How EC works
  • Introduction
  • How the Economic Machine Works
    • How the Economic Machine Works: “A Transactions-Based Approach”
    • How the Market-Based System Works
    • The Template: The Three Big Forces
    • 1) Productivity Growth
    • 2) The Long-Term Debt Cycle
    • 3) The Short-Term Debt Cycle
  • Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
    • An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Deflationary Deleveragings
    • The Beautiful Deleveragings
    • The Ugly Inflationary Deleveraging
    • A Closer Look at Each
      • United States Depression and Reflation, 1930-1937
      • Japan Depression and Reflation, 1929-1936
      • UK Deleveraging, 1947-1969 UK Deleveraging,1947-1969
      • Japan Deleveraging, 1990-Present
      • US Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • The Recent Spain Deleveraging, 2008-Present
      • Germany’s Weimar Republic: 1918-23
    • US Deleveraging 1930s
      • Preface
      • Conditions in 1929 Leading up to the Crash
      • 1H1930
      • 2H1930
      • 1Q1931
      • 2Q1931
      • 3Q1931
      • 4Q1931
      • 1H1932
      • 2H1932
      • 1933
      • March 1933
      • 1934-1938
    • Weimar Republic Deleveraging 1920s
      • Overview
      • World War I Period 1914 – November 1918
      • Post-War Period November 1918 - December 1921
      • Hyperinflation
      • Second Half of 1922
      • 1923
      • Stabilization: From Late 1923 Onward
  • Productivity and Structural Reform: Why Countries Succeed & Fail, and What Should Be Done So Failing
    • Part 1: The Formula for Economic Succes
      • A Formula for Future Growth
      • Projections
      • Productivity and Competiveness Measures
      • Our Productivity Gauge
      • Value: What You Pay Versus What You Get
      • A Simple Measure of Cost: Per Capita Income
      • Education
      • Cost of a Productivity Adjusted Educated Worker
      • Working Hard
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Average Hours Worked
      • Working Hard Subcomponent: Demographics
      • Investing
      • Investing Subcomponents: Aggregate Fixed Investment Rates
      • Investing Subcomponents: Household Savings Rates
      • Culture Components
      • Self-Sufficiency
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic - Average Hours Worked
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Labor Force Participation
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Actual Vacation Time
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Work Ethic – Retirement Age as Percentage of Life Expectancy
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Government Expenditures
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Government Supports – Transfers to Households
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Unionization
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Ease of Hiring and Firing
      • Self-Sufficiency Subcomponent: Labor Market Rigidity – Minimum Wage as Percentage of Average Income
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponents: Observed Outcomes
      • Savoring Life Versus Achieving Subcomponent: Expressed Values
      • Innovation and Commercialism
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Outputs
      • Innovation and Commercialism Subcomponent: Inputs
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Rule of Law
      • Our Indebtedness Gauge
      • Debt and Debt Service Levels
      • Debt Flow
      • Monetary Policy
      • Summary Observations
    • Part 2: Economic Health Indices by Country, and the Prognoses That They Imply
      • India's Future Growth
      • China's Future Growth
      • Singapore's Future Growth
      • Mexico's Future Growth
      • Thailand's Future Growth
      • Argentina's Future Growth
      • Korea's Future Growth
      • Brazil's Future Growth
      • USA's Future Growth
      • United Kingdom's Future Growth
      • Russia's Future Growth
      • Australia's Future Growth
      • Canada's Future Growth
      • Germany's Future Growth
      • France's Future Growth
      • Hungary's Future Growth
      • Spain's Future Growth
      • Japan's Future Growth
      • Italy's Future Growth
      • Greece's Future Growth
      • Appendix: List of Statistics that Make Up Our Gauges
    • Part 3: The Rises and Declines of Economies Over the Last 500 Years
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  1. Debt Cycles: Leveragings & Deleveragings
  2. US Deleveraging 1930s

2Q1931

The Global Dollar Shortage Caused a Global Debt Crisis and a Strong Dollar 全球美元短缺导致全球债务危机和强势美元

Because lots of debts were denominated in dollars and the ability to earn dollars fell (because of reduced US imports), and because the ability to borrow dollars also fell as credit tightened, a global dollar shortage emerged. Of course, simultaneously there were lots of debts denominated in all currencies that couldn’t be paid, though dollars were especially short.

由于许多债务以美元计价,美元下跌(因美国进口减少)的能力下降,而因为信贷紧缩而借款的能力也下降,全球出现了美元短缺。当然,虽然美元特别短,但是所有货币都有很多债务是无法支付的

Time magazine reported that the president of the Chase National bank said, “The most serious of the adverse factors affecting business is the inability to obtain dollars in amounts sufficient both to make interest and amortization payments on their debts to us and to buy our exports in adequate volume. Cancellation or reduction of the inter-allied debts has been increasingly discussed throughout the world. This question has an importance far beyond the dollar magnitude of the debts involved...I am firmly convinced it would be good business for our Government to initiate a reduction in these debts at this time.”

“时代”杂志报道说,大通银行行长表示:“影响业务的最严重的不利因素是无法获得足够的美元,足以使债务的利息和摊销付给我们,并购买我们的出口 体积足够。取消或减少联盟债务在全世界越来越多地被讨论。这个问题的重要性远远超出了所涉债务的美元数量。我深信,我们政府在这个时候开始减少这些债务是件好事。“

The battle for world trade continued to lead to more trade barriers. With the trade war going on, foreign nations were unable to earn enough dollars to make payments on their outstanding loans The effects of the deleveraging were becoming severe in Canada which was a prominent trading partner. Canada imposed tariffs so stiff against U.S. Steel that U.S. owners were forced to sell off assets in Canada

世界贸易战争继续导致更多的贸易壁垒。随着贸易战争的进行,外国无法赚取足够的美元来支付其未偿还的贷款加拿大是一个突出的贸易伙伴,去杠杆化的影响正在变得越来越严重。加拿大对美国钢铁公司强加关税,美国的所有者被迫在加拿大出售资产

Fears over the banking situation were as alive in Europe as they were within the United States The Treaty of Versailles had isolated Germany and Austria, reducing their economic viability significantly. The practices of “printing” paper money which came about via deficit spending that was monetized created higher rates of inflation in Europe Germany was saddled with reparation payments it could not make. So, Germany was forced to borrow dollars in order to meet its obligations, but without a trade surplus it remained a credit risk.

对欧洲的情况的担忧在欧洲也是如此,因为它们在美国境内。“凡尔赛条约”已经隔离了德国和奥地利,大大降低了经济活力。通过货币化的赤字支出实现“印刷”纸币的做法造成了欧洲的通货膨胀率较高德国承受了无法偿还的赔偿。所以德国是为了履行其义务而被迫借款,但没有贸易顺差,它仍然是信用风险。

Austria was in no better shape The combined debts of Germany, Austria, Hungary and other Eastern European nations on a short-term floating basis appeared to slightly exceed $5 billion. This was a figure which was almost equal to the peak in money which had been lent on call within the stock market back in 1929. This figure did not include long-term bond issues, war debts or municipal issues which had been floated and held largely by private investors In other words, these debts were huge.

奥地利没有更好的形态德国,奥地利,匈牙利和其他东欧国家在短期浮动基础上的债务合计似乎略超过50亿美元。这是一个数字,几乎等于1929年以来在股市中借出的货币高峰。这个数字不包括长期债券问题,战争债务或主要浮动的市政问题换句话说,这些债务是巨大的。

The small international investor was attracted to German bonds by the favorable carry, but Germany had big reparations payments so it indirectly sent this money back to the governments of the people it was getting the money from. Germany couldn’t service its existing debt, most importantly its reparations, so it borrowed the money to do it. Many of the buyers of German bonds were foreign private citizens who were attracted by the higher interest rates (6% to 7%); the proceeds were paid to the foreign nations who demanded reparation payments. It was essentially a Ponzi scheme that transferred the earnings of the small investor into the hands of the German government through the medium of bonds, which transfers them back to the government that Germany owed it to. Germany wasn’t really servicing its debts, but as long as this continued, nobody questioned it. This “Ponzi scheme” approach to servicing debt has, throughout time, commonly existed and, more than any other factor, caused credit problems.

小国际投资者被德国债券吸引,而德国则有大量赔偿金,因此间接将这笔款项转回给其获得资金的人民币政府。德国不能服务其现有的债务,最重要的是它的赔偿,所以它借钱来做。德国债券的许多买家都是被高利率(6%至7%)吸引的外国私人公民;所得款项支付给要求赔偿的外国人。它基本上是一个庞氏骗局计划,将小投资者的收益转移到德国政府的手中,借债券转让给德国政府。德国并没有真正为其债务提供服务,但只要持续下去,没有人质疑。这种“庞氏骗局”的债务方式在整个时间内一直存在,而且超过任何其他因素造成了信贷问题。

On May 10, 1931, Germany and Austria signed a free trade agreement that was viewed as antagonistic by the French. The Bank of France, accompanied by many other French banks, presented short-term Austrian bills for redemption. This was the final straw which broke the back of the European economic system as repayments were impossible. Britain came to the aid of Austria, advancing 4.5 million pounds. The French responded by selling the pound through the liquidation of their sterling holdings, which caused a liquidity crisis, to get back at Britain.

1931年5月10日,德国和奥地利签署了一项被法国视为对抗的自由贸易协定。法国银行在许多其他法国银行的陪同下,提出了短期的奥地利法案来赎回。这是欧洲经济体系背后的最后一根稻草,因为偿还是不可能的。英国来自奥地利的援助,增加了450万英镑。法国人通过清算英镑来引发流动性危机来回报英国方面的回应。

The liquidity shortage caused bank runs in Austria. On May 13, 1931 riots broke out in front of Austria’s Credit- Anstalt bank, which was Austria’s largest bank On May 15, runs were reported throughout Hungary as well. On May 17, 1931 the Credit-Anstalt published its balance sheet and showed sharply reduced capital because of operating losses in almost 250 Austrian companies which it controlled.This triggered a run on its foreign deposits which threatened to exhaust Austria’s gold and foreign exchange reserves.

流动资金短缺导致奥地利银行运作。1931年5月13日,在奥地利最大的银行 - 奥地利信贷银行前面爆发了骚乱. 5月15日,匈牙利全境汇报了经营情况。1931年5月17日,信贷公司出版资产负债表,资本大幅减少,由于其控制的近250家奥地利公司的经营亏损.这引发了对外国存款的冲击,威胁到奥运黄金和外汇储备

Similar problems plagued Germany. In June Germany’s central bank, the Reichsbank, saw its reserves of gold and foreign exchange drop by one-third to the lowest level in five years. In an attempt to attract liquidity at the end of July, the Reichsbank raised its discount rate to 15% and its rate on collateralized loans to 20%. Bank runs continued in Germany so the German government took over the Dresdner Bank, the second largest in the nation. It did this by buying preferred shares, which was the popular way of governments buying interests in banks to help stabilize them. Sound familiar? Germany’s reserves continued to decline throughout 1931.

类似的问题困扰着德国。德国央行德意志银行6月德国央行看到黄金和外汇储备下降了五年来的最低水平三分之一。为了在七月底吸引流动资金,帝国银行将贴现率提高至15%,抵押贷款利率上调至20%。德国银行继续持续下去,德国政府接管了全国第二大德累斯顿银行。它通过购买优先股来做到这一点,这是政府在银行中购买兴趣以帮助稳定他们的流行方式。听起来很熟悉德国的储备在整个1931年持续下降

Hoover described the situations as follows: “The nations of Europe have not found peace. Hates and fears dominate their relations. War injuries have permitted no abatement. The multitude of small democracies created by The Treaty of Versailles have developed excessive nationalism. They have created a maze of trade barriers between each other...” The battlefront was forming along the lines of 1) socialism and capitalism within countries and 2) countries against other countries.

胡佛描述的情况如下:“欧洲国家没有找到和平。仇恨和恐惧主宰了他们的关系。战争伤害不允许减轻。“凡尔赛条约”创造的众多小民主国家发展了过度的民族主义。他们造成了彼此之间的贸易壁垒迷宫......“这个战场正在形成一个国家内的社会主义和资本主义,2)与其他国家相反的国家.

Running from Europe, investors’ money poured into the U.S., so U.S. interest rates fell. The Fed reduced the discount rate to 1.5% in hopes of making the dollar less attractive to investors. Britain had been losing gold to the United States as scared investors fled Britain and Europe in general The Central European states raised their interest rates in an attempt to attract foreign capital. This was then followed by foreign exchange controls so investors were not permitted to take money out of the country. This created a drastic side-effect – a halt in international trade Although no one officially went off the gold standard in May of 1931, since the exportation of capital was prohibited, no gold payments were made. So this had the same result as abandoning the gold standard by the Central European states.

从欧洲经营,投资者的钱涌入美国,所以美国的利率下降。美联储将贴现率降至1.5%,希望使美元对投资者的吸引力降低。英国一直因为害怕的投资者逃离英国和欧洲,一直在美国失去黄金中欧国家提高利率以吸引外资。其次是外汇管制,所以投资者不准从国外出钱。这造成了巨大的副作用 - 在国际贸易中停止了虽然1931年5月没有人正式脱售黄金标准,但由于资本的出口被禁止,所以没有黄金付款。所以与中欧各国放弃黄金标准的结果相同。

Global tensions worsened. In June of 1931, the European press began to attack the United States. They asserted that the economic policies of the U.S. were attracting the world’s gold, creating the flight from European stock markets and foreign exchange markets. U.S. gold reserves had climbed by $600 million despite the Fed’s cut in the discount rate as the flight to safety was too powerful to negate. Despite the deleveraging in the U.S., the U.S. was viewed by world investors as still the safest place at that point, supported by the dollar shortage, debt squeeze in Europe, as well as political concerns there

全球紧张局势恶化。1931年6月,欧洲新闻界开始袭击美国。他们声称,美国的经济政策吸引了世界黄金,创造了欧洲股市和外汇市场的航班。美国黄金储备上涨了6亿美元,尽管美联储削减贴现率,因为安全飞行太强大,无法否定。尽管在美国有去杠杆化,但是由于美元短缺,欧洲债务挤压以及政治担忧,世界投资者认为美国仍然是最安全的地方

As the second quarter of ’31 began, hoarding of gold continued to rise including in the US which contributed to reducing the velocity rate of money by 22% from the previous year. Gold became very attractive both in physical form as well as in gold stocks.

随着'31开始的第二季度,黄金的囤积继续上涨,包括在美国,这使得货币流动速度比上年下降了22%。黄金在物理形式和黄金股中都变得非常有吸引力。

On June 7, the German Finance Minister publicly stated that the Austrian banking crisis would spread to Germany in about 60 days in his opinion, so the panic began immediately. Virtually every German bank suffered runs and foreign banks began to pull credit seeking the immediate redemption of German trade bills and bankers’ acceptances.

6月7日,德国财政部长公开表示,奥地利银行业危机将在60天内扩大到德国,所以恐慌立即开始。几乎每个德国银行都遭受了流动,外国银行开始拉扯信贷,寻求立即赎回德国贸易账单和银行承兑汇票.

On June 19th, in an attempt to ease Germany’s debt problems, President Hoover proposed a one-year moratorium on Germany’s war debts, catching most political observers by surprise. The international reaction to the moratorium was favorable. In fact, commentators expected the moratorium was the first step toward restoring international finances, stimulating trade and ending the Depression. Stocks and commodities rose for several days in what became known as the “moratorium rally”.

6月19日,为了缓解德国的债务问题,胡佛总统提出暂停德国战债一年,令大多数政治观察家感到惊讶。国际对暂停的反应是有利的。事实上,评论家预计暂停是恢复国际财政,刺激贸易和结束大萧条的第一步。股票和商品上涨了几天,被称为“暂停反弹”

At the time (i.e., in mid-1931), there still was not a sense of crisis to produce stronger actions by the administration, as it was generally assumed the economy would recover and that the moves that occurred were adequate. Financial markets held up reasonably well through June. Governor Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York thought that the commercial banking system was stronger than ever because of its increased liquidity. No major industries appeared to be in danger of bankruptcy, and the U.S. economy appeared to be moving sideways.

当时(即1931年中期),行政当局仍然没有发生强硬的行动,因为一般认为经济会复苏,发生的举动是足够的。六月份金融市场稳中有升。纽约联邦储备银行行长哈里森认为,商业银行系统由于流动性的增加而比以往更强大。没有一个主要行业似乎有破产的危险,而美国的经济似乎正在出现转机

The stock market rose 13% in three weeks in the “moratorium rally” and was up 36% from June 1st at this point This was the biggest rally since the decline began and commodity prices soared as well, so confidence again returned.

“暂停反弹”三周内股市上涨13%,至6月1日以来涨幅达36%这是自下跌开始以来大涨,商品价格大幅上涨,信心再度回升。

Within a week of Hoover’s public announcement of his moratorium proposal, 15 governments had agreed with the plan “unconditionally!” The only important opponent was France who still held bitter resentment toward Germany. So, many people believed that the international debt problem was being managed.

在胡佛公布其暂停提案的一个星期内,有15个政府“无条件地”同意了这一计划。唯一重要的对手是法国,对德国仍然抱有不满。所以很多人认为国际债务问题正在得到管理

The chart below puts this rally in perspective. It conveys how seeming very big rallies at the time, and the big increases in confidence that accompanied them, were rather small when one steps back to put them in perspective. There was, and still is, a strong tendency for people – workers, investors and policymakers – to exaggerate the importance of relatively small things because they look big up close.

下图显示了这一反弹。它传达了当时看起来非常大的集会,随之而来的信心大大增加,当一个人退后进行观察时,却相当小。对于工人,投资者和政策制定者来说,还有一个强烈的倾向,夸大了相对较小的东西的重要性,因为它们看起来很大。

The international debt crisis continued during the moratorium rally. On July 11th, only five days after the moratorium was announced, the German government asked the United States to make further loans and to renegotiate reparations, because short-term investments were still being rapidly withdrawn from Germany. At the same time, the German stock exchanges were closed for Monday and Tuesday, and on Monday July 13th a nationwide bank holiday was declared in Germany. The German banking system was in chaos. Banks’ deposits shrank almost 30% in the year through June 30, 1931 and the unemployment rate soared. The government was threatened from both the left and the right as Communist riots broke out in many cities and Hitler threatened not to make German reparations payments.

暂停集会期间,国际债务危机持续。7月11日,暂停宣布暂停五天后,德国政府要求美国进一步贷款和重新谈判赔偿,因为短期投资仍在迅速从德国撤出。同时,德国证券交易所周一和周二关闭,7月13日星期一在德国宣布全国银行假期。德国的银行体系混乱。银行存款在一九三一年六月三十日的一年中下降近30%,失业率飙升。政府受到左右两边的威胁,因为许多城市的共产主义骚乱爆发,希特勒威胁说不要做德国的赔偿.

National governments were unable to finance their cash requirements in Germany, South America, Sweden, Hungary, Romania, and the United Kingdom, and virtually every South American country, except Argentina, defaulted on its foreign debts. Their bond prices dropped to a range between $5 and $25. Eastern Europe did not default during the year, but the prices of East European external debt issues dropped below $40 in anticipation of the problems ahead. Economic chaos caused political chaos as the battle for wealth between workers and capitalists intensified. Almost every country in South America had a problem with revolution, revolt or war,118 so investors, both from these countries and from elsewhere, moved their money elsewhere.

在德国,南美洲,瑞典,匈牙利,罗马尼亚和英国,各国政府都无法提供现金需求,实际上除了阿根廷,几乎每个南美国家都拖欠了外债。他们的债券价格下跌到5美元到25美元之间。东欧在这一年没有违约,但由于预期未来的问题,东欧对外债务的价格下跌到40美元以下。经济混乱造成政治混乱,因为工人和资本家之间的财富斗争加剧。南美洲几乎每个国家都有革命,反抗或战争的问题,所以这些国家和其他国家的投资者都将钱转移到别的地方。

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