How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
  2. US Deleveraging 1930s

2H1932

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Last updated 7 years ago

The economy continued to plunge with deflation. Broad measures of the economy in 1932 had dropped to about 50% of their 1929 levels in current dollar terms, though if expressed in constant dollars the decline was approximately 28% from 1929. There were a record 31,822 bankruptcies, with liabilities of $928 million. Though these were painful, they reduced debt service obligations, thus helping to fix the debt service imbalance. Industry as a whole had an after-tax loss of $2.7 billion in 1932, compared with its peak profits of $8.6 billion in 1929, Through this painful process, those businesses that survived became leaner and meaner.

通货紧缩导致经济继续下滑。1932年经济的广泛措施已经下降到目前美元的1929年水平的50%左右,不过如果以恒定的美元表示,则从1929年下降约28%。创纪录的31,822笔破产,负债为9.28亿美元。虽然这些都是痛苦的,但却减轻了债务偿还的义务,从而有助于解决债务不平衡。1932年整个行业的税后亏损为27亿美元,而1929年的高收入为86亿美元。通过这个痛苦的过程,那些幸存下来的企业变得越来越瘦。

At the same time, workers became militant, which scared investors. Unemployment averaged 36.3% for non- farm workers during 1932. During July of 1932, 11,000 veterans marched on Washington, demanding immediate cash payment of the soldier’s bonus instead of spreading it out over several years. The atmosphere of unrest, if not revolution, unsettled investors, businessmen and politicians, especially as socialism and communism were becoming more popular.

同时,工人变得好战,害怕投资者。1932年的非农业工人的失业率平均为36.3%。在1932年的7月,11000名退伍军人在华盛顿游行,要求立即支付士兵的奖金,而不是在几年内传播。

Economic conditions were miserable. In New York, most of the major hotels were in default. Tax arrears in New York City reached 26%. Conditions were even worse than in the farm areas, where drought and low prices combined to bankrupt farmers. Problems in the banking system dominated short-term money markets in 1932 This crisis virtually halted bank lending in the second half of 1932, as banks wanted to conserve cash and could not lend prudently.

不稳定的革命气氛,不安的投资者,商人和政客,特别是社会主义和共产主义,正在变得越来越流行。经济条件恶劣。在纽约,大多数主要酒店都是违约。纽约市的拖欠税款达26%。条件甚至比干旱和低廉价格结合破产农民的农场更糟糕。1932年,银行体系中的问题主导着短期货币市场年,随着银行希望节约现金,谨慎谨慎,这场危机在1932年下半年几乎停止了银行贷款.

The great New York City banks had become the liquidity reserve for the rest of the financial system. Corporations and institutions which feared that their deposits would be tied up in closed domestic banks transferred deposits to New York. Regional banks built up their liquid assets by increasing interbank deposits with New York, so when the outflow from New York banks occurred it essentially represented the end of capitalism as we know it. In July 1932, it seemed as though the capitalist system had shut down, government was paralyzed and anarchy was brewing.

伟大的纽约市银行已经成为金融体系其余部分的流动性储备。公司和机构担心其存款将被封闭的国内银行将存款转移到纽约。区域性银行通过增加与纽约的同业存款来建立流动资产,因此当纽约银行流出的时候,基本上代表着资本主义的结束。1932年7月,似乎资本主义制度已经关闭,政府瘫痪,无政府状态正在酝酿中

On an otherwise un-eventful Friday – July 8, 1932 – the stock market bottomed Going into its final low, volume was very low. Most of the speculative positions had been wiped out by that time. Understandably, risk premiums were extremely high.

在其他不幸的星期五 - 1932年7月8日 - 股市触底进入最后的低点,数量非常低。当时大部分的投机头寸已被消灭。可以理解,风险溢价极高

The lowest point for commodities prices was during the liquidity crisis in May and June, which was also the low point for stock and bond prices and for the economy. Interestingly, as the liquidity crisis worsened, stock and bond markets strengthened in the second half of 1932 The corporate bond market recovered in the third quarter as quickly as it had declined in the second quarter, in line with improvement in the stock market and modest recovery in the economy The Dow recovered in August and September to a peak of 80, which was almost double the low hit in July (see below)

商品价格最低点是5月和6月的流动性危机期间,也是股票和债券价格和经济的低点。有趣的是,随着流动性危机的恶化,股票和债券市场在1932年下半年得到加强年第三季度公司债券市场回升幅度较第二季度回落,符合股市及适度复苏在经济上道琼斯指数在8月和9月份回升至80点,高出7月份的低点几下(见下文)

During 1932, arguments over the war debts and reparations created a problem for confidence. As the December 1932 payment date approached, England and France petitioned the United States for a further extension of the moratorium on payments. The moratorium was not extended, so in December, France, Belgium, Hungary and Poland defaulted on their war debts. England paid its installment, as due, in gold.

在1932年期间,对战争债务和赔偿的争论引起了信心的问题。随着1932年12月付款日期的到来,英国和法国向美国提出请求,进一步延长暂停付款。暂停延期,所以在十二月份,法国,比利时,匈牙利和波兰也拖欠了债务。英国在黄金方面分期付款。

The situation in Germany was much worse. The policies of government had forced on Germany a severe deflation, which by the fall of 1932 had cut the standard of living by nearly 50%. As a result, political and social conflicts intensified. Polarity increased, and Communistic and Hitlerist groups gained popularity There were regular weekend street riots between Nazis and Communists in which deaths were frequent. In July, the Reich took over the government of Prussia and declared a state of emergency in Berlin, in September the military pushed the Republic to request the right to rearm, and the country’s finances appeared to be collapsing. German gold reserves continued to decline These circumstances led to Hitler’s victory in 1932.

德国的情况更糟。政府的政策迫使德国出现严重的通货紧缩,到1932年秋天,生活水平已经将生活水平降低了近50%。结果,政治和社会矛盾加剧。极地增加,共产主义和希特勒组织得到普及纳粹和共产党人之间经常发生周期性的街头骚乱,死亡人数很多。七月份,帝国接管了普鲁士政府,并在柏林宣布了紧急状态,9月份军方推动共和国要求重新布防,国家财政似乎正在崩溃。德国黄金储备继续下滑这些情况导致希特勒在1932年取得胜利。

Japan also became militaristic and invaded Manchuria in 1931 and Shanghai in 1932. Domestic and international conflicts increased around the world

日本也在1931年成为军国主义,入侵满洲,1932年上海。国内和国际冲突在全世界增加

There were opportunities in 1932 to make significant profits from the price movements in middle grade bonds.

1932年有机会从中年级债券的价格走势中获利。

For example, Australia’s bonds rose over 150% from their lowest 1931 price of $35; Finland’s bonds doubled inprice from a low of $34 in 1931 to a high of $68 in 1932; bonds of Argentina rose 92 1/2% from their 1931 lowprice; Japan’s rose by 72%; and Czechoslovakia’s rose by approximately 50%. Investors could have tripled their money in the bonds of Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Berlin between their low and high prices for 1931-32. Chile’s bonds traded between $15 and $3 1⁄2, Peru’s between $10 and $3, Bolivia’s between $10 and $3 1⁄4.

例如,澳大利亚的债券从1931年最低的35美元的价格上涨了150%以上;芬兰的债券价格从1931年的34美元低位到1932年的高达68美元;阿根廷的债券从1931年的低价上涨了92 1/2%;日本上涨了72%捷克斯洛伐克的涨幅约为50%。投资者在智利,秘鲁,玻利维亚,乌拉圭,南斯拉夫和柏林的债券可能将其资金增加了三倍,而这些债券的高低价格为1931-32。智利的债券交易在15美元到3美元之间,秘鲁在10美元到3美元之间,玻利维亚在10美元到3美元之间。

Western Europe’s bonds recovered from the 1931 currency crisis, and the yields on the best bonds declined to nearly as low as Aaa corporate bond yields. However, East European and South American bonds hit new low prices in 1932 as these parts of the world suffered such social and economic dislocations that even the most daring speculators were unwilling to bet on these bonds

西欧的债券从1931年的货币危机中恢复过来,而最佳债券的收益率下降到几乎与Aaa公司债券收益率一样低。然而,东欧和南美债券在1932年创下新低的价格,因为这些地区遭受了这样的社会和经济混乱,甚至大多数大胆的投机者都不愿意赌这些债券。

The gold drain also stopped, and foreign funds began to return to the United States. Foreign optimism improved considerably, especially in England, Germany, France and Australia. A League of Nations survey on the world economy found cautious optimism in most countries.

黄金流失也停止了,外资开始回到美国。外国乐观情绪大大改善,特别是在英国,德国,法国和澳大利亚。国际联盟对世界经济的调查发现,大多数国家都认为是乐观的。

Why did the stock market bottom in early July? There was not much big news to bring it about. On July 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt was nominated at the Democratic National Convention, but this was no great surprise. The Wall Street Journal attributed the rally to a cessation of gold outflows, rumors of foreign buying, a general rise in commodity prices, and the approval of a railroad merger. Time magazine pointed to the rally in commodities, which was the single biggest jump in across the board commodities since 1925, but the commodities eventually fell to new lows in November though the stock market held the July lows and never violated the 50 area again.

为什么股市在7月初下挫?没有什么大的消息来提出来。7月2日,富兰克林·罗斯福被提名为民主党全国大会,但这并不奇怪。“华尔街日报”归因于反弹,停止黄金流出,外国买家谣言,商品价格普遍上涨以及铁路合并的批准。时代杂志指出,商品涨势是自1925年以来全面上涨的大宗商品,但商品在11月份最终跌至新低,尽管股市持续7月低位,并未再次超过50个区域。

Short covering was clearly a factor behind this bull move. Cornered bears, fat with three years of profits, fought madly to cover their short positions. Much of the buying flowed from Europe into the States, which also pushed the dollar higher. European buying of U.S. securities, which was reported from many sources in July, was largely driven by a hedge against a fear of further devaluations of European currencies.

短仓明显是这场公牛背后的一个因素。胖胖的三年利润,疯狂地战胜了他们的空头。欧洲的大部分购买流入美国,这也使美元走高。7月来自许多消息来源的欧洲证券买卖主要受到欧元货币进一步贬值的冲击。

In August 1932, the CCC decided to lend on the collateral of raw materials. The Commodity Credit Corporation was set up by New York City banks in August 1932 at the urging of the then Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Eugene Meyer, to lend on the collateral of raw materials.

1932年8月,CCC决定借贷原材料。商品信贷公司由纽约市银行于1932年8月由当时的联邦储备委员会主席尤金·梅耶(Eugene Meyer)催促原材料抵押品设立。

There was also a strong corporate bond market rally, despite worsening economic conditions.

尽管经济状况恶化,但也有强劲的公司债券市场反弹。

Roosevelt was elected amid widespread brokerage commentary that his success would halt the economic recovery and provoke a new crisis in securities markets. The Federal Reserve halted its open market purchases after August. Bank problems were obviously accelerating as well. New York City suddenly plunged into a major crisis. The news was bad. The old adage that when a market declines on bullish news, it must mean that it’s a bear market and, conversely, when a market rallies on bearish news, it must be a bull market, proved true.

罗斯福在广泛的经纪人评论中当选,他的成功将阻止经济复苏,并引发证券市场的新危机。美联储在八月份之后停止开放市场采购。银行问题也明显加快。纽约市突然陷入重大危机。消息不好当市场在看涨的消息下降的时候,这个古老的格言就是说这是一个熊市,相反地,当一个市场在看空的消息上涨的时候,一定是一个牛市,这是真的。

Roosevelt’s campaign for the Presidency began in August with a strong anti-market tone, which added to the volatility of the market. Franklin Roosevelt opened his campaign with a nine-point speech focused solely on securities abuses and demanding federal control of stock and commodities exchanges. He criticized the Hoover Administration for the activities of 1929, for the activities of bank investment affiliates, for Federal Reserve policies, for foreign bond issues, and for stock market speculation

罗斯福的总统职务从8月份开始,反强烈的反市场态度加剧了市场的波动。富兰克林·罗斯福(Franklin Roosevelt)开始了一场九点讲话,专注于证券滥用和要求联邦控制股票和商品交易所。他批评了胡佛政府1929年的活动,银行投资关联公司的活动,美联储政策,外债债券和股市炒作。

Roosevelt also indicated that he favored a devaluation of the dollar.

罗斯福还表示,他赞成贬值美元。

Europeans began to sell the dollar dramatically when Roosevelt won the election, because he represented soft money to them.

当罗斯福赢得选举时,欧洲人开始大幅度出售美元,因为他们向他们表示软钱。

The stock market did not recover during the rest of the year because fear of Roosevelt’s success was widespread up to the November 8th election, and the reality of it did not engender investor confidence.

股市在今年余下时间没有恢复,因为担心罗斯福的成功普遍到11月8日的大选,而且现实并没有引起投资者的信心。

But to the average working man this election was reason for optimism. The Republicans were marked as the party for the rich and the Democrats emerged as the defender of the poor and working class. So while capitalists were scared, workers were hopeful.

但是对于一般工作人员来说,这次选举是乐观的理由。共和党人被列为富人的党,民主党成为穷人和工人阶级的捍卫者。所以当资本家害怕的时候,工人是有希望的。

On the eve before the elections, pressure from many sectors demanded that Roosevelt clarify his position about devaluation. He did. He pledged that he would not abandon the gold standard and conveyed that concerns he would devalue were not warranted. He was not the first nor the last government official to knowingly mislead the public regarding their willingness to support their currencies.

在选举前夕,许多部门的压力要求罗斯福澄清他对贬值的立场。他做到了他承诺说他不会放弃黄金标准,并表示他认为贬值的担忧是不值得的。他不是第一位也不是最后一位政府官员,故意误导公众是否愿意支持其货币。

Though very painful, the deleveraging was not devastating for everyone. Throughout the deleveraging, major companies except for railroads and investment companies didn’t default. Numerous industries did not have losses, and several even maintained their profit levels. Cigarette companies, can manufacturers, food, drug, grocery and variety store companies, and utilities all kept their net income at levels up to half their 1929 levels.

虽然非常痛苦,但去杠杆化对大家没有破坏性。在整个去杠杆化过程中,除铁路和投资公司以外的主要公司并未违约。许多行业没有亏损,几个行业甚至维持了利润水平。香烟公司,制造商,食品,药品,杂货和各种商店公司和公用事业公司都将其净收入保持在1929年的水平上。

In contrast, bonds of East European and South American governments fell to approximately 10% of par value. Many railroad bonds, too, had great losses, but among the major issues which lost their top credit ratings the decline was to approximately 40% of par. Only a small proportion of municipal bonds went into default.

相比之下,东欧和南美政府的债券下降到约10%的面值。许多铁路债券也有很大的损失,但在失去信用评级最高的主要问题之中,下降幅度达到标准普尔的40%左右。只有一小部分市政债券违约。