How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
  2. US Deleveraging 1930s

1H1932

In spite of the National Credit Corporation, bank failures were still hitting the papers almost daily. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which was the TARP program of the time, was proposed to Congress by President Hoover in December 1931 and signed into law on January 23, 1932,166 with authority to spend $1.5 billion. Largely as a result of all this support for banks and others, the Dow rallied from that December 1931 low of 73 to nearly 86 in early January which was about a 19% gain, but finished January back down at the 76 level.

尽管国家信贷公司,银行倒闭仍然几乎每天都在报纸上。1936年12月,Hoover总统向国会提出了当时的TARP计划的重建金融公司(RFC),并于1932年1月23日签署了法律,授权投资15亿美元。由于所有这些对银行和其他银行的支持,道琼斯指数从1月的1931年12月低点上涨至近1月份的86点,涨幅约19%,但是1月份回落至76点。

The tensions between workers and capitalists intensified in 1932. In 1932 there were demonstrations in Washington and politicians turned their sights on the investment community as a whole. Some politicians accused the banks of intentionally trying to destroy the economy of the world in an effort to force the United States to cancel the outstanding war debts of Europe so that normal commercial debts could be settled with the banks. Some politicians supported the total abolition of the stock market while others urged that the shorts could be exposed and jailed as if their actions rose to the level of treason The proletariat and politicians turned on capitalists and investors.

1932年,工人和资本家之间的紧张局势加剧。1932年在华盛顿举行示威游行,政客们将视线转变为整个投资界。一些政客指责银行有意试图摧毁世界经济,以迫使美国取消欧洲的突出战争债务,使正常商业债务能够与银行结算。一些政治家支持彻底废除股市,而另一些政治家则强调,这些短裤可能会被暴露和被监禁,就好像他们的行为上升到叛国的水平无产阶级和政客转向资本家和投资者。

The fiscal 1932 budget deficit grew because revenues were cut in half between fiscal 1929 and fiscal 1932, while federal budget expenditures grew by half. Believing that a budget deficit could lead the U.S. to default, the administration began to push for tax increases and expenditure cuts Everyone wanted a balanced budget back then. Business support for a balanced budget was almost universal. The American Bankers Association and the Investment Bankers Association predictably passed resolution at their conventions early in the year favoring higher taxes and lower expenditures to balance the budget. Political support for a balanced budget was broadly bipartisan.

1932年财政赤字增长,因为1929年财政年度和1932年财政年度的收入减少了一半,联邦预算支出增加了一半。相信预算赤字可能导致美国违约,政府开始推动增加税收和削减开支所有人都希望在此之后获得平衡的预算。平衡预算的业务支持几乎是普遍的。美国银行家协会和投资银行家协会在年初公布通过决议,主张增加税收和降低支出以平衡预算。平衡预算的政治支持大体上是二党

In January 1932, the Comptroller of the Currency abandoned mark to market accounting for banks. Bank examiners were instructed to use par value as the “intrinsic value” of bonds rated Baa or better held by national banks The Comptroller of the Currency also issued a demand to all national banks that they report on what bonds they were holding. Even good bonds had been devastated so banks either faced huger paper losses on what they held, or suffered actual cash losses if they sold.

1932年1月,货币主计长放弃了对银行市场会计的标记。银行审查员被指示使用面值作为国家银行持有的Baa或更高债券的“内在价值”货币主计长也向所有国家银行发出要求,报告其所持有的债券。即使是好的债券也遭到破坏,所以银行面临的是纸币损失,如果他们卖掉了,那么就会遭受实际的现金损失。

Optimism returned in mid-February when the RFC began to make loans to banks and railroads and when Congress passed an amendment to the Federal Reserve statute permitting the Federal Reserve banks to hold US government bonds, as well as gold, as cover for Federal Reserve obligations so the Federal Reserve System was freed to pursue an aggressive open market policy of purchasing government securities without being constrained by the loss of gold to foreigners expected to follow such an “inflationary” policy. So, the Dow Jones Industrial Index jumped by 19.5% The stock market immediately rallied back to the January high and managed to close above the 80 level.

2月中旬,RFC开始向银行和铁路贷款时,乐观主义回归,当国会通过对美联储法规的修正案,允许美联储银行持有美国政府债券以及黄金作为美联储义务的覆盖所以联邦储备体系被释放出来,采取积极的公开市场政策来购买政府证券,而不会受到预期会遵循“通货膨胀”政策的外国人的黄金损失的限制。所以道琼斯工业指数上涨了19.5%股市立即回升至1月份的高位,成交高于80水平。

On February 11, Hoover managed to obtain cooperation from all parties to usher through the Glass-Steagall bill, which broadened the scope of debt that was eligible for rediscounting at the Federal Reserve. Broadening the scope of collateral that can be discounted at the central bank is a classic step in the D-process. This was perceived as bullish as it was felt that this would help many banks to unfreeze assets that were previously unacceptable as collateral at the Fed. The bill was signed by Hoover on February 27.

2月11日,胡佛成功地通过Glass-Steagall法案获得各方的合作,扩大了适用于美联储重新贴现的债务范围。扩大中央银行可贴现的抵押品范围是D进程的经典步骤。这被认为是看涨,因为它被认为这将有助于许多银行解冻以前无法接受作为美联储抵押品的资产。该法案于1974年2月27日由胡佛签署

At the time, the Senate Finance Committee conducted hearings into international banking and war debts. It sought a complete list of all foreign bond issues which were currently in default. That information was obtained from the Institute of International Finance. The Senate made that list public in January 1932. The list totaled $815 million worth of foreign bonds denominated in dollars with defaults covering 57 issues, with all being obligations of South American governments. The majority of the junk bonds were held by small investors who had been lured into buying them by numerous advertising campaigns which touted bonds as the “safe” investment and offered high yields.

当时参议院财政委员会对国际银行业务和战争债务进行了听证会。它寻求了目前违约的所有外国债券问题的完整清单。该资料来自国际金融研究所。参议院于1932年1月公布该名单。该名单共价值8.15亿美元,以美元计价,违约金为57个,其中一切均为南美政府的义务。大多数垃圾债券是由小投资者持有的,这些投资者被多次广告宣传吸引,并将债券作为“安全”投资,并提供高收益。

Investor fears intensified, so in Europe and the U.S., the hoarding of U.S. $20 gold coins increased, with the premium rising to 50% - i.e., the price rose to as much as $30.

投资者担忧加剧,所以在欧美,囤积20美元的金币增加了50%,即价格上涨到了30美元。

Japanese bonds and the yen had collapsed. Japan had abandoned the gold standard a few months before, so the yen fell from the par level of 49.84 cents to 35 cents. As a result, Japanese bonds denominated in dollars collapsed from 100 to 61. The total U.S. investment in Japan was reported to be $450 million, of which $390 million was Japanese bonds. But Japan’s gold reserves had dropped to only $190 million which represented half of the outstanding debt to the United States alone, so it wasn’t difficult to figure out that Japan would default on its obligations to pay its debts in gold.

日本债券和日元已经崩溃了。日本在几个月前已经放弃了黄金标​​准,所以日圆从49.84美分跌至35美分。结果,以美元计价的日本债券从100美元跌至61.美国在日本的总额为4.5亿美元,其中3.9亿美元为日本债券。但日本的黄金储备只有1.9亿美元,仅占美国一半的未偿债务,所以不难估计日本是否会履行其黄金债务的义务。

Throughout history the French have always been among the first to hoard gold in a crisis and the French government was always the first to ask for gold during a monetary breakdown – e.g., in 1968 when DeGaulle asked for gold instead of dollars from the U.S., etc. The French people are the same, so they caused the French government problems by asking the French government for gold. To avoid demand from the French public, the French government stated that it would only make gold payments in $8,000 lot minimums. As a result, gold coins were in very high demand. In the United States, many contracts began to be issued in terms which required payment in gold coin. While gold was rising in street value, other commodities continued to decline.

在整个历史上,法国人一直是第一个在危机中囤积黄金的国家,法国政府一直是第一个在货币崩溃期间要求黄金的国家 - 例如,在1968年,当戴高乐要求黄金而不是美国的美元等法国人是一样的,所以他们通过向法国政府要黄金来引发法国政府的问题。为了避免法国公众的需求,法国政府表示,只能以最少8,000美元的黄金付款。因此,金币的需求量非常大。在美国,许多合同开始发行,要求以金币付款。黄金价格上涨的同时,其他商品继续下滑。

That reflected decreasing confidence in holding debt, including government debt, during a deleveraging when the demand for commodities is weak.

这反映了当商品需求疲软时,去杠杆化期间持有债务的信心下降,包括政府债务

In February, the business failures were the highest on record for any month.

二月份的业务失败率是历史最高纪录

In March, the stock market sold off again as expectations that the Fed’s move to reliquify were disappointed. The market decline began in March and extended for 11 weeks until the Dow had dropped from 88 on March 8th to 44 on May 31st, a decline of 50%. This stock market decline occurred while the Federal Reserve was following an unprecedented open market policy of expanding its holdings of U.S. government securities from $740 million at the end of February 1932 to $1.8 billion at the end of July.178

3月份,股市再度出现反弹,因为美联储再度复苏的预期令人失望。市场下滑开始于3月份,延续11个星期,直到道琼斯指数从3月8日的88点下降至5月31日的44点,下降了50%。这个股市下滑发生在美联储正在采取前所未有的公开市场政策,将美国政府证券的持有量从1932年2月底的7.4亿美元扩大到7月底的18亿美元。

The British pound, which had fallen from the par value of April 1931 before the devaluation, began to fall again, dropping to $3.65 from its March high of $3.77. The downtrend would eventually continue into November of 1932 when the pound dropped to $3.15. Only the French and the Swiss currencies remained steady.

英镑在1931年4月贬值之前的面值已经开始回落,从3月的3.77美元高点下跌至3.65美元。下降趋势最终将持续到1932年11月,当时英镑跌至3.15美元。只有法国和瑞士的货币依然稳定

Trading volume on the NYSE during April had declined to 31.4 million shares. This was the first panic sell off where new lows were achieved on lower volume. The Dow Jones Industrials fell almost continuously straight down, closing May on the low for the month. Yet volume declined considerably. The lower volume reflected lower investor participation as they had essentially given up on it. Big sell-offs on low volume late in a bear market are a good sign of exhaustion. On a percentage basis, the market decline was about equal to the panic of 1907 and that of the panic of 1920.

四月份纽约证交所交易量下降至3140万股。这是第一次惊慌失措,下跌幅度达到新低。道琼斯工业股连续下跌,收于5月份的低点。然而,数量大幅下降。较低的数量反映了投资者参与度的下降,因为他们基本上放弃了这一点。熊市下跌的大盘大跌是疲惫的好兆头。按百分比计算,市场跌幅大致相当于1907年的恐慌,1920年至180年的恐慌

Hoover tried to but couldn’t get credit going. Hoover and Treasury Secretary Mills regularly blamed the banks for restricting loans and condemned both the public and the banks for hoarding.181 Hoover tried to get the banks to lend, but couldn’t. For example, Hoover organized committees of prominent citizens in all Federal Reserve districts to try to encourage the larger regional banks to make loans.182 During May 1932, Hoover requested a doubling in the RFC authorization to $3 billion, of which $300 million was earmarked for aid to local governments.183 But nothing was adequate.

胡佛尝试但不能得到信用。胡佛和财政部长米尔斯经常指责银行限制贷款,并谴责公众和银行的囤积.81胡佛试图让银行借款但不能。例如,胡佛组织了所有联邦储备区的知名公民委员会,试图鼓励较大的区域性银行提供贷款.82在1932年5月,胡佛要求将RFC授权增加一倍,达到30亿美元,其中3亿美元用于对地方政府的援助。

Back then, the Fed didn’t handle failed banks, so they were turned over to the RFC. The government didn’t have the administrative resources to handle all of these problems.

那么当时美联储没有处理失败的银行,所以他们被转交给了RFC。政府没有行政资源来处理这些问题

Like TARP, the RFC lent to financial institutions. In fact, the relationship with the Bank of America then and the Bank of America now is basically the same. In 1932, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation prevented bank closings from being more numerous by lending $1.3 billion by the end of August 1932 to 5,520 financial institutions, which included its first loan to the Bank of America for $15 million, which it ultimately expanded to $64.5 million, and the Federal Reserve continued to buy U.S. Treasury bonds. The Federal Reserve System’s holdings of U.S. government securities expanded from $870 million on March 31, 1932, to $1784 million by June 30.

像TARP一样,RFC借给了金融机构。事实上,美国银行和美国银行的关系现在基本相同。1932年,重建金融公司通过在1932年8月底向5,520家金融机构贷款13亿美元,阻止银行关闭,其中包括首次以1500万美元贷款给美国银行,最终扩大到6450万美元美联储继续购买美国国债。美联储持有的美国政府债券从1932年3月31日的8.70亿美元扩大到1.854亿美元。

Then, like now, the RFC (the TARP equivalent) and the Fed made loans directly to borrowers who couldn’t roll debt, while letting others default. They felt compelled to do this because the banks were unwilling to lend even to borrowers facing bond maturities. The intense desire for liquidity created such competition for short-term government securities that Treasury bill yields were negative in much of October, November and December.

那么,像现在这样,RFC(TARP等价物)和美联储直接向不能偿还债务的借款人提供贷款,同时让他人违约。他们觉得不得不这样做,是因为银行不愿借给债券到期的借款人。10月,11月和12月的大部分时间里,国债法案的收益率是负的。

The decline in short-term interest rates was also driven by aggressive Fed buying of T-bills. Between April and August 1932, the Federal Reserve instituted an unprecedented open-market purchase program in an effort to create bank liquidity. This helped. The 11 months following January had fewer suspensions than either 1930 or 1931. Federal Reserve borrowing was relatively low for banks in major cities during 1932, and these banks’ investments were stable, which also gave the impression that the emergency in banking conditions had passed. The effect on money market rates was dramatic. 3-to-6-month Treasury securities yields dropped 180 basis points from 2.25% to 0.30% in eight weeks once the Federal Reserve began its purchases.187

短期利率的下降也受到美联储激进购买T-bill的推动。在1932年4月至8月期间,美联储制定了前所未有的开放市场采购计划,以创造银行流动性。这有帮助。1月份以后的11个月比1930年或1931年的暂停时间更少。1932年,主要城市银行的联邦储备借款相对较低,这些银行的投资稳定,这也给银行业的紧急情况已经过去。对货币市场利率的影响是戏剧性的。联邦储备委员会开始采购后,8个月期间,3至6个月的国债证券收益率从8月的2.25%下降至180%。

Interestingly, the market reactions to government moves began to change. While previously government programs to increase lending and spending were viewed by the market optimistically, in mid-1932 they did not produce optimism.188 It was then apparent that Hoover had established many programs to stimulate lending, spending and job creation, but they did not have the desired effect, yet they cost a lot of money. In fact, some government attempts to help banks hurt them. For example, the RFC lending to some banks saved them from bankruptcy, but the banks gave all their good assets to the RFC as collateral. A J.P. Morgan & Co. partner described this dynamic as follows: “For a fatal year and a half the RFC continued to lend money to the banks on adequate collateral security and gradually bankrupted them in the effort to save them.” The RFC made large loans to banks on the collateral of real estate loans and securities that many considered to be of questionable value, but the RFC still had to make these loans based on some estimate of the fair market value of the collateral and with some margin of surplus collateral. These collateral values were well below the banks’ book values in the securities. As a result, the borrowing banks found they had pledged all but their worst assets to the Federal Reserve and to the RFC at a discount from the par values and could only get back a portion of their deposits.

有趣的是,市场对政府行动的反应开始转变。虽然以前政府增加贷款和支出的方案被市场乐观地看待,但在1932年中期,他们并没有产生乐观态度.188然而显然,胡佛已经建立了许多计划来刺激贷款,支出和创造就业机会,但是他们没有有理想的效果,但它们花费了很多钱。事实上,一些政府试图帮助银行伤害他们。例如,向一些银行提供的RFC贷款将其免于破产,但是银行将所有良好的资产作为抵押品。JP摩根公司的合伙人描述了这一动态如下:“一年半的时间里,RFC继续向银行提供足够的抵押安全资金,并逐渐破产,以挽救他们。”RFC大型贷款给银行的房地产贷款和证券的抵押品,许多人被认为是有价值的,但是RFC仍然必须根据对抵押品的公平市场价值和一定的过剩抵押品的一些估计来做出这些贷款。这些抵押品价值远低于证券的银行账面价值。因此,借款银行发现,除了以最坏的资产向联邦储备委员会和RFC之外,他们已经把所有的资产都从面值中扣除,只能收回部分存款。

Many banks would have had their net worth effectively wiped out if all their assets, securities, and loans had to be written down to the low values of mid-1932. This is essentially what happened when the RFC calculated how much it could lend a bank. This failure to make the banks healthy became apparent, so banks’ deposits dropped further than could be borrowed from the RFC after it had sold its highly liquid securities, so the bank had no more good assets on which to borrow elsewhere.

如果所有资产,证券和贷款都必须记入1932年中期的低值,许多银行的净值将有效消除。这实际上是当RFC计算出可以借给银行多少时发生的。这样使银行健康的失败变得明显,所以银行的存款在卖出高流动性证券后,可以从RFC中借钱,所以银行没有更好的资产借贷其他地方.89

Borrowing from the RFC also signified a bank was in need, which led to withdrawals. There was a vicious circle in progress for the banks which borrowed from the RFC. Directors, officers, other banks, and often major customers were aware of a borrowing bank’s problems, and this information circulated in the business community and naturally caused large depositors to be cautious about the size of deposits they left with the bank, so they pulled them.190 So, if word got out that a bank was borrowing from the RFC its condition was immediately suspect and runs on its deposits began.

从RFC借款也意味着一家银行是需要的,这导致了提款。从RFC中借钱的银行正在发生恶性循环。董事,高级职员,其他银行,经常是主要客户都意识到借款银行的问题,这些信息在商业界传播,自然也导致大存户对银行存款的大小谨慎,所以他们把他们.00因此,如果一个银行从RFC那里借来的话,它的条件就立即被怀疑并在其存款上运行。

Because the banks wanted to hoard cash to keep safe and because they didn’t want to lend to borrowers who weren’t creditworthy, the banks did not want to roll over many maturing debts. Railroads were in trouble of their large revenue and income losses, so they were unable to pay the $300-$400 million in bond maturities that came due in 1932.192 But the government wanted the banks to rollover these debts, so the government via the RFC and the ICC mandated that railroad bonds (heavily owned by the banking system) maturing in 1932 should not be paid off in cash lent by the RFC, but rather should be settled by a combination of cash and refunding bonds which lenders had no choice but to accept.193 Needless to say, this further undermined the confidence of investors in their abilities to get cash from their investments and in the legal system protecting their rights.

因为银行希望保留现金以保持安全,并且因为不愿借给不信用的借款人,所以银行不想卷入许多成熟的债务。铁路公司的收入和收入损失很大,因此无法支付1932年到期的3亿至4亿美元的债券到期日.192但是,政府希望银行将这些债务转嫁,所以政府通过RFC和国际商会规定铁路债券(由银行业拥有)制度)在1932年到期,不应该由现金借用的现金和退还债券结合起来,借款人不用选择就可以结算.133不用说,这进一步削弱了信心投资者有能力从投资和法律制度中获得现金,保护其权利。

In March 1932 suspicion led the U.S. Senate to authorize an investigation into securities practices which ultimately led to the massive legal and structural changes in the securities industry embodied in the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.194 The government investigation of stock manipulation was like a witch hunt.195 Understandably there was a lot of congressional digging that turned up abuses. However, this went beyond reasonable.

1932年3月的怀疑导致美国参议院授权调查证券业务,最终导致1933年“证券法”,1934年“证券交易法”和Glass-Steagall所体现的证券业大规模法律和结构性变化1933年的法案.194政府对股票操纵的调查就像一个巫婆狩猎.195可以理解的是,国会大量的挖掘造成了滥用。但是,这超出了合理的范围。

Congress had problems making decisions as conflicting factions argued endlessly. For example, the fiscal 1933 budget was debated in Congress from March through June while Hoover gave little guidance on the budget cuts necessary, trying to place the onus for them on Congress in this election year. Foreign investor reaction to both the anti-investor mood and the indecision in government was negative and contributed to capital flight, which was clearly expressed in U.S. gold losses throughout the period.196 The Federal Government had a big budget deficit and the pending tax bill seemed to be going nowhere. Meanwhile, spending increased as Hoover sought to create jobs for the unemployed. The billions of dollars being spent in recovery attempts without any plan for paying for them scared European investors, so gold outflows began to increase.

国会有矛盾的派别无休止地作出决定。例如,1933年财政预算在3月至6月在国会进行了辩论,而胡佛对这一选举年度的预算削减几乎没有提出任何指导意见,试图在国会上为国会作出责任。外国投资者对反投资者情绪和政府犹豫不决的反应是负面的,有助于资本外逃,这在整个时期都被美国的黄金损失清楚地表达出来。 联邦政府的预算赤字很大,而未来的税收法案似乎没有任何地方。同时,随着胡佛寻求为失业人员创造就业机会,消费增加。数十亿美元用于恢复企图,没有任何计划付款给他们害怕欧洲投资者,所以黄金流出开始增加。

Back then it was a popular technique of the government to package spending as loans – i.e., to create “loans” to entities which spent which allowed the government to keep the loans on its books as assets. For example, if the government made a loan to a bank, it could treat that as an exchange of one asset for another rather than an expense. This technique made the budget deficit look smaller than if the same money was provided as assistance. So, the government promoted loan programs outside the budget, particularly for the RFC. Of course, the impact of these loan programs on government financing requirements was no different than if the programs were government spending,198 so the supply demand imbalance for government credit remained.

那么当时政府呢是把消费支出作为贷款的一种流行技术,就是为那些允许政府把贷款作为资产的贷款创造“贷款”。例如,如果政府向银行贷款,那么它可以将它作为一种资产交换而不是一种费用。这种技术使预算赤字看起来比如果提供相同的资金作为援助更小。所以政府在预算之外推出了贷款计划,特别是RFC。当然,这些贷款计划对政府融资需求的影响与政府支出方案没有什么不同,198则仍然是政府信贷供需不平衡。

At this time there was a move to redistribute wealth. Although governments would stop short of full blown communism, laws progressively were intended to redistribute wealth. For example, the gradated income tax rate eventually rose to 90%199 and the budget deficit ballooned (see below).

在这个时候,有一个重新分配财富的举动。虽然各国政府将停止共产党共产主义,但法律逐渐意图重新分配财富。例如,分级所得税率最终上涨到90%,预算赤字激增(见下文)

In Europe, concerns about the deficit and the inhospitable environment in the United States sparked heavy withdrawals of gold by European investors. Within the first ten days in June, $152 million in gold bullion had been withdrawn. On June 6, 1932, President Hoover signed into law the new Revenue Act, which increased income taxes and corporation taxes along with a variety of excise taxes. On June 14, 1932, France withdrew her last gold which was held on deposit at the NY Federal Reserve.

在欧洲,对美国的赤字和不适宜的环境的担忧引发了欧洲投资者大量的黄金提款。在六月份的头十天,金银一千五百二十万元已被撤回。1932年6月6日,胡佛总统签署了新的“收入法”,增加了所得税和公司税以及各种消费税。1932年6月14日,法国撤回了在纽约联邦储备银行存款的最后一笔黄金。

The Federal Reserve publicly reassured the public that it intended to continue buying U.S. governments in order to fund the deficit and hold interest rates down. Of course, this was incompatible with the stable exchange rate policy. So, despite these assurances, purchases of bonds finally came to a halt in August, after which the Federal Reserve holdings of U.S. securities remained very stable at $1,850 million. That year net new U.S. borrowing in 1932 exceeded $3 billion, the federal budget deficit exceeded $2.5 billion, and the deficit was over one-half of federal expenditures.

美联储向公众公开表示,打算继续购买美国政府,以资助赤字并持有利率。当然这跟稳定的汇率政策是不相容的。所以尽管有这些保证,8月份债券购买终于停止了,其后美联储持有的美国证券仍然稳定在18.50亿美元。那一年,美国新增的借款在1932年超过30亿美元,联邦预算赤字超过25亿美元,赤字超过了联邦支出的一半。

On June 16 in Switzerland, a group of seven nations met and finally agreed at Lausanne to reduce the German reparations payments from $64 billion to less than $1 billion.

6月16日在瑞士,一个七国集团会晤并最终同意洛桑将德国的赔偿金额从640亿美元减少到不到10亿美元。

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