未来的工作增长估计包括两个主要组成部分:生产力估计和负债估计。我们在下面显示这两个估计。它们强调了大多数新兴国家相对于发达国家的劳动力套利的普遍吸引力。这些国家还有更多的空间来利用,而大部分发达国家已经达到其长期债务的顶点,并且是去杠杆化的,这意味着消费和收入增长的空间将更加有限,来自信贷扩张。

Below, we describe in depth our measures of productivity—both what you pay for what you get, and culture.

下面,我们将深入描述我们的生产力措施 - 无论是为了获得什么付出代价,还是为文化付出代价。